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Abstract. 
 
Much of the literature and methodology of polarization emphasises party mean-
ideology points and/or party unity. Using this approach alone neglects a vital aspect of 
polarization; namely, remaining ideological variety and party disunity among both 
Democrats and Republicans today.  I measure both of these factors in a new 
methodology, the Independence (I)-Score. This methodology scores each legislator in a 
single figure on how often they vote against their party, and also how moderate they are 
ideologically. This blends elements of DW-NOMINATE and party unity scores into one 
scoring system, which emphasises those left behind by polarized parties, who are also 
under-represented in the literature. I argue that these independent outliers may yet play 
a key role in bridging the gap between the two parties, whilst the I-Score methodology 
finds their decline to be a crucial aspect of polarization and demonstrates why. This is a 
fresh take on the history and problems of polarization, particularly because it considers 
the vital (if not numerically large) groups of moderates who still remain in Congress. In 
a time when intra-party debates are increasingly important, the I-Score provides a new 
take on polarization to supplement the use of one-dimension, left-right party-average 
points. 
In Chapter One I provide an overview of the polarization literature to date. In 
Chapter Two I survey the state of party heterogeneity and ideological variety in the 110
th
 
Congress. In Chapter Three I consider the endangered and numerically weak groups 
which ‘modify’ their party behaviour and provide some much needed high I-Scores, I 
assess how far these groups alleviate polarization. Finally, in Chapter Four, I conclude 
with an analysis of three issues which demonstrate how polarization works on typical 
domestic themes, whilst breaking down along non-party lines on national security. I also 
suggest further refinements for the I-Score method, and provide ideas for its future use. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Literature Review. 
 
Chapter Abstract 
This chapter will provide an overview of the literature on polarization in American 
politics, to situate my research against the broader discussion and debate. The literature 
review will begin by discussing different definitions of ‘polarization’ and consider how 
definitions of ‘polarization’ inform the academic debate and its content. I will consider 
the conditions necessary for Congress to be called ‘polarized’ and then synthesize a 
definition of ‘polarization’ from the literature. The review will consider the ongoing 
dispute over whether polarization even exists at all at the mass level, identify key debates 
in the field over the causes and consequence of elite-level polarization, assess different 
explanations for polarized politics in Congress today and acknowledge the relationship 
between mass ideology (or lack of it) and the legislature. Whilst this paper is concerned 
with elite polarization, theories of mass polarization are considered here too, for the 
reason that elite behaviour and ideology cannot be entirely insulated from mass opinion 
and public partisan affiliation. 
This chapter serves as the backdrop to my own research and in this literature review I 
will identify the space where my methodology and focus make an original contribution to 
the field. This chapter will note key research methodologies and how my methodology 
can supplement them.  
 
What is ‘Polarization’, and who is ‘Polarized’? 
Hetherington writes that much of the academic debate over polarization ‘can be understood as 
a question of definition.’1  In any piece of academic writing it is clearly vital to define one’s terms, but 
in the study of polarization failing to define what is meant from the outset can lead to a wildly 
different discussion from other research on ostensibly similar topics. Without defining the terms now 
it would be impossible to discuss where polarization comes from, what it looks like or indeed if it 
actually exists at all. Even on the definition of this vital term, consensus among scholars is lacking. 
                                                          
 
1
 Hetherington, ‘Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective’ in British Journal of Political Science Vol. 
39, Issue 2 (April 2009), p. 415. 
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Because different academics use the word polarization to describe different political strata within 
American society, debate over what the word means seeps into discussion of whether polarization 
exists and, if it does, who we consider to be polarized. For this reason it would be artificial to draw a 
line between the definition of polarization and the ostensibly separate debate over who we consider to 
be polarized or where polarization exists, so I will therefore review both questions here in one 
discussion.  
Firstly then, what does polarization mean? A number of different definitions have been 
offered by academics but Poole and Rosenthal, in their 1984 paper ‘The Polarization of American 
Politics’ offer a comprehensive definition. In their abstract they name two conditions which we can 
take here as their definition of what polarization entails, and what it means. The first condition is that 
‘elected officials in the United States appear to represent relatively extreme support coalitions rather 
than the interests of middle-of-the-road voters.’ The second is that ‘there is now competition between 
equally balanced but extreme support coalitions throughout most of the United States.’2 So these two 
factors, the relative extremism of elite-level representatives (congressmen and senators) when 
compared to the centre, and the existence of ‘extreme support coalitions’ in the mass public, equate in 
Poole and Rosenthal’s view, to a polarized political-electoral system. In their later book, Congress: A 
Political-Economic History of Roll 
Call Voting, Poole and Rosenthal 
identify a third condition of 
polarization, that ‘for parties to be 
polarized they must be far apart on 
policy issues, and the party 
members must be tightly distributed 
around the party mean.’ 3  Later 
debates fall largely within the 
bounds of this definition; in any 
case it is a useful starting point 
from which to review subsequent 
literature. I will consider the first of 
these two propositions below, in 
terms of overlap between the two 
                                                          
 
2
 Poole and Rosenthal, ‘The Polarization of American Politics’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, (Nov, 
1984), p. 1061. 
3
 Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, (Oxford, 1997), p. 81.  
Figure 1.1- Polarization in 90
th
, 100
th
, and 110
th
 Congresses. 
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parties in Congress. However, the distribution of congressmen and senators around a party mean is 
particularly relevant to this thesis, as I consider that ‘[tight] distribution’ from the perspective of 
voting independence, rather than as an ideological mean point. 
Poole and Rosenthal have identified what we might call the “diagnostic criteria” for 
polarization, but what level of partisan division is outright polarization, with all of the negative 
connotations that implies, rather than the normatively appropriate debate of a functioning democracy? 
Poole and Rosenthal discuss the concept of ‘overlap’ between the two parties and establish the 
reasonable criteria that, ‘if parties have a high degree of overlap- with the left wing of the 
“conservative” party overlapping the right wing of the “liberal” party- then they are less polarized 
than if they have no overlap whatsoever.’4 So, for Poole and Rosenthal, less overlap between parties 
means more polarization. Between 1997, when their book was published, and the 110
th
 Congress 
(which is the subject of Chapter Two), the overlap between the parties had shrunk away rapidly. 
Figure 1.1
5
 demonstrates the receding common ground between Democrats and Republicans in both 
the House and the Senate. By 2011 the National Journal reported that ‘for only the second time since 
1982… every Senate Democrat compiled a voting record more liberal than every Senate Republican- 
and every Senate Republican compiled a voting record more conservative than every Senate 
Democrat.’ 6  Therefore American politics today, at the elite-level, certainly meets Poole and 
Rosenthal’s criteria of having no ideological overlap. So, the elite have no ideological cross-over 
(Figure 1.1), but what of the ‘equally balanced but extreme…coalitions throughout most of the United 
States’7 required for polarization? Is this condition also met, are the American public also polarized?  
Whilst this paper is explicitly focused on elite-level polarization, disputes in the literature 
over whether the electorate is polarized must be considered as well. This also leads into the question 
of whether a polarized elite has radicalised the electorate, or whether the inverse is true and an 
increasingly partisan mass public has elected more and more ideological candidates. Of course the 
relationship need not be that explicit, and as we get into the literature more nuanced explanations are 
reviewed. 
So, when we speak of a ‘polarized’ America who are we actually talking about? Here, we find 
that establishing a definition seeps into the debate as even the terminology of polarization is 
contested. In recent years a school of thought advocated by Morris Fiorina, dubbed the ‘elite theory of 
                                                          
 
4
 Poole and Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, (Oxford, 1997), p. 81. 
5
 Carroll et al., ‘Who is More Liberal, Senator Obama or Senator Clinton?’ referenced in J. A. Thomson, ‘A 
House Divided/ Polarization and Its Effect’ from RAND Corporation (2010, California), p. 9.  
6
 Brownstein, ‘Pulling Apart’ in National Journal, (24th February, 2011).  
7
 Poole and Rosenthal, ‘The Polarization of American Politics’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, (Nov, 
1984), p. 1061. 
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polarization’8 by critic Alan Abramowitz, has conceptualised an America split not into ‘red’ and 
blue,’ but into two, distinct political classes. The first of these two classes are the aforementioned 
‘elite.’ This group is comprised of elected officials like congressmen and senators, (our subject), as 
well as party activists (and arguably, to a lesser extent, primary voters). The second category or strata 
is the vast ‘silent majority’9 of “ordinary” Americans, (or the “mass”/”mass public”).  
Fiorina’s argument is that most ordinary Americans do not live overtly political lives, nor do 
they view events from a particularly ideological worldview, so most Americans are not radical or 
polarized.
10
 They are essentially moderate and ‘the great majority of the American citizenry rejects 
extreme positions.’11 To demonstrate this Fiorina et al. discuss numerous examples in Culture War?, 
from social issues like gay marriage
12
 and abortion,
13
 to show that, ‘rather than adhere to a bright-line 
principle, Americans once again revealed their pragmatic mentality, preferring to make decisions on a 
case-by-case basis.’14 Levendusky and Pope use a different methodology, finding ‘that there is only 
limited polarization and a good deal of common ground-between red states and blue states,’15 echoing 
what Fiorina et al. had described. It is promising for their model that a different methodology has 
arrived at the same (or similar) conclusions.  
Back in the 1960s, ‘the authors of The American Voter partially blame cognitive limitations 
for Americans’ lack of ideological sophistication’16 and this is an argument which many academics 
maintain today, indeed Abramowitz calls it the ‘conventional wisdom’ of ‘students of American 
political science.’17  Hetherington argues that ‘although scales of elite and mass opinion are not 
directly comparable, we should expect that mass preferences will tend to bunch closer to the middle 
than those of elites because of the massive differences in ideological sophistication [between the elites 
and the mass public].’18 In other words, we should anticipate public opinion to be more centrist than 
elite (or in this case, congressional) opinion. However Levendusky questions the role of voter 
                                                          
 
8
 Abramowitz and Fiorina, ‘America’s Polarized Public: A Reply to Fiorina’ in Polarized or Sorted? Just 
What’s Wrong With Our Politics, Anyway? From The American Interest (11th  March, 2013). 
9
 This phrase of the 1968 Nixon campaign still has remarkable currency. 
10
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011). 
11
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 93. 
12
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), Chapter 6. 
13
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), Chapter 5. 
14
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 159. 
15
 Levendusky and Pope, ‘Red States vs. Blue States: Going Beyond the Mean’ in The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 75, No.2, (Summer, 2011), p. 227. 
16
 Hetherington, ‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ in American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 621. 
17
 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy, (Yale, 
2010), p. 15. 
18
 Hetherington, ‘Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective’ in British Journal of Political Science Vol. 
39, Issue 2 (April 2009), p. 433 
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knowledge and argues that of all the ‘numerous theories [which] argue that voters with more 
information behave fundamentally differently from those with less…nearly all of the empirical 
support for these theories… comes from cross-sectional data. As a result, these findings are typically 
biased, and systematically overstate the effect of information on behaviour.’19 Levendusky finds that 
‘[the adjustments made in his study] cause the estimated effect of information to shrink dramatically, 
often falling to one-half to one-quarter of its former size.’20  
Fiorina, and those who follow or develop his line of argument (such as Levendusky,
21
 Abrams 
and Pope),
22
 argue that ‘[America is] a nation whose people share a great deal of common ground’23 
but whose small class of elite, elected officials have become more divided ‘than at any time since the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’ 24  For Fiorina, the view that America is a ‘50:50 
nation’25 made up of two irreconcilable ‘red’ and ‘blue’ voting blocks, is a falsehood and the product 
of Americans being presented with increasingly radical, polarized choices at elections by their elected 
elite.
26
 In Fiorina’s view, to speak of a polarized American public is to ignore that ‘increased [elite] 
polarization of electoral choices results entirely from movement by the candidates, not the voters.’27 
In other words, as elites have radicalised (spurred on by increasingly radical, ideological
28
 primary 
voters who ‘favour more ideologically extreme candidates’)29 the American public have been forced 
to choose between increasingly sharply divided alternatives. The subsequent use of polling and voting 
data by political scientists to construct the red state/blue state-divided America thesis has led to the 
logical fallacy that voters who cast their ballot for an extremely ideological Republican (in the 
absence of a moderate alternative in the general election) are considered to be as partisan as their 
voting choice. Fiorina believes this recurrent methodological error has led to significant 
                                                          
 
19
 Levendusky, ‘Rethinking the Role of Political Information’ in The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 1, 
(Spring, 2011), p. 42.  
20
 Levendusky, ‘Rethinking the Role of Political Information’ in The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 1, 
(Spring, 2011), p. 42. 
21
 Levendusky, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans, 
(Chicago, 2009). 
22
 Fiorina, Abrams and Pope, ‘Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings’ in The 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 2, (April, 2008), p. 556.  
23
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. xii.  
24
 Haberlig, Hetherington and Larson, ‘The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of 
Congressional Parties’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 68, No. 4, (November, 2006), p. 992. 
25
 ‘On His High Horse’, The Economist, November 9th 2002 cited in  Fiorina, Abrams and Pope in Culture War? 
The Myth of a Polarized America 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011) p.4. 
26
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 25. 
27
 Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 29. 
28
 Hirano, Snyder and Ting, ‘Distributive Politics with Primaries’ in The Journal of Politics Vol. 71, No. 4, 
(October, 2009), p. 1467.  
29
 Brady. Han and Pope, ‘Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?’ 
in Legislative Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 1, (February, 2007), p. 79. 
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misunderstanding of politics and mass ideology. Perhaps Bafumi and Shapiro fall into this trap with 
their article on the ‘New Partisan Voter’ in which they cite the ‘visible strength of partisan voting’30 
as evidence for a newly ideological American electorate, in contrast from that described in The 
American Voter. In turn this exciting mythology of split and division has been perpetuated by the 
media, whose ‘culture war frame fits the news values of journalists who cover American politics’ and 
who seek ‘conflict [which is] high in news value.’31 The extreme left/right fringes of the very partisan 
media are often identified as generators of ideological, polarizing content, but Levendusky points out 
that ‘like-minded media should primarily polarize those who want to watch it.’32 Such outlets are 
unlikely to change minds then, but simply to reinforce opinions and ideological frames for more 
partisan voters. Nonetheless, the existence of outlets like Fox News and MSNBC is pointed to 
regularly as one reason for polarization.
33,34,35,36
 In any event, with the mainstream, relatively centrist, 
moderate media, as DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson note, ‘polarization, fragmentation and division have 
become familiar themes in American political discourse.’37  
So, in Fiorina’s view, polarization only applies to this small cabal of elected officials and 
party activists, whom he emphatically reminds us, ‘are not normal people’ 38 in terms of their 
ideological sophistication. For Fiorina and sympathetic thinkers, this group cannot be used as an 
indicator of mass politics in the way that it has been before. It seems that Congress’ approval rating 
backs up Fiorina’s point. As the gap between the parties has widened over time39 (which fits with 
Poole and Rosenthal’s definition of polarization) Congressional approval has sunk.40  Clearly the 
debate is already bleeding into the definition, which perhaps ought to be a relatively easy foundation 
to establish. In the study of polarization even the definition is subject to fundamental disagreements. 
                                                          
 
30
 Bafumi and Shapiro, ‘A New Partisan Voter’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 1, (January, 2009), p. 1. 
31
 Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 3. 
32
 Levendusky, How Partisan Media Polarize America, (Chicago, 2013), p. 79.  
33
 DellaVigna and Kaplan, ‘The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting’ in The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 122, No. 3, (August, 2007). 
34
 Morris and Francia, ‘Cable News, Public Opinion, and the 2004 Party Conventions’ in Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, (December, 2010). 
35
 Arceneaux, Johnson and Murphy, ‘Polarized Political Communication, Oppositional Media Hostility, and 
Selective Exposure’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 74, No. 1, (January, 2012). 
36
 Groeling, ‘Who’s the Fairest of them All? An Empirical Test for Partisan Bias on ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox 
News’ in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 4, (December 2008). 
37
 DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, ‘Have Americans’ Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?’ in American 
Journal of Sociology, (Chicago, 1996), p. 690. 
38
 Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), p. 16. 
39
 See Figure 1.1. 
40
 Saad, ‘Congress’ Job Approval Ratings Grow More Polarized/ Democrats Approve; Republicans and 
Independents increasingly disapprove’ in Gallup Politics, (20th August 2009) taken from 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122399/congress-job-approval-ratings-grow-polarized.aspx accessed on 30th March 
2014. 
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Fiorina’s ideas will be returned to again, but for now his view that polarization only applies to a small 
elite is the important point to take away from the discussion; as well as his identification of several 
self-reinforcing factors that cause and then strengthen the elite-level ideological divide, and the (in his 
view) common misconception that the American public are divided. These factors include the 
polarized elite and the media narrative of polarization, which the press has a clear self-interest in 
promoting; polarized politics is much more “exciting” than moderate, centrist, consensus politics. 
For Abramowitz, author of The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization and 
American Democracy, Fiorina’s argument is a non-starter because of ‘important changes in American 
society such as increasing racial and ethnic diversity, the decline of the traditional family and growing 
economic inequality’41 which have all contributed to a stark division between the ‘orthodox’ and 
‘progressive’ Americas identified by James Davison Hunter in Culture Wars: The Struggle To Define 
America.
42
 For Abramowitz, the distinction between the masses and the elite made by Fiorina and 
other proponents of “elite polarization” ‘absolves the public of any responsibility for the polarized 
state of our nation’s politics’43 and ignores ‘the evidence … that states have become much more 
sharply divided along party lines since the 1960s: red states have been getting redder while blue states 
have been getting bluer. While the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections were highly competitive at 
the national level, the large majority of states were not competitive.’44 The use of state results in 
presidential elections as evidence for polarization is dealt with in the next section of this chapter, 
under the topic of re-alignment. Suffice to say for now that it has its limitations. For the moment the 
difference between seeing polarization as an elite phenomenon (Fiorina), or viewing polarization as 
both a mass and elite phenomenon (Abramowitz) is the important dispute to consider. The nature of 
this paper means it will naturally be concerned with elite polarization, but the interaction between the 
elite and the mass, and the question of who radicalises whom, is a recurrent theme of the literature.  
One of the questions that Hetherington raises is the ‘salience’45 of issues. If Americans are in 
a 50:50 divide on an issue (for instance gay marriage) then they may appear polarized, but if most 
only rank gay marriage very low on their list of priorities, then are they really as deeply divided as it 
appears? Americans consistently rate gay marriage very low on their list of priorities, even if 
                                                          
 
41
 Abramowitz and Fiorina, ‘America’s Polarized Public: A Reply to Fiorina’ in Polarized or Sorted? Just 
What’s Wrong With Our Politics, Anyway? From The American Interest (11th  March, 2013). 
42
 Fiorina, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011), pp. 2-3. 
43
 Abramowitz and Fiorina, ‘America’s Polarized Public: A Reply to Fiorina’ in Polarized or Sorted? Just 
What’s Wrong With Our Politics, Anyway? From The American Interest (11th  March, 2013). 
44
 Abramowitz and Saunders, ‘Is Polarization a Myth?’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 2 (April 2008), 
p. 548. 
45
 Hetherington, ‘Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective’ in British Journal of Political Science 
Vol. 39, Issue 2 (April 2009), p. 436. 
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‘progressive’ and ‘orthodox’ America are in disagreement. So can we really call them polarized? This 
is the argument advanced by Fiorina.
46
 For this reason, Hetherington suggests ‘another way to 
consider the relative degree of polarization caused by an issue is as the product of distance between 
groups and the salience of the issue.’ 47  Salience must factor into a reasonable definition of 
polarization because ‘salience helps to determine the weight that opinions carry.’ 48 
Another dispute over the definition of polarization is the literalist reading of the word as 
‘polar’-ization. This is a definition which Hetherington critiqued on the following grounds; ‘the 
DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson definition [of polarization as polar-ization] also suffers from the fact 
that there is no agreed amount of distance between groups necessary for popular polarization to exist. 
Do their preferences, on a scale from 0 to 100, need to cluster around 90 and 10, 70 and 30, or 
something else? Can groups be polarized if they are far apart but are on the same side of the 
midpoint?’49 Do Americans have to occupy literally ‘polar’ opposite views to be labelled ‘polarized’? 
In that case not even Congress could be described as polarized, which seems incongruent with the 
widely accepted evidence
50
 that it is. Because of this, setting the threshold for polarization at a literal 
grouping of parties around the two ideological poles is an unreasonable standard, and I accept the 
more commonly held view (put forward by Poole and Rosenthal) that the required ideological 
difference between party elites be set at no (or extremely little) overlap; which is currently the case.  
Brewer, Mariani and Stonecash offer an alternative
51
 definition of polarization which leads 
well into the research angle taken here, and they identify four potential measures/conditions of 
polarization. They write that, ‘polarization may be measured as the percentage of party votes 
(majorities of each party voting against each other), party cohesion (the percentage of members voting 
with their party), liberal-conservative DW-Nominate voting scores, or the average ratings of an 
interest group such as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA).’ 52  For my purposes their 
acknowledgement of ‘party cohesion’, which is also scored as ‘party unity’, is crucial. Much of the 
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literature to date focuses on the divide between the average scores of the two parties;
53
 my research 
aims to supplement this by investigating the inverse of party unity scores within the two parties; what 
I term ‘Independence Scores’ (or I-Scores). So including party cohesion/unity as Brewer, Mariana and 
Stonecash do is very important. At what threshold then, does a party become united enough to be 
considered ‘polarized’ against its rival (and also homogenous) party? If a party only votes cohesively 
70% of the time, and/or has regular defections and a large internal split between 
mavericks/moderates/ideologues/interventionists (as is the case in the modern GOP) then can we 
really describe it, on the basis of its average DW-NOMINATE score, as polarized? Even if the two 
parties have no ideological overlap on any measure (such as the Poole and Rosenthal scores), there 
may still be some ideological variety which is hidden by simply considering aggregate party scores, 
which much of the literature on polarization does. This is why my scoring system, which I introduce 
fully in Chapter Two, measures independence (or party dis-unity) to examine the pockets of 
ideological variety within the parties. These clusters may be missed if the study of polarization 
focuses on mean party positions. To consider whether Congress is polarized according to the 
definitions of Poole and Rosenthal, or Brewer et al, investigations of party unity are essential. The 
literature does consider this, and various party unity scores exist,
54,55,56
 but by considering it from 
another angle, from party disunity, we can focus on the (once significant yet still important) minority 
who regularly break party ranks. By focusing on these independent minorities within the two parties, 
we can explore how the broader causes of polarization set out throughout this chapter have affected 
them, and in turn how they modify the behaviour and position of their party mean (if at all). This 
points us towards later discussion of whether these independent clusters have any hope of breaking 
the gridlock in the near future. Average or mean scores for legislators, such as the DW-NOMINATE 
series can obscure some relevant details. For instance, a hypothetical Republican legislator may be 
extremely conservative, but moderate on one or two issues. His average DW-NOMINATE position 
could then place him on the far right, obscuring his other moderate views. We might then find that he 
votes with Democrats on some issues, which would be at odds with his DW-NOMINATE position on 
the far end of the right wing. These aggregate legislator scores are then accumulated to derive party 
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mean points, which will hide some of this detail and on an even larger scale, particularly because 
when showing differences between mean party scores the second dimension sometimes used in 
plotting votes or chambers with DW-NOMINATE is lost and the data is “flattened” to produce a left-
right spectrum only.
57
 The DW-NOMINATE series is of immense value to political scientists, but 
because of the way these average scores stack and the dimension is lost, the mean points cannot show 
us the whole picture. Indeed Poole and Rosenthal write that the ‘second dimension is no longer 
important’.58 In Chapter Four I argue that a second dimension (libertarian-authoritarian) is in-fact 
increasingly salient. The I-Score contributes to the literature by considering polarization through the 
prism of legislator disloyalty and independence, rather than ideological average points on a ‘liberal-
conservative’59 scale. Though I do consider I-Score average points, this is primarily to demonstrate 
that party heterogeneity still exists rather to make broader arguments about the raw distance between 
the two parties. Party disunity is not a well-developed part of the contemporary polarization literature, 
largely because party unity and polarization are so dominant in US politics today. However, as the I-
Score analysis shows, ideological variety (as a function of party disunity) still exists. The other 
advantage of the I-Score is that it is firmly grounded in, and derived from, “real-world” votes (and 
voting patterns); whereas much of the literature based on DW-NOMINATE has been criticised for not 
‘convert[ing] the estimated [DW-NOMINATE] coefficients into a quantity that maps directly into 
real-world voting behaviour’. 60 The I-Score aims to complement what DW-NOMINATE tells us 
about relative party distance by analysing intra-party factions and identifying specific groups, regions 
and caucuses that drive or decrease these distances, thus effecting the gulf between parties and 
mitigating or exacerbating the extent of polarization. How significant are these moderators?
61
 
Some of the main debates within the definition of polarization can be summarised as follows. 
When we say American politics is polarized do we mean American voters are irreconcilably split or 
do we mean American leaders have no middle ground between them in Congress? When we say the 
‘elite’ are polarized from each-other do we include congressmen and activists in the same category, or 
do elected officials constitute an elite within an elite? When we use the word ‘polarization’ do we just 
mean ‘have strong disagreements’ or do we mean have totally incompatible and unsympathetic 
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worldviews? When we say ‘polarization’ do we mean a literal -50 to +50 split on the left-right 
spectrum; in which case how do we factor emerging libertarian-authoritarian debates like those over 
state surveillance? And most importantly for this research, what level of internal party cohesion must 
be achieved for parties to be polarized? Must parties be homogenous on all issues, and when can we 
safely take average mean ideology points as evidence for polarization? The methodology I have 
developed here, the I-Score, will test how united the parties actually are and consider the outliers 
which resist the parliamentary-style conformity of polarization. For the purposes of this research I 
accept an elite-level definition of polarization. There is an overwhelming academic consensus that the 
American elite is polarized.
62
 Within this consensus other questions remain, like whether Congress is 
the most polarized it has ever been, or whether it is simply the most polarized it has been in a long 
time. Hetherington, for instance, argues for the latter; ‘the stakes in 1860 were much higher than they 
are in the early twenty-first century. Then, the republic itself was in grave peril. Today, feelings run 
deep, but cross-party compromises still occur regularly, and, even if they ceased, the future of the 
nation would not hang in the balance.’63  Whether or not the civil war is a reasonable base-line for 
comparison, it is clear that spikes in partisanship are historically common. ‘Although elites polarized 
by party may seem new because the post-Second World War era was atypically consensual, it is more 
the norm.’64 Despite their other disagreements a polarized elite is a view common to both Fiorina and 
Abramowitz; whilst they both dispute mass polarization they agree about the elite. I  am not 
convinced by the literalist reading of ‘polar’-ization and accept that given the two parties now have no 
overlap in Congress at all,
65
 we can call them ‘polarized’ and indeed argue it would be reasonable to 
use that term even if there were some minute, surviving space of consensus. Quantitative arguments to 
one side, other factors like the highly toxic rhetoric used in American public life (one of the most 
egregious moments perhaps being Congressman Joe Wilson (R-SC) heckling President Obama during 
the State of the Union), mean that polarization is a reasonable and useful term of analysis. To argue 
for a literal ‘polar’-ization definition seems to be a semantic debate and a reasonable definition of the 
term need not be contingent upon it.  
Despite lively disagreements over what polarization means and who it describes, some 
conclusions can be drawn from the literature and the evidence. Firstly, American politicians are more 
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divided today than they have been in a generation
66
 and both ‘Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress are becoming increasingly ideological.’67 Secondly, most American voters are not closely 
enough involved in politics to frame their decisions ideologically;
68
 as Hetherington puts it, ‘…a 
relatively small percentage of Americans will have the cognitive ability and/or the political certainty 
to cluster towards the poles of a distribution.’69 That said, as Fiorina argues, Americans do make 
pragmatic, non-ideological judgements along the lines described by Alvarez and Brehm; ‘most 
[survey] respondents have many preferences, but… these preferences vary over policy areas.’70 So, 
whilst Americans make political judgements, most Americans do not make ideological decisions. 
They respond to issues on a case-by-case basis. However, in an increasingly charged elite 
environment information cues from Congressmen and Senators (and other elected officials for that 
matter)
71
 may increasingly influence mass opinion,
72
  and voters will likely respond to elite cues.
73
 
Therefore an increasing polarization in the American mass public is possible, if in no other way than 
through the radicalisation of their electoral choices. The final common conclusions we can draw is 
that Congress is divided now in such an extreme way that virtually no middle ground exists between 
the two parties.
74
 Therefore, my working definition of polarization (drawn from a synthesis of the 
literature) is an elite with little-to-no ideological overlap in Congress. The elite distorts its issue 
priorities, promoting (for instance) social issues despite the fact they have little salience with the 
public.
 75
 Elections are characterised by polarized electoral choices for voters. Whilst the public do not 
have the ideological frame of the elite and activist strata, the potential for mass polarization exists, 
should these conditions continue (given the power of elite opinion to shape the mass public’s 
ideological preferences). Finally, and most crucially in the context of this paper, party unity is a 
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contingent part of polarization. It is identified by Poole and Rosenthal’s data as a condition of 
polarization and Clinton, Katznelson and Lapinski use DW-NOMINATE to show a ‘very strong 
relationship’76 between party unity and the level of polarization. The flip side of that party unity, 
legislator independence and party disunity, is at the heart of this thesis. This research places the 
minority of relatively disloyal, independent-voting legislators at the heart of the study, to explore the 
aspects of polarization which are less well developed (or omitted) in the broader literature. Congress 
at the present time meets all of the requirements of polarization drawn out from the literature here, but 
the last point on party unity scores and their inverse, what I call independence (I-)Scores, is the aspect 
of the debate this paper will primarily concern itself with. As I (and much of the extant literature) 
identify the increase in party unity with the rise of polarization, a review of the literature of 
polarization is almost synonymous with a review of the literature on party unity. 
 
Realignment and ‘sorting’. 
Having established a definition, and set out the boundaries of the debate in the literature, I 
will now consider some of the causal factors of polarization identified by academics.  
At the macro-level, large geopolitical changes coming out of the Civil Rights era have been 
singled
77
 out as the primary reason for the ‘ideologically driven’78 ‘partisan sort’79 which saw southern 
conservatives move into the Republican Party and northern liberals defect to the Democratic Party. 
The effect of this has been that, ‘Republican gains in the South and the diminished influence of 
Northern moderates have made the Republican Party more conservative and the loss of Southern 
conservatives has made the Democratic Party more dominated by Northern and Western liberals.’80 
This change in the caucus/conference membership has filtered into congressional leadership, who are 
increasingly drawn from the more extreme wings of the ideological spectrum, as both parties re-align 
geographically, demographically and philosophically.
81
 Two primary explanations of this exist, 
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realignment and sorting. Realignment emphasises changes in the electoral map, whilst sorting deals 
with mass changes in voter identification. As historian Geoffrey Kabaservice notes, ‘moderate 
Republicans had particular reason to fear the impact of realignment on their party. Every defection 
from the moderate ranks had the effect of pushing the Republican centre to the right, leaving the 
remaining moderates and progressives more exposed and less influential. The influx of Southerners 
and Westerners threatened to make the GOP not only more conservative, but fundamentally a 
different kind of party.’82 The inverse can also be said of the Democratic Party, as an infusion of 
former liberal Republicans entered the party. The realignment model has tended to focus on the South 
but the influx of northern liberals into the Democratic Party is also very important.
83
 In any case, this 
new network of party coalitions tipped the electoral map upside-down. Debate exists over whether it 
was a national or regional phenomenon.
84
 In either case the effects were stark. 
However, the realignment perspective has been criticised, with Carmines and Stimson arguing 
that, ‘the closer we look [at the realignment model] the more these “simple” realignments become 
movements over time, taking decades or multiples of decades to achieve their final form. When 
precursors and after-shocks are added, the multiple decade processes overlap, and the continuing 
effects of old movements are still manifested while new and different movements toward a still new 
alignments are underway.’85 Of course one reason for this delay between re-alignment in presidential 
election voting and actual re-alignment in the institutions of American government, what Carmines 
and Stimson call the ‘multiple decades [process]’ is due to incumbency, which has great powers to 
slow-down and distort at the congressional level that which appears far more quickly at the 
presidential level. As Bullock put it, ‘an incumbent can delay the consequences of [an electoral] 
realignment for years after the control of other positions has changed hands.’86 So it perhaps isn’t fair 
to dismiss realignment on the basis of holdouts in the “wrong” party/region, (like Maine Republicans 
Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins). That said, it would clearly be insufficient to view polarization 
through the prism of electoral realignment alone, and Theriault writes that ‘future polarization studies 
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must go beyond electoral explanations.’ He adds, ‘currently, congressional observers focus too much 
on the electoral side, though to ignore it would be equally imprudent.’87 
In the intervening decades between Carmines and Stimson’s 1989 critique, new conceptual 
explanations have been advanced and one of the most significant of these is known as ‘party 
sorting.’88 Party sorting is a theoretical explanation aimed at supplanting a mass-polarization narrative 
by explaining mass politics in terms of voter identification with “correct” and “incorrect” parties. In 
other words as the Republicans became more conservative and the Democrats became more liberal, 
conservative voters sorted themselves into the Republican Party and liberals sorted themselves into 
the Democratic Party. This means ‘that mass partisans are following what are now clearer elite cues to 
sort themselves into the “correct” party, which decreases intra-party heterogeneity and increases the 
difference between party adherents.’89 In turn as elites have polarized (through sorting themselves into 
the correct liberal/conservative party), the public have responded to these elite cues (which were 
increasingly partisan, and thus clearer) and sorted themselves into the “correct” ideological party. The 
elite-level sort is a key theme of this paper, and is measured by my methodology in subsequent 
chapters through declining I-Scores. As the electoral cleavage of civil rights broke-up the old party 
coalitions, conservative Democrats stopped identifying with the Democratic Party and defected to the 
Republicans, and liberal Republicans stopped identifying the GOP and moved to the Democrats (as in 
the standard re-alignment explanation). These mass changes can be seen in presidential election 
results of North Eastern states in Figure 1.2, as the North-East dramatically defects (or so it appears at 
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Figure 1.2- Electoral College vote allocation of North Eastern states from 1948 to 2012. 
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the presidential/ Electoral College level) from the GOP to the Democrats. Whilst it is important to 
grasp the macro-level changes, the ‘red-blue’ map also distorts our view by presenting a simplified 
result. Fiorina, Abrams and Pope criticised the use of Electoral College results as evidence for 
political scientists in the following way: 
 
 ‘A state is a large aggregation, a gross unit of comparison. California is a blue 
state, but most of the state’s counties are red. Similarly, Texas is a red state, but there is 
considerable blue in is large cities and along its border with Mexico. For this reason, few 
professional analysts take the red states/blue states distinction very seriously.’90 
 
In a limited, qualified sense I agree with this but the utility of the red/blue state model 
depends on the nature and subject matter of the research in question. For the study of electoral 
strategy in presidential elections, for instance, the fact that California is geographically (by county) 
more red than blue is of little significance (in the current electoral alignment) during a discussion of 
which party will win its Electoral College votes. It is clear that, for now, California is a safe 
Democratic stronghold. So in some fields it is demonstrably more useful than in others, but as Fiorina, 
Abrams and Pope point out it is a blunt analysis indeed if a thesis depends upon the state as an 
indicator of public opinion or mass ideology. For the study of polarization then, the red-blue macro 
level view tells us how party coalitions have flipped (or ‘sorted’) but it can’t tell us much more than 
that. The danger of exclusively viewing polarization from a re-alignment perspective is that the detail 
is lost through the use of monolithic voting blocs, states, as indicators for voter preference. This 
criticism is at the heart of Levendusky and Pope’s paper rebutting ‘difference-of-means test to 
determine when [red and blue states] are polarized.’91 In a rebuttal to Abramowitz and Saunders’ 
critique of their theory, Fiorina et al. also argued that ‘if red-blue polarization was as deep as 
Abramowitz and Saunders believe it to be, why would voting patterns for other offices not produce 
exactly the same red-blue map that presidential voting does? But “red” states elect Democratic 
governors and “blue” states elected Republican ones. And half the states have divided party control of 
the state government.’ 92  This is a powerful rebuttal; clearly the realignment explanation of 
polarization has its limits, and split-ticket voting in the manner described by Fiorina et al. does 
weaken the validity of the standard realignment model.  
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Whilst they arrive at the same conclusions, the party sorting hypothesis is an important 
refinement of the standard geopolitical realignment model. Sorting helps to explain the transformation 
of American politics over the last half century in terms of voter movements from and to parties, rather 
than describing change in terms of monolithic state voting blocs; which while useful for the purposes 
of presidential election strategy or explanatory short-cuts, do not offer a sophisticated model of party 
makeup or voter behaviour, primarily because they consider whole state outcomes at the presidential 
level. The seemingly drastic change seen in Figure 1.2 does mask a more nuanced pattern which 
Fiorina describes as party sorting. Hetherington writes that ‘contemporary American politics is 
probably best described as polarized on the elite level and increasingly well sorted in the electorate.’93 
Furthermore, Theriault writes that whilst ‘the degree to which Americans are divide into red and blue 
states is rigorously debated, few question that Americans have politically sorted themselves 
ideologically.’94 Among others, Ambramowitz has spent considerable time refuting Fiorina’s analysis. 
In one article for The Atlantic, Abramowitz identified a few key pieces of evidence which he claims 
undo the central tenet of Fiorina’s thesis that the American public are not polarized, but sorted. 
Abramowitz cites a statistic from American National Election Studies that ‘the percentage of voters 
who place themselves in the centre of a seven-point liberal-conservative scale has decreased, while 
the percentage who place themselves near the left and right ends of the scale has increased 
considerably since the 1970s.’95 The NES surveys also formed a key part of Fiorina’s argument.96 The 
other critical factor Abramowitz cites in support of the widely-held view that Americans are polarized 
is race. In terms of electoral politics Abramowitz notes that, ‘as the American electorate has become 
more racially diverse, the racial divide between the Democratic and Republican parties has widened 
considerably and this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The Democratic Party 
today depends heavily on votes from African-Americans, Hispanics, and other non-whites. About 45 
percent of Democratic presidential and congressional voters in 2012 were non-white, compared with 
only 11 percent of Republican voters.’97 The difference in the issue profile between white and non-
white voters is also staggering, unsurprisingly. ‘The growing dependence of the Democratic Party on 
non-white voters, who generally hold much more liberal views on the role and size of government 
than white voters, has helped to drive racially and economically conservative whites toward the 
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Republican Party, thereby deepening the ideological divide between the parties.’ 98  This racial 
component of re-alignment is important, and it is closely related to another indicator of political party 
allegiance, income inequality.
99
 
McCarty el al. note that ‘blacks now compose a greater portion of both of the extreme income 
quintiles.’100 The high rate of identification with the Democrats among African-Americans, since 
President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, is the most striking instance of racial-economic and 
ideology correlation. Perhaps this was one of the most significant “elite cues” in modern history, 
heralding (along with Barry Goldwater’s nomination in 1964) the start of the mass voter sort which 
came to define the post-realignment era. These issues are not at the heart of this paper, but do provide 
important context and heed Bartel’s advice that ‘students of party politics would do well to examine 
more closely the interrelationships of mass-level and elite-level trends.’101  
The older re-alignment model would likely phrase this transfer of voters in terms of the Old 
South flipping to the Republican Party over Civil Rights. The ‘sorting’ school of thought would 
probably call tight racial-party identification a natural result of sorting into “correct” parties. Mass-
level explanations would stress the role of race and income. Abramowitz asserts this as evidence for 
polarization whilst Fiorina argues this term applies only to the elite. The same facts have led to 
different explanations; there are however obvious similarities in each rationalisation of events. It is 
not clear what the difference between ‘sorting’ and re-alignment actually is in practical terms. In both 
the sorting and realignment models conservatives and liberals defected en masse to join the more 
appropriate party. So is ‘sorting’ just a description of the mechanism of realignment? In fact the main 
difference between these two theories seems to be one of emphasis; a re-alignment understanding 
favours consideration of politics though large aggregate units (states), whilst sorting deals mainly with 
the voter-level ideological judgements made by the American people. Realignment is a more useful 
model for presidential elections, whilst sorting is more useful for the study of Congress. In any case 
the end result is the same, and the elite are certainly sorted and therefore polarized from one another 
in an ideological exaggeration of mass-level trends. This dramatically increased elite-level party unity. 
At the mass level, as voters ‘sorted’ themselves into the ideologically appropriate party, elite-
level changes accelerated. But a number of other factors have been identified by scholars interested in 
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the origins of polarization. Hetherington sums up some of the main explanations for political 
polarization as follows:  
 
‘In identifying the causes of partisan polarization in Congress, Jacobson suggests 
sorting them by those that occur outside political institutions, such as changes in the 
electorate or electoral system, and those that occur inside them, such as rule changes or 
changes in the character of party leadership. Poole and Rosenthal demonstrate that the 
lion’s share of change in party preferences can be explained by the replacement of old 
[Congressional] members with new ones. And, as Fleisher and Bond and also Grose and 
Yoshinaka, demonstrate, party switching by [Congressmen and Senators] whose 
ideological profile is inconsistent with their party is more likely in recent years compared 
with the several decades after the Second World War. Moreover, Nokken and Poole 
demonstrate that these party switchers, especially recent ones, exhibit large changes in 
their voting behaviour, reinforcing polarization.’102 
 
Theriault listed additional explanations cited by scholars in his book, Party Polarization in 
Congress, including, ‘redistricting, income inequality, changes in House procedure, political 
migration and segregation, the ideological sorting of voters, Newt Gingrich’s combative style, 
Clinton’s impeachment, the breakdown in social connections between members’ families and changes 
in the Washington community.’103  These explanations are by no means mutually exclusive, and 
indeed some of them have distinct causal relationships. For instance, ‘McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
have demonstrated the most concrete policy consequence of elite polarization. In addition to being 
caused by income inequality, they demonstrate that polarization increases income inequality.’104 There 
are of course other reasons for polarization which have been identified, however those listed above 
are the most dominant explanations in the current literature. What follows now is an overview of these 
explanations in the extant literature.  
 
Mass level trends (race, gender and income inequality). 
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As for the causes of polarization, there are other factors cited behind the polarization surge 
that are not particularly salient to this paper but which ought to be referred to; I will note them 
extremely briefly now (principally because they are mass level explanations and this paper is 
explicitly concerned with the elite and dominant mass level explanations have been set out above). 
Income inequality is one such factor and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal write that ‘partisanship and 
presidential vote choice have become more stratified by income.’105 Given that income inequality has 
rapidly increased since the 1970s
106
  this is particularly worrying. Race is another, related factor. 
Gender is the next of these mass-level explanations and ‘is something Stimson traces back to the 
‘1980 [Republican] platform written for the Reagan campaign’ which opposed the Equal Rights 
Amendment. Stimson argues that the ‘platform sent a signal that conservatism and feminism would be 
on opposite sides’. He goes on to state that before this event Americans were ‘accustomed to gender 
not being relevant to politics.’107 The so-called “gender-gap” between the two parties is significant, 
but nowhere near as vast as the racial distribution of party affiliation. Demographic trends may 
exacerbate this racial divide if the Republican Party remains on its present course, as Latinos and 
African-Americans come to dominate elections as white America and the GOP base shrink. 
In a sense, elites have undergone a party “sorting” of their own; and all too often this has 
meant the exodus of moderates, to be replaced by far more ideological members. This tightens party 
unity, and decreased party heterogeneity (as my I-Score analysis shows).  Innumerable Senators and 
Congressmen have left (or been driven out) by Congress’ turbulent operating environment, citing 
partisan division and polarization
108
and further depreciating the small pool of legislators who served 
before the Gingrich revolution and who can remember how Congress used to function in a bipartisan 
way. Given the way in which experience and practices are transmitted from old members to new ones, 
and given this extended recent experience of procedural polarization in Congress and the extreme 
becoming the “new normal,” it appears as though the cycle of radical polarization will be self-
perpetuating within the legislature. The gerrymandering of congressional districts is also a near 
guarantee for ideological congressmen that their constituents will not provide as much check on their 
relative extremism (compared to the median voter). Granger points out that ‘as districts become 
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“safer,” legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions.’109 Even if gerrymandering doesn’t 
lead directly to polarization, the clumping of constituents into homogenous blocks will in all 
likelihood contribute to high levels of party unity, which is one major result found in Poole and 
Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE series over the course of the last fifty years. 110  Criteria for 
“diagnosing” a highly polarized political environment must therefore include high levels of party 
unity. In a sense the choice boils down to the paradox between the (small ‘r’) republican and (small 
‘d’) democratic methods; should congressmen be ideological mirrors of their constituents, or should 
they obey the Burkean invocation that, ‘your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his 
judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.’ 111  In the 
meantime, whilst this tension remains unsolved, there is a danger that polarization will become even 
more firmly entrenched, now that an entire generation of the political elite has gone through the 
divided Congress. Whilst Fiorina explains that at the mass voter level, it isn’t all that bad currently, 
‘elite polarization… appears to be a potential engine for change at the mass level’112 and there is a 
distinct danger that in responding to elite cues, given the extremely limited choices available at the 
ballot box and the polarization of choices, the mass public will become truly polarized at the mass 
level, and that this polarization will not just be philosophical, but partisan as well. 
 
 
Rules Reform, Congressional Norms and Politicised Procedural Votes. 
As we have now considered discussion of changes in the electorate (via realignment and/or 
party sorting), the next set of explanations identified in the literature to be considered here are the 
changes internal to Congress. Rules reform is a particularly current topic and the so-called ‘nuclear 
option’ deployed by Senator Reid (D-NV) in November of 2013113 marked a concerning new height 
of polarization in the Senate. Theriault identifies procedural debates as the main culprit for ‘the 
overwhelming growth in the voting disparity between Democrats and Republicans in both the House 
and the Senate since the early 1970s’114 and also insists that ‘future polarization studies must explain 
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the increasing frequency of and polarization on procedural issues.’115 Theriault makes an interesting 
set of points around procedural votes and identifies them as a primary reason for increasing 
polarization as ‘the majority party implements… highly restrictive [rules]’116 governing amendments, 
who can add them and when. This has resulted in procedural votes and arcane parliamentary strategy 
being used just to make what Theriault calls ‘substantive’117  points of argument. This worrying 
growth in polarized procedural votes and parliamentary obstructionism (such as widespread use of the 
filibuster) seems to be fairly bipartisan,
118
 as with gerrymandering, both sides play the rules when they 
are in a position to do so.
119
 If partisan polarization has filtered down into even the procedural matters, 
which it certainly now has done, it is easy to see how the trend will get worse.  
In 1973 Herbert B. Asher wrote that, ‘the institution, be it the House or Senate or a state 
legislature, must transmit its norms to legislative newcomers in order to insure the continued, 
unaltered operation of the institution and that the member himself must learn these norms if he is to be 
an effective legislator.’120 Given the stark deterioration since then, both in terms of raw polarization 
between the parties in Congress and the use (and misuse) of procedural tactics by both Republicans 
and Democrats it is hard to see how, given the transmission of these ‘norms’ in the manner Asher 
describes, the damage can be undone. This polarization is becoming a new normal, and new members 
will become quickly acclimatised to this as older congressmen and senators pass these tactics on to 
their younger colleagues, as Asher describes. The abuse of procedural rules is most worrying because 
it means that polarization is being institutionalised. Binder notes that ‘as contemporary alignments of 
partisanship register themselves in chamber rules- and as inherited rules temper their effects- each 
chamber develops an institutional history. When unpacked, these histories are arguably no more than 
the accumulation of past procedural choices.’121 Given the sharp uptake in partisan polarization (and 
partisan polarization of procedural voting choices) it is readily apparent that the institutional 
history/memory that Binder explores will be tainted (almost completely) by the past twenty (plus) 
years of historically extreme partisanship. Whilst the misuse of procedural votes is properly a 
symptom of polarization, the way in which information and practices are transmitted from older to 
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newer members clearly means that it can also become an exacerbating factor. Other internal factors 
have been identified for driving up party unity in Congress. For instance Rohde and Sinclar both 
identified the resurgence of ‘[party] leadership organizations in congress’122 who are empowered by 
conformist and homogenous parties. 
 
Party Identification and the Benefits of Polarization. 
 
The last twenty years have seen marked moments of partisan escalation. From Hunter’s 
identification of a ‘culture war,’123 through the divisive election of George W. Bush and into the rise 
of the Tea Party, polarization has been the dominant narrative in both academia and the press.
124
  
However, all of this came out of a period in which there had been a significant block of academic 
opinion arguing that American’s two-party system was crumbling. These academics argued that 
moderate, non-ideological and non-partisan voters with casual party attachments heralded an end to 
America’s two-party system. Writing in 1994, Green and Palmquist summed up this thinking on party 
affiliation as follows: ‘partisan affiliation was originally thought to be something of an unmoved 
mover, a psychological attachment that remains highly stable over time. This view came under attack 
during the 1970s and 1980s, when party identification was found to respond to retrospective 
evaluations of presidential performance (Fiorina, 1981; Brody and Rothenberg, 1988).’ 125  This 
instability in party identification and an increase in votes for third parties
126
 led to a relatively 
widespread theory of party decline.
127
 In turn this theory of collapsing party identification fell by the 
wayside as the ‘culture war’ theory came to the fore. The theory of decline in party identification had 
something of a fierce undoing during 1990s and 2000s. In 2001 Hetherington noted, on the 
differences between the late Clinton years and the broad coalitions of Reagan and Nixon, that 
‘Americans in the 1990s are more likely to think about one party positively and one negatively, less 
likely to feel neutral toward either party, and better able to list why they like and dislike the parties 
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than they were ten to thirty years ago.’128 Paradoxically this chimes with Fiorina’s view of ‘sorting’, a 
result (or mechanism) of realignment but could also be seen as evidence for Abramowitz’s view of 
mass-level polarization. Hetherington notes that ‘people in the 1990s are better able to array the 
parties ideologically,’129 demonstrating the widening political gap and the effect of party sorting. 
Hetherington goes on to explain that ‘from 1984 until 1990, only about 50% of the public [matched 
ideology to party] correctly, but this figure reached 63% in 1996.’130 Clearly as the Clinton presidency 
and Gingrich speakership went on, punctuated by acute moments of paralysis (the government 
shutdown and Monica Lewinksy scandal perhaps chief among them), voters become more 
ideologically attuned. Finally Hetherington writes that ‘in addition to arraying the parties correctly, 
respondents perceive a widening ideological gulf between them. According to data from the NES 
Cumulative File (Sapiro et al. 1997), the mean signed ideological distance between the parties rose 
from 1.52 points in 1984 to 1.94 points in 1992 and 1996, an increase of 28%.’ 131 The ‘mood’ of the 
country was certainly increasingly partisan from the early 1990s, and the rhetoric matched this. But is 
this a bad thing? In the eyes of the American people, substantiated by innumerable polls
132
 that report 
extremely weak congressional approval ratings, it clearly is. But Abramowitz takes a contrary view. 
In his book The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy, he 
sums up the conventional view as such;  
 
‘In recent years a number of pundits and political commentators have claimed 
that ordinary Americans are turned off by the hyperpartisanship and polarization that 
they see in Washington. In their view, most Americans have little interest in the 
ideological battles that preoccupy the politicians and their activist supporters, and they 
have become increasingly frustrated that Democrats and Republicans are unable or 
unwilling to work together to address the major problems facing the country. As a result, 
we are told, ordinary Americans are losing faith in the political process.’133 
                                                          
 
128
 Hetherington, ‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ in American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 628. 
129
 Hetherington, ‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ in American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 623. 
130
 Hetherington, ‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ in American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 623. 
131
 Hetherington, ‘Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization’ in American Political Science 
Review Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 623. 
132
 There are a very large number of such polls, for instance; Jones, ‘Congress Job Approval Starts 2014 at 13%/ 
Essentially unchanged since December’ in Gallup, (14th January 2014), Newport, ‘Congressional Approval 
Sinks to Record Low/ Current approval at 9%; 2013 average now 14%’ in Gallup, (12th November 2013). 
133
 Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy, (Yale, 
2010), p. 18.  
  
 
31 
 
 
 
Abramowitz refutes this argument and cites ANES data from 2004 which, ‘casts serious 
doubt on this argument.’134 Namely because the ‘ANES time series shows that the level of political 
engagement among the public has been increasing.’135 Piecing together some of the strands of this 
literature review so far we can now see a pattern emerging. In his seminal book The Nature of Belief 
Systems in Mass Publics, Converse notes that ‘the common citizen fails to develop more global points 
of view about politics’136 and that most voters are uninformed and inconsistent in their ideological 
beliefs. He was writing at a time when party-polarization was not a factor in American political life; it 
is important to note that polarization did exist on issues like civil rights, but that the polarization was 
across parties (i.e. there were pro- and anti- segregationists in both parties, and therefore significant 
overlap between the two parties and large divisions within them).
137
 So, in this period of significant 
party overlap, public engagement with politics was low (as were levels of voter information and voter 
ideology). However, by the 21
st
 century when party polarization was extremely high, Abramowitz 
argues that voter interest in politics was much higher as well. He notes that ‘political information and 
political participation… are closely related’138 and that because of polarization, voters are actually 
more interested and engaged with political debates, and with elections. Abramowitz cites the example 
of George W. Bush and finds that ‘the intense polarization of voter opinion about President Bush was 
directly responsible for the extraordinarily high level of public engagement in the 2004 presidential 
election.’139 This is because ‘the larger the difference that voters perceive between the candidates and 
parties, the greater their stake in the election outcome, and the more engaged in an election they are 
likely to be.’140 So what Fiorina calls the polarization of ‘choices’141 actually engages the electorate 
with political decision making at the ballot box. Abramowitz is not alone in this position, among 
others Levendusky agrees and wrote in 2010 that ‘elite polarization, by clarifying where the parties 
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stand on the issues of the day, causes ordinary voters to adopt more consistent attitudes.’142 On the 
other hand, Claassen and Highton reject this argument and assert that ‘only the well informed 
responded to the growing elite polarization by becoming more partisan in their opinions. Apparently, 
in the absence of the motivation to develop coherent opinions, even a simplification of the political 
environment does not close the gaps between those who are more and less aware about politics.’143 
So is this level of elite polarization a desirable feature of the political system; or is the current 
dysfunction too high a price to pay for an engaged electorate? Abramowitz points out positive effects 
of polarized choices (see above).
144
 In a sense this brings us back to the contradiction at the core of 
American legislative/electoral politics, that Americans strongly disapprove of a partisan congress, but 
almost always favour
145
 (and re-elect)
146
 their increasingly partisan representatives; this can be a 
symptom of gerrymandering, posited as a cause of polarization quite frequently
147
 and discussed next. 
In principle most Americans want a bipartisan, cooperative congress, but in reality they are more 
heavily invested in elections when presented with two easily distinguished, ideologically polarized 
candidates (as in Abramowitz’s example of the 2004 presidential election). Perhaps the clearer and 
further apart the two parties are, the easier it is for voters (and especially low information voters) to 
respond to these elite information cues, to accrue political and ideological knowledge and ultimately 
to vote for the most appropriate candidate for them, even if they are only choosing the “least bad” 
option from a polarized ballot. Rogowski rejects this and finds that ‘increasing policy differences 
between candidates [in Senate and House races] significantly reduce voter turnout.’148  
This is really the essence of party sorting: ‘mass partisans are following what are now clearer 
elite cues to sort themselves into the ‘correct’ party.’149 Though, given the polarization of choices, the 
‘correct’ party may in fact just be the “least bad” party for many voters. Intriguingly Nicholson finds 
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that ‘in-party leader cues do not persuade by that out-party leader cures polarize.’ 150 He gives the 
example of George Bush in 2008, noting that the outgoing president’s ‘endorsement did not persuade 
Republicans but it polarized Democrats.’151 This seems to be an active case of voters (in this case 
Democratic leaning ones) identifying with the party they find least bad of all; a true polarization of 
choices. Indeed McGhee and Krimm note that ‘the strongest trend by far is not growing polarization 
[in the public] but the large and pervasive increase in registered independents.’ They attribute this 
partially to the fact that ‘voters have no viable alternative to the major-party candidates;’152 which 
Fiorina identifies as a polarized choice. Perhaps the low party identification theory is not wholly 
discredited, if we accept this hybrid of Fiorina’s polarized choice theory and McGhee and Krimm’s 
finding that even the 2008 election had some (albeit ‘ambiguous’) impact on increasing independent 
voter registration trends.
153
 
From this we can raise a broader objection to Fiorina; if elites are polarized and 
extraordinarily high rates of re-election for incumbents exist
154
 then does it matter whether the public 
are polarized or ‘sorted’, if the end result is the same? Of course Fiorina offers us a new explanations 
of the mechanism, but given that all of the real power lies with the elite (given the extraordinary rates 
of incumbency re-election),
155
 because electoral choices are polarized
156
 and districts are ideologically 
homogenous,
157
 and the elite are unanimously considered to be polarized, then can we not say that 
American politics is polarized? We can take that as given even without recourse to Abramowitz et 
al.’s rebuttal of the non-polarized electorate component of Fiorina’s theory. The next polarizing factor 
we must consider is that of redistricting and gerrymandering. 
 
Redistricting and Gerrymandering. 
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Carson and Crespin note that whilst the ‘United States Constitution requires that a census be 
taken every 10 years to reapportion representation in the United States House of Representatives… 
the Constitution implicitly leaves the drawing of political districts… to the states.’158 This has led to a 
situation where different states have ‘set the responsibility for this inherently political task to different 
officials (McDonald 2004).’159 Each of these different methods will produce wildly different results 
and therefore a diffuse academic literature exists. Clearly such a vast set of local regulations, state and 
federal laws have blossomed into a large academic literature which cannot be taken in its entirety 
here. Some key debates from the literature are reviewed here as fully as space allows, particularly 
geared of course to the subject of polarization and its relationship (if any) with gerrymandering. In 
general I take three methods of drawing district lines; partisan, bipartisan and non-partisan. 
One of the arguments in favour of using states as measures of public opinion, and thus one of 
the defences of their use as evidence in the realignment model, is that states cannot be gerrymandered. 
Their boundaries are fixed and their constituents cannot be exchanged in the service of political 
expediency for the elite. Congressional districts on the other hand are notorious for often blatant,
 160
 
partisan (and racial)
161
 redistricting; though academics differ quite widely on the effect (if any) this 
has on polarizing Congress. Before considering extracts from the sizeable academic literature on this 
matter, let us turn to the account of one legislator who found himself on the wrong side of the 
redistricting process. The geographical contortions of some re-drawn House districts are quite 
extraordinary,
162
 as now-retired eight-term congressman Mickey Edwards (R-OK) reports: 
 
‘I, a city dweller with no rural experience, found myself representing farmers, 
ranchers and small-town merchants after a legislature dominated by a different party 
redrew my district to stretch from the middle of Oklahoma to the Kansas border and 
then, in an upside-down "L" halfway to Arkansas, all to strengthen their party in other 
districts.’163 
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Edwards blames this on a partisan redistricting process, though in truth both parties have faced 
accusations of gerrymandering in recent years.
164
 That said, Republicans seem to have faced more 
accusations than Democrats not least of which because the configuration of House districts has 
returned Republican majorities despite Democrats polling higher on generic ballots nationally.
165
 The 
sum total of the gerrymandered House was felt in the 2012 congressional elections. Sean Trende 
writes that ‘one of the most striking aspects of the 2012 elections is that Republicans won their third-
largest House majority since the late 1920s while losing the popular vote.’166  Obviously in the 
Congressional system voting is not proportional and we cannot expect the party with the most votes 
nationally to win overall control, but the disparity is startling. The left wing blog Think Progress 
argues that ‘in order to take control of the House, Democrats would have needed to win the 2012 
election by 7.25 percentage points.’167 Clearly, the current districts favour the Republicans, though as 
Congress is not elected by a proportional representation system we should therefore not expect 
proportional outcomes. That said, some Republicans have attempted to transform this congressional 
advantage into a presidential one, by changing state Electoral College laws to allocate votes by 
congressional district,
168
 lending credence to allegations of a partisan redistricting process on their 
part. Whilst demonstrably unfair on a proportional basis, and blatantly corrupt if taken to the 
presidential level, the crucial question is, does partisan redistricting lead to polarization? 
Theriault and Rohde write that the gerrymandering/redistricting argument is ‘popular especially 
among the political pundits and politicians;’169 as in the example of Congressman Edwards cited 
above. But there is also support among scholars for the theory. Drawing on the work of Carson, 
Crespin and Finocchiaro, Theriault and Rohde summarise the basic argument as follows: ‘the 
purposive creation of safe districts through redistricting has lead ideologically purer districts to elect 
more conservative Republicans and more liberal Democrats.’170 This has an impact on the ideological 
homogeneity of the parties which I explore with I-Scores throughout this thesis. In their paper on this 
topic Carson et al. do find ‘districts that have undergone significant changes as a result of redistricting 
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have become even more polarized’, whilst conceding that ‘the effect is relatively modest.’171 Perhaps 
the most egregious aspect of gerrymandering is that, given few credible general election challenges in 
incumbent-favourable, reapportioned districts, electoral competition increasingly comes from the 
more ideological flank of congressional candidates during primary contests,
172
 (particularly in the age 
of the Tea Party). Given the dilemma between a relatively moderate electorate and extreme primary 
voters, Brady, Han and Pope find that ‘congressional candidates… position themselves closer to the 
primary electorate.’ 173  This means that ‘primaries pull candidates away from median district 
preferences’174 and that given the clear fundraising advantages of more extreme candidates,175 more 
ideological behaviour by representatives is rewarded both by “king-making” primary voters (who 
radicalise general election choices for everyone else) and by donors alike; who often contribute on the 
basis of a single, salient issue.
176
 This clearly exacerbates the problem; as the most ideological group 
of voters among a party-homogenous district select and then elect a more ideological candidate.  
Another longer-term impact of gerrymandering can actually be felt in the Senate. Theriault and 
Rohde draw attention to a group of Senators they label as the ‘Gingrich Senators’, who had ‘served in 
the House after 1978’177 before passing into the Senate subsequently. Theriault and Rohde note the 
‘effect of House experience on Senator ideology’178 and cite the work of Sinclair who finds that ‘the 
1990s saw an influx of ideologically committee conservatives into the Senate, with many of them 
being veterans of the highly partisan House.’179 Given the acknowledgement above of how working 
practices and institutional memory are transmitted across generations, it is very important to adopt 
Theriault and Rohde’s caution that these norms will transmit across chambers too. The high levels of 
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polarization found in the modern Senate by Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores confirm 
this worrying trend. 
There are dissenting voices however. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal summarise their finding 
that ‘gerrymandering has increased the Republican seat share in the House [but] this increase is not an 
important source of polarization.’180 They criticise some of the prior literature for overlooking that;  
 
‘Reapportionments since 1980 have shifted seats from the Northeast where 
polarization is moderate to more polarized regions, the South and Southwest, while the 
relatively unpolarized Midwest has neither lost nor gained seats. Consequently, new 
congressional districts and those significantly redrawn are not a random sample of all 
districts, but are heavily concentrated in polarized regions.’181 
 
Furthermore, Masket, Winburn and Wright argue that the ‘effects of partisan redistricting on 
competition and polarization are small… and overwhelmed by other aspects of the political 
environment.’182 Even if polarization was largely attributable to redistricting, some scholars have 
identified potential positive consequences of this (beyond the “clearer elite cues” argument already 
outlined). Gelman and King found that as ‘partisan redistricting produces additional districts that the 
party in control of redistricting is likely to win’ then that party ‘finds it easier to field better 
candidates, which, in turn, produces more votes for those candidates.’ 183  This chimes with what 
Hetherington, Larson and Globetti conclude in their paper on redistricting and candidate decision, 
with the added qualification that ‘quality challengers are less likely to emerge as the redistricting 
cycle progresses’ but vulnerable congressmen are ‘more likely to face quality challengers toward the 
beginning of the redistricting cycle than the end.’184 In other words once a partisan redistricting 
process has taken place more quality challengers are likely to emerge in the manner Gelman and King 
describe. In a sense this is more democratic; the ideological correlation between constituents and 
representative will be much higher than if congressmen were elected from districts with roughly even 
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numbers of Democrats, Republicans and Independents. Indeed, as Yoshinaka and Murphy explain, 
‘redistricting can foster electoral competition, but it can also sever representational ties between 
constituents and their representatives.’185 But the price of this increased representation in balanced 
districts is ideological units of voters electing increasingly ideological candidates (all too often what 
Gelman and King call ‘better candidates’ will mean more and more extreme candidates, given the 
political landscape), thus populating Congress with the intractable red and blue blocs that we see 
today in both the House and Senate.
186
 Whilst partisan redistricting might alleviate what Bafumi and 
Herron call the ‘leapfrogging’187 problem, (where elections become simple swaps of partisan of one 
flank for ideologues of another), the price of this seems to be more severe polarization in the manner 
described by the majority of academics writing on polarization and its causes.  
Whilst bipartisan redistricting might sound appealing, in fact many scholars believe this could 
be even worse at generating a polarization feedback. Lyons and Galderisi find that ‘incumbents do 
indeed benefit from party controlled redistricting and more so under bipartisan than under partisan 
redistricting.’ 188  The implication here is that the two parties would conspire to protect their 
incumbents and maximise electoral outcomes for themselves. It is in both parties’ rational self-interest 
to divide the electorate into homogenous blocks of Republican, Democratic and Independent voters 
because this strengthens the incumbency effect, protects their legislators and permits the election of 
more ideological candidates than would otherwise be possible in a moderate district.  
This criticism of the bipartisan redistricting model fits in with the ‘cartel’ description of 
American party politics advocated by Cox and McCubbins (among others). Strong representative 
identification with party will exacerbate polarization, as the two parties increasingly behave like 
‘cartels’189 designed to maximise outcomes for their in-group by ‘[directing] legislative activity to 
enhance the collective electoral fortunes of their members.’190 In the case of gerrymandering we might 
also include using redistricting to maximise outcomes for their ‘in-group’. McCarty, Poole and 
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Rosenthal describe the ‘primary function of such a cartel [as] to build a collection reputation on which 
its members can run’191 and the in-out, us-v-them mentality (demonstrated in procedural votes and 
stalling tactics by both parties during both majority and minority status) will make worse the already 
considerable problems in elite-level American politics. In a sense the only difference between partisan 
and bipartisan redistricting processes is the introduction in the latter case of a second corrupt party. If 
the objective of a corrupt partisan redistricting is to unite groups of allied voters into ideologically 
homogenous, partisan districts (thereby protecting incumbents), then it follows that both parties will 
want similar electoral maps. If Republicans want all Republican voters grouped together in the same 
districts and all Democrats in their own constituencies where they can’t endanger (or moderate) 
Republican candidates/representatives, then the desired Republican reapportionment outcome is 
virtually identical to the desired Democratic outcome: Republicans vote for Republicans in 
Republican districts, Democrats vote for Democrats in Democratic districts. The two cartels can work 
together on this, in a particularly cynical example of “bipartisanism”. The link between political 
parties as ‘cartels’ and the reapportionment process is one identified by Samuel Issacharoff.192 On 
non-partisan commissions, if they achieve their aim of producing competitive districts with weakened 
incumbency advantages and (presumably) roughly equivalent sets of Democratic and Republican 
voters, are we not returned to the same problem identified before; namely that half of the electorate 
will not be ideologically represented by their congressmen? Is it better to have a system of district 
division where voters are represented by an ideologically sympathetic congressmen, or one where the 
electorate is ‘leapfrogged’ and balanced districts introduce an element of democratic deficit? I do not 
seek to provide an answer here, merely to draw attention to what seems to be an intractable conflict 
between good intentions and the reality of American politics; indeed this evokes the recommendation 
of the authors of  The American Voter  in the 1960s that ideologically homogenous parties might be 
beneficial, and lead to high voter engagement.
193
 Perhaps one answer to this question lies in the 
structural advantages of American politics, for the voters within a congressional district are 
represented not just by a Congressman but by two Senators, a Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, 
state senators, school board representatives, the President and Vice President of the United States and 
inordinate local and county officials. A congressional district is not an exclusive zone of 
representation. Overlapping spheres of representation are at the heart of American democracy and the 
presence of multiple legislative and representative actors per district is crucial in negating the impact 
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of democratic deficit. Given this, perhaps balanced districts are the least bad of all other options; if 
voters are ‘leapfrogged’ 194  at the congressional level they have recourse to other types of 
representation, and ultimately to the ballot box two years later.   
 
Conclusion. 
 This literature review has provided an overview of the key debates in polarization 
relevant to this study (as permitted by the space available), and it provides a bedrock to rest my own 
research on.  
One of the criteria for defining polarization that Poole and Rosenthal identify, party unity, is 
the one that concerns us most here. One of their justifications for including party unity is as follows, 
‘two Senators from the same state and party tend to be very similar. In contrast, senators from the 
same state but from different parties are highly dissimilar suggesting that each party represents an 
extreme support coalition in the state.’195 The current party system is an engine of high party unity 
(dependent upon it for fundraising, issuing “elite cues” for voters and establishing clear cartel-like 
“branding”) and within the literature of Congressional polarization ‘the focus on collective action has 
generated much interest in the cohesiveness of parties as floor coalitions. The principal prediction is 
that a party produces a more cohesive coalition than would be possible if members were to act on 
their individual preferences.’196 Party cohesion is increasing with polarization and (as shown above) 
much of the literature has focused on it. I will take a different approach, building on the existing work, 
to consider party disunity which I measure as the I-Score. I consider the advantages of this in the next 
chapter in far greater detail. 
Many (even if historically few) legislators are still acting on many of their own individual 
preferences, (as I will show in Chapters Two, Three and Four), in breach of party unity. Furthermore, 
new cleavages on issues like national security, individual liberty and the fourth amendment have led 
to unlikely voting coalitions in Congress, further unsettling the conventional picture of polarization (I 
address this in Chapter Four). The literature has placed a great emphasis on mean ideological points as 
measures of polarization, and the use of party unity scores to demonstrate homogeneity. However, 
small but significant groups of legislators still cross party lines and are currently a neglected part of 
the polarization puzzle. To fully grasp why polarization exists we must not just consider the rise of 
                                                          
 
194
 Bafumi and Herron, ‘Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their 
Members in Congress’ in American Political Science Review, Vol. 104, No. 3, (August, 2010). 
195
 Poole and Rosenthal, ‘The Polarization of American Politics’ in The Journal of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, 
(Nov, 1984), p. 1061.  
196
 McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, ‘The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress’ in American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 95, No. 3 (September 2001), p. 673. 
  
 
41 
 
 
party unity, but where the decline in independent voting has come from and how this drives 
polarization. I explore the unique insights of I-Scores throughout this paper, and consider how they 
can supplement established methodologies in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Introducing the ‘I-Score’ Methodology with a Case Study of the 110th 
Congress. 
 
Chapter Abstract 
For the purposes of introducing my methodology and analysis, this chapter will consider 
the 110
th
 Congress in detail. As the last Congress before the Obama Administration and 
the rise of the Tea Party, it is a good starting point to consider how polarization of the 
preceding decade manifested itself in Congress. The 110
th
 Congress is also at the very 
start of a period of Democratic power. This chapter will serve as an entry point into the 
methodology by demonstrating the reasoning and application of the I-Score. Here I 
address what the I-Score is, how it works and from what data it is derived. I also 
acknowledge and resolve potential methodological objections and demonstrate with 
reference to DW-NOMINATE why a high I-Score is a valid measure of ideological 
moderate, demonstrating why the I-Score is a valuable contribution to the existing 
literature and how it supplements major scoring methods. In terms of the 110
th
 Congress, 
I explore I-Scores in the House and Senate, a breakdown of House and Senate delegation 
I-Scores and a regional analysis of I-Scores. 
  
 
Introducing the ‘I-Score’. 
 
Many scholars have drawn attention to party unity as a measure of elite-level polarization,
197
 
and a substantive literature exists to explain why high party unity occurs.
198
 Most credible 
explanations of elite-level polarization incorporate realignment and party sorting to some degree. 
Abramowitz, for instance, notes ‘the Southern revolt against the national Democratic Party [which] 
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manifested itself in a high level of disloyalty on party votes.’ 199  Ultimately these conservative 
Democrats defected en masse to the GOP, tightening the ideological range of both parties and 
producing ideological homogeneity in party conformity. Other academics identify factors like the 
fundraising advantage for  ideologically homogenous parties. Cantor and Herrnson note the effect this 
had on those Democrats ‘who received substantial assistance’ 200  from national-level party 
organisations and committees finding that they were ‘more likely than others to vote with their party 
on key votes.’201 More unified parties have greater advantages in signalling their agenda to voters, by 
proving less diffuse and more precise messaging, and they fit neatly into the ‘cartel’ theory of party 
behaviour advocated by Cox and McCubbins.
202
 Historians and political scientists alike note the 
discrete historical periods in which levels of party unity fluctuate, identifying recent times like the 
‘highly ideological and polarizing politics of the Reagan era’203 for breeding higher levels of party 
unity than had existed in the polarized, but not partisan, 1950s and 60s.
204
 In a sense high levels of 
party unity are both a cause and a symptom of polarization. There is a consensus that polarization has 
increased,
205
 and as I set out below the data clearly correlates this trend to higher party unity. In this 
paper I consider inverse of this and look at independent voting trends within the two parties in recent 
years; which is important given the emphasis on party unity within the literature. This is an attempt to 
restore these ideological outliers to the fore of the polarization/party unity debate. Despite almost all 
of the contemporary literature focusing on the homogenous majority as a measure of polarization, 
these I-Score high outliers can tell us a lot about why polarization has happened, how it has develop 
through high party unity and perhaps identify where it might be reverse (principally from these poorly 
sorted ideological outliers). To explore this I have developed the ‘I-Score’. The I-Score is a measure 
of how often a legislator votes against their party line in any given Congress, and I contend that a high 
I-Score will typically indicate an ideologically moderate legislator. Before further discussion of the 
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Figure 2.1- Relationship between Party Unity and DW-NOMINATE Scores. 
score, I will demonstrate the empirical basis for its link between high I-Scores and ideological 
moderation. 
Are independent voters in Congress really moderates? Clinton, Katznelson and Lapinski 
demonstrate that an individual legislator’s party unity206 has a very high correlation with their having 
high levels of ideology. Clinton et al. use evidence from Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE 
series
207
 to prove their contention. Figure 2.1 compares polarization in party-mean DW-NOMINATE 
                                                          
 
206
 Clinton, Katznelson and Lapinski, ‘Where Measures Meet History: Party Polarization During the New Deal 
and Fair Deal’ in Governing in a Polarized Age: Elections, Parties, and Representation in America, p. 17, taken 
from https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joshclinton/files/2013/06/CKL_Mayhew-Conference.pdf accessed on 17th April 
2014. 
207
 Carroll, Lewis, Lo, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, ‘DW-NOMINATE Scores With Bootstrapped Standard 
Errors’, (17th February, 2013) taken from http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm. 
  
 
45 
 
 
scores with average party unity, and finds a compelling relationship between polarization and party 
unity. My analysis rests on the logical extension of their proof; that low levels of party unity will 
typically indicate low levels of ideological extremism (i.e. moderation). Clinton et al. note that ‘party 
unity voting slowly declined from 1877 through the early 1960s until it fell rather dramatically, then 
began a steep ascent in the 1970.’208 This corresponds with the peaks and troughs of polarization in 
Congress (see Chapter Three, ‘I-Scores Over Time: The 102nd to 112th Congresses’). For instance, 
Hetherington notes that ‘Congressional behaviour…changed in the late 1970s. With the 95th 
Congress, ideological polarization between the parties began a steady rise’209 and this is reflected in 
the steep climb in the standard deviation of DW-NOMINATE scores. Polarization is mirrored in the 
rising levels of party unity from this time period, offering some evidence for Clinton et al.’s important 
finding. Excluding the New Deal and Fair Deal eras, Clinton et al. find that ‘the correlation between 
average party unity and polarization measured using DW-NOMINATE is… 84.’210 The correlation is 
particularly strong from the 1970s onwards. The fact that the correlation is not perfect indicates that 
there is some underlying ideological variety which is obscured by using mean ideological points to 
demonstrate polarization. This is because, for instance, a socially conservative Republican may be 
liberal on economic matters but still hold an overall conservative DW-NOMINATE score (depending 
on how many dimensions are used) because of their strength of feeling on the socially liberal-socially 
conservative axis. On an individual legislator basis DW-NOMINATE compensates for this by using 
two dimensions, but these mean left-right scores are then used to find average party mean points. 
These are almost always one dimensional across a single left-to-right axis to show how many 
NOMINATE points are between the two party mean points. But this can hide where ideological 
heterogeneity still exists in Congress because it loses the second dimension, and thus the nuance of 
the individual legislator’s ideological position.211 This is where I-Scores come in, to demonstrate 
where legislators are still breaking with the party line and to examine why. This heterogeneity, or 
variety, is an important part of understanding where polarization has come from and areas where it 
may be turned back in the future. DW-NOMINATE scores show that the parties are polarized, but by 
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Poole and Rosenthal’s own definition (see above) party conformity is a contingent criteria of 
polarization. Nonetheless, the correlation of 84% between high party unity and relatively extreme 
ideology is clearly compelling. Indeed, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal state that ‘party discipline is 
manifest in the location of [a] legislator’s [DW-NOMINATE] ideal point’.212 
Back in 1960 Campbell et al. noted the links between diffuse party identity and low levels of 
elite polarization
213
 in The American Voter, and given the DW-NOMINATE correlation their finding 
remains applicable to this day. This clearly validates an approach to understanding polarization based 
on party unity (which is common in the literature) and, therefore, one based on party disunity (which 
this paper scores as ‘independence’) and which does not have very much in the way of contemporary 
study. For the 1950s and 60s, during the height of the bipartisan congress,
214
 there is ample literature 
on the various civil rights coalitions, liberal Republicans, Southern Democrats and so on, but even in 
this height of polarization some variety remains within the party (as I will show here), and to examine 
this I have developed my own scoring method, in contrast with conventional party cohesion scores
215
 
which emphasize the oft-studied majority. Instead I focus on the vital minority of high I-Scorers, 
whose decline relative to their historic size and influence are a key (and neglected) part of 
understanding polarization.  
Now that I have shown the reasoning behind the I-Score, I will explain the methodology in 
more detail. Throughout my research I have assigned all Senators and Congressmen from the 102
nd
 to 
112
th
 Congresses,
216
 an ‘independence’ (I-)Score derived from the inverse of their conventional ‘party 
unity’ (PU-) score. For instance, during the 110th Congress, Roger Wicker (R- MS) had a PU-Score of 
78% from which we derive an I-Score of 22%. This means that Wicker cast 22% of his votes against 
the Republican Party line. The party unity (PU) is only used to determine an I-Score, and is not the 
main thrust of this research. Many other measures of party unity exist; such as the scores compiled by 
the Brookings Institute,
217
 or OpenCongress.org
218
 so simply developing a new party conformity score 
would offer little to an already well developed literature. The figures I use here to generate PU-scores 
and the corresponding I-scores have been taken from The Washington Post online Congress 
                                                          
 
212
 McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, ‘The Hunt For Party Discipline in Congress’ in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, (September, 2001).  
213
 Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, The American Voter, (Michigan, 1965), p. 185. 
214
 Han and Brady, ‘A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization after the Second 
World War’ in The British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3, (July, 2007). 
215
 Like those used by the Brookings Institute for instance. 
216
 Including non-voting members and members elected/appointed mid-session, though non-voting members 
were not used to calculate average I-Scores for parties/caucuses or other groupings. 
217
 Ornstein, Mann, Malbin and Rugg, ‘Vital Statistics on Congress’ for the Brookings Institute, (8th March 
2013). 
218
 Taken from http://www.opencongress.org/ accessed on 17
th
 April 2014.  
  
 
47 
 
 
database
219
 which in turn has information compiled from the ‘House clerk, the U.S. Senate and the 
Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.’220  
The statistical correlation between party unity and polarization is high (84%), and to 
demonstrate qualitatively that the inverse is true, I have identified several case studies from Brookings 
Institute research. Brookings, using Poole and Rosenthal’s scores, Brookings have plotted the 
ideological distribution of each party over every Congress since 1857. Arraying each congressman 
across a left-right axis and a party unity (high-low) axis to show ideology and party unity, (derived 
from DW-NOMINATE rather than the official Congressional figures used in this paper from the 
Washington Post database), these graphs show us which congressmen were most moderate and which 
were more independent in their voting during the 110
th
 Congress. Figure 2.2
221
 demonstrates the high 
correlation between low party unity and high moderation; validating the approach taken here based on 
the similar link found by Clinton et al. The correlation between PU-scores and polarization/partisan 
behaviour found in two independent analyses of the DW-NOMINATE series (Clinton et al. and 
Brookings), and the examples I give of highly independent, moderate members, both serve to defend 
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Figure 2.2- 110th Congress, 2007 to 2009, DW-NOMINATE (ideology) by Party Unity. 
  
 
48 
 
 
the connection I make in this paper between high independence and high levels of political 
moderation.  
I will now address a potential objection that could be raised to the methodology. Could it be 
the case that high I-scores actually indicate more extreme behaviour than the party aggregate? For 
instance, take a hypothetical Democrat voting against a restrictive gun control bill supported by their 
leadership and the majority of their party. We could conclude that they are more moderate than the 
rest of their party, and therefore vote against the bill because it is too politically liberal and is too 
prohibitive. However, it could equally be the case that they find the bill does not go far enough in 
banning certain firearms, and therefore vote against it because it is insufficiently liberal. A roll-call 
vote is a simple binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’ so if applied in the way cited above it could lead us to the wrong 
conclusion. Given the high correlation between party unity and more polarized voting we know this is 
unlikely, though not impossible. There are naturally some outliers where congressmen are more 
extreme than their leadership and the majority of their party, and therefore score as more 
rebellious/independent whilst clearly not more ‘moderate’, but these cases are (according to Clinton et 
al’s analysis of Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE) extremely rare, given the high correlation 
between ideology and party unity. In addition, Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young found that ‘legislators 
who are more extreme have a tendency to increase their level of [party] unity from one Congress to 
the next.’ 222  This further strengthens the relationship I identify between high party unity and 
polarization; and high I-Scores with ideological moderation. Carson et al. find the same result as 
Clinton et al. and conclude that ‘ideological extremity is correlated with party unity.’223 
However, to further demonstrate the connection between high I-Scores (or low PU-Scores) 
and moderate (rather than even more extreme voting), we must take into account some contextual 
information. This information can include voting profiles, issue positions, records of prior votes, 
records of speeches on related topics, and lifetime rating scores by organisations like the NRA, the 
NRLC, the ACU, the NARAL or the ACLU. Indeed there is such a proliferation of this information 
available on the internet that the difficulty is not applying such information but sifting through it. One 
final point on this subject is the widespread consensus among scholars that the two parties in 
Congress now occupy relative ideological extremes,
224
 and that within the parties the leadership are 
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even more polarized than their respective congressional parties are;
225
 this alone indicates that 
members who vote against their party are far more likely to be more moderate than their party 
aggregate, rather than more ideological. Given this infusion of contextual and qualitative information, 
and the high correlation found by Clinton et al.
226
 the connection between a high I-Score and moderate 
political/ideological/voting behaviour is tenable. The use of qualitative data to support the findings of 
I-Score analysis heeds Hall and Fowler’s criticism of other ideological scores like DW-NOMINATE 
for not incorporating the ‘political content of each bill’.227 My method explicitly incorporates political 
content by weighing a legislators voting (dis)loyalty to increasingly polarized party leadership. In 
Chapter Four I offer suggestions for further refinements of this method by developing a thematic I-
Score, to incorporate even greater ‘political content’ into roll call analysis.  
 
 
Case Studies: Independents as Moderates? 
 Here I consider some case studies of moderate legislators with commensurately high I-Scores. 
Just over two years before the 110
th
 Congress was elected, Fleisher and Bond wrote that there were 
‘substantial numbers of… partisan non-conformists in both parties and in both chambers until the 
early 1980s when the middle began to shrink.’228 So at this point some moderate, independently-
voting legislators still remained in both parties. As the literature does not focus on them and instead 
considers the great majority who have conformed to party unity pressures, these individuals (and 
groups) are the focus here. Fleisher and Bond note that through ‘replacement and conversion’ these 
moderate, ‘cross-pressured members’ or poorly sorted legislators were ‘likely to be [replaced by] 
mainstream partisans.’229 The few survivors of this process, whose persistence can often be attributed 
to incumbency
230
 and the tremendous benefits that provides,
231
 are the subject of these case studies 
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Figure 2.3- Number of North Eastern Republicans in Congress (House and 
Senate). 
and this paper. These examples seek to provide some qualitative justification for treating high I-
Scores as evidence of moderate voting behaviour (in addition to the high statistical correlation found 
by Clinton et al. in the Poole and Rosenthal scores). I have identified these legislators from the 
Brookings Institute analysis of the Poole-Rosenthal scores and these examples from both chambers of 
the 110
th
 Congress and entirely from the Republican Party.
232
 I consider examples from across the I-
Score/high moderation trend, with three moderates first and then an example of a legislator on the 
relative extreme. 
 Firstly, I will consider two examples of moderate, centrists with independent voting records 
from the Senate. Since the 1960s North Eastern Republicans (known for their moderation and often 
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liberal stances)
233
 have been significantly reduced in strength, as shown in Figure 2.3. Two of the few 
surviving North Eastern Republicans in the Senate are Olympia Snowe (R-ME) and Susan Collins (R-
ME). Snowe was elected to the House in 1991 and then to the Senate in 1995. Collins followed, 
elected in 1997. Throughout their time in the legislature these two Senators have been considered 
moderate and independent-minded by the press,
234
 but labelled by their detractors as ‘Republican in 
name only’235 for their consistent record of voting against the majority of their party. These two 
senators sit at the low end of the polarization scale, and therefore rate commensurately high in 
independent-moderate voting. In a sense they are a classic case of moderate, independent-minded 
legislators. Snowe and Collins fit the moderate profile of the party unity-extremism correlation neatly; 
indeed Snowe cited polarization as the reason for her departure.
236
 Both Republican Senators have 
retained impressively high I-Scores, likely a key factor in keeping their seats, despite the near-
extinction of the North Eastern GOP contingent elsewhere. During the 110
th
 Congress Snowe had an 
I-Score of 35% and Collins an I-Score of 32% (see Figure 2.4). Maine, therefore, had an average 
delegation I-Score of 33.5% making it by far the most moderate delegation in both the House and the 
Senate of the 110
th
 Congress. The American Conservative Union gave lifetime ratings of 49.12 and 
52.24 to Snowe and Collins respectively, further pointing to a moderate legislative record in both 
cases. The internal party splits quantified by analysis of party unity scores are revealing. 
OpenCongress.org finds that Collins votes least often with Senator Mike Lee (R-UT), a member of 
her own party. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) votes least often with both Collins, and Bernie Sanders (I-
VT), an independent democratic-socialist.
237
 This is another example of why I-Scores are worthwhile, 
because based on their legislative mean points alone it might not be clear that Sanders and Collins 
have anything in common at all, but by rating their willingness to rebel we can find similarities in 
their ideology and behaviour not apparent on a left-right spectrum. The propensity of a legislator to 
rebel against party leadership is an important part of a legislator’s profile. The I-Score blends the 
ideological-measurement component of DW-NOMINATE
238
 with the conventional party unity scores 
to measure this. From Snowe and Collins’ political profile, we can conclude that high I-Scores are the 
result of political moderation. They correlate to the trend demonstrated by Clinton et al, and by 
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Brookings
239
 and clearly sit at the independent-moderate end of the scale. This is a quick 
demonstration of how qualitative date can help to substantiate the statistical basis of this paper’s 
claims about the intersection of high I-Scores with political moderation (and vice versa). As cited 
above this correlation is at 84% in the last century.
240
 
 The most centrist Republican by DW-NOMINATE score was Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD). By 
the Brookings party unity score (rather than the official congressional figures used in my 
methodology) Gilchrest voted with his party 60% of the time in the 110
th
 Congress. My methodology 
scores him at 25% independent voting and the difference in the two I-Scores is likely due to different 
methodologies and the incorporation of different types of vote in the two different datasets.
241
 As with 
the data I use in my PU-score from the Clerk of the House, the Brookings rating scores party 
cohesiveness by how often a congressman voted with/against the majority of their party, in common 
with most measures of party cohesion.
242
 Gilchrest has a 63% lifetime rating from the American 
Conservative Union
243
 indicating a relatively moderate profile compared to the GOP House 
conference as a whole. This is a fairly rare example of a very moderate, centrist legislator; from what 
would once have been an abundance. 
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Figure 2.4- Comparison of Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins ' I-
Scores against GOP Senate Average. 
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I will now review a case at the other end of the spectrum and look at one of those legislators 
who had extremely low (even 0%) I-Scores to assess whether they could be labelled as ideological 
extreme, as the correlation would predict. Just above the densest area of the Republican distribution 
on the Brookings Institute DW-NOMINATE analysis we find congressman Broun (R-GA) with a 
DW-NOMINATE score of 0.970, among the highest of the entire 110
th
 Congress. Brookings assigns a 
party unity score of 99.5% to Broun, and from his issue profile it is quite clear that a low I-Score is 
indicative of a high level of ideological extremism. Broun received the American Conservative Union 
Award for his 99% lifetime ACU rating,
244
 nominated Allen West (R-FL) as Speaker of the House 
(despite West then being an outgoing congressman),
245
  and has made a number of incendiary 
speeches condemning evolutionary science and the theory of man-made global warming.
246
 Broun 
holds a 23% lifetime rating from the ACLU
247
 affirming his status as a hard-line conservative. 
Interestingly from a methodological point of view Broun is to the right of his party (he is a Tea Party 
favourite)
248
 but still maintains high party unity. This could indicate that the I-Score is an even 
stronger measure of polarization than I argue above, because in this case even a legislator to the 
ideological extreme of their party still registers very low levels of independent voting. This further 
negates the potential methodological objection I discuss above. 
Space is limited here, but by concentrating solely on the median ideological scores of the 
congressional parties to demonstrate polarization, there is a danger that some of the variety between 
representatives is obscured. To be sure this variety is much less than it was in the 1950s and 60s,
249
 
but it is still a feature of modern American politics. If only just to measure the rise of polarized 
parties, the study of variety (in this context through the I-Score), can be valuable. These case studies 
help to demonstrate qualitatively the validity of the quantitative evidence cited above. We can 
conclude that legislators with high I-Scores are more centrist that their parties, and are not therefore, 
more extreme. I refer to legislators of note throughout this paper, including a small number of 
outliers,
250
 some other case studies will be cited. In short, from this qualitative data, it is clear that the 
correlation found by Clinton et al. holds true in Brookings’ analysis of the Poole-Rosenthal scores. 
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Within the study of polarization it is vital that we consider these internal party dynamics, to assess 
whether the polarization label is accurate and if so, how it came to be and whether it might be undone. 
For future studies along these lines, plotting the parties along a libertarian-authoritarian axis as well as 
a left-right axis would yield a far more detailed, and revealing, picture. Whilst the Democrats are 
more homogenous ideologically (see analysis below, particularly of the 110
th
 House), the Republicans 
have a very broad range of internal factions. Plotting DW-NOMINATE against a similar measure of 
libertarianism-authoritarianism would allow the I-Score and the various party unity scores to measure 
rebellious voting within the different coalitions. We would anticipate, for instance, neoconservatives 
to have higher levels of party unity during the Bush administration, whilst Republicans leaning 
towards the libertarian axis might vote more in common with liberal Democrats. These strange 
coalitions have come to the fore in recent years (particularly in the Senate)
251
 and are the focus of the 
final chapter of this paper. This is a good example of where I-Scores can supplement DW-
NOMINATE. 
 
Overview of I-Scores in the 110
th
 Congress.  
 The 110
th
 Congress was the unlucky beneficiary of several trends which led towards tighter 
party unity and a commensurately high level of polarization between the two parties. These trends, 
elucidated in the literature review, culminated in a largely conformist House, increasingly conformist 
Senate and record disapproval levels from the public.
252
 I will demonstrate this here, in a brief, broad 
overview, before delving deeper into the data and analysis for the remainder of this chapter; which 
will explore I-Scores by House and then by Senate, I-Scores between the two chambers, I-Scores 
across parties and variations in independent voting across ‘red’ and ‘blue’ states. 
 I will deal with the aggregate figures here, which are averages of I-Scores and corresponding 
Party Unity (PU)-Scores derived from the database of the Washington Post. The 110
th
 Congress, from 
January 2007 to January 2009, had an average, bicameral, bipartisan I-Score of 8.79%. In other 
words, from 2007 to 2009, 8.79% of all votes cast in both chambers by both parties were cast by 
legislators voting against their party line. Despite all the moves toward a tightly conformist Congress, 
almost one-in-ten votes were cast against party line. Though conformity is clearly the dominant 
behaviour, these 8.79% of votes are still an important part of the picture; not least of which because 
analysing them with I-Scores can tell us a lot about which groups of legislators drive party unity and 
thus polarization. This is an area where the literature, which emphasis party unity, can be developed 
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Figure 2.5- 110
th
 House, I-Scores and Party Unity Scores. 
Averages
Democrats: Republicans:
PU-Score: I-Score: PU-Score: I-Score:
96.337% 3.663% 90.657% 9.343%
Bipartisan 
PU-Score: I-Score:
93.497% 6.503%
much further. Equally, 91.2% of all votes were cast along party lines (a PU-Score of 91.2%). Within 
these figures, the Democrats in the House and Senate combined had an I-Score of 5.365%, whilst the 
Republicans in the House and Senate of 12.220%. As separate chambers but across both parties, the 
Senate had a bipartisan mean I-Score of 11.07% and the House a bipartisan average of 6.5%. These 
figures provide a simple starting point to contextualise the analysis. At the very least they establish an 
important baseline for comparison. I will now consider the House and Senate separately, given the 
important constitutional and historical precedents which separate them, before considering both 
together in a brief, comparative analysis. 
 
I-Scores in the 110th House. 
In total, in the House of Representatives during the 110
th
 Congress, there were 246 Democrats 
and 207 Republican members, including those who served only partial terms. As shown below in 
Figure 2.5, the House had a bipartisan average I-Score of 6.5%, a corresponding PU-Score of 93.49% 
and significant differences in these two measures between the two parties. The Democratic Majority 
had an average I-Score of just 3.66%, whilst the GOP Minority had an I-Score average of 9.34%. This 
contrasts with Sinclair’s assertion that the Democratic Majority was more ‘ideologically 
heterogeneous than their Republican counterparts.’253 Sinclair doesn’t offer any basis for this claim 
and the distribution of the I-Scores seem to refute it; indeed Sinclair acknowledges that much of the 
early Democratic programme for the ‘100 hours’ plan was chosen for ‘[commanding] unified 
Democratic support’254 rather than for specific bipartisan appeal. I will now consider structural factors 
and more politically localised, transient explanations for this disparity. The larger forces at work in 
American politics 
(namely polarization) are 
considered in the 
preceding literature 
review. 
Leadership 
within the House is one 
factor signalled by 
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academics Harris and Nelson for Democratic party unity. They note that, whilst once ‘House 
Democrats had selected ideological “middlemen” for top leadership posts’255 by the time of the 110th 
Congress ‘only little more than one-quarter of the Democratic Caucus was more liberal than Nancy 
Pelosi (D-C.A.) at the time she was selected as Speaker.’256 This is truly a barometer of polarization as 
much as it may be a cause (and then only a contributory one). The (by historic standards) liberal 
Democratic Caucus elected a more liberal leader in Nancy Pelosi than it had ever done in the past to 
reflect the modern ideological mainstream of its caucus. So in effect the Democrats are still selecting 
“middlemen” from within their own Caucus, it just so happened that the middle of their caucus is now 
significantly further to the left than it had been in the past. Certainly this fits into the pattern of elite 
polarization identified throughout the literature. As with many aspects of the polarization debate the 
question hinges on your definition; if Harris and Nelson mean that Democrats were selecting leaders 
who were “middlemen” by national standards, then certainly their thesis is correct and that is no 
longer the case; however if they are referring to  
“middlemen” strictly within the context of the Democratic Caucus then Speaker Pelosi is still a 
(relative to the Democratic Caucus) moderate, middle-of-the-road leader, as they themselves 
acknowledge.  
With so much talk of political extremism in the Republican Party dominating the news 
coverage of recent years, it is surprising to find that during the 110
th
 Congress they were in fact more 
independent minded than the Democrats in voting against their leadership. Historically speaking these 
I-Scores are very small in the 110
th
 Congress (see Chapter Three), but there is still a sizeable portion 
of the Republican Party which behaves more moderately than its national leadership does. The 
plummeting approval ratings of Republican President George W. Bush and the unpopularity of the 
Iraq War likely provided strong incentives for surviving moderate Republicans (and/or those elected 
from relatively moderate districts) to distance themselves from the national Republican leadership. 
Given that much of the Democratic victory in the 2006 midterm landslide had been at the expense of 
61 districts ‘that President Bush had won in 2004,’257 the remaining moderates were presumably keen 
to distinguish themselves from the President and, by implication, their party leadership. This effect 
must have been particularly acute given the ‘referendum effect’258 at play in the 2006 congressional 
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elections, lensing attention away from individual legislators and towards the unpopular president. This 
could help explain a localised spike in GOP independence during the 2007-2009 Congress, and given 
that in the two prior Congresses, the 108
th
 and the 109
th
, the GOP exhibited lower average I-Scores 
(6.28% and 7.64% respectively) the “George Bush factor” does seem a likely contributor.  However, 
one other factor that emerges from my analysis is whether a given party holds of Minority or Majority 
status. In the 110
th
 Congress the GOP minority was decidedly more independent in its voting record 
than the Democratic Majority (9.343 to 3.663), and I consider this trend from the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 
congresses in Chapter Three.   
 Returning to the crux of this section, the overview of I-Scores in the 110
th
 House, we find 
further evidence of the imbalance between Republican disunity and Democratic conformity. It is hard 
to establish empirically in the space this paper allows whether some intrinsic characteristic of the two 
parties causes this, but Majority v. Minority status seems a significant part of the explanation (see 
Chapter Three). Nonetheless, there are some striking differences between the two parties during the 
110
th
 Congress. To investigate these differences I have divided the House by I-Score percentile, so 
that I consider the congressmen in blocks according to their independent voting rating. So, in the first 
block I consider those with 0% I-Scores, and then those with 1% I-Scores and then those with 2% I-
Scores and so on until I-Score 25% (held by Ron Paul (R-TX) and Wayne Gilchrest (R-MD), the 
highest I-Scores of the 110
th
 Congress). This approach allows a demonstration of the range of the I-
Scores within each party but is also to establish patterns for where Democratic and Republican 
congressmen are more likely to fall in the distribution of I-Scores. This analysis finds a preponderance 
of Democratic Party I-Scores in the very low range during the 110
th
 Congress and most Republicans 
clustered slightly higher on the I-Score distribution; this conforms to the pattern of past behaviour by 
Majority and Minority parties (a trend I consider in more detail in Chapter Three). Figure 2.6 shows 
the distribution of I-Scores by party in the 110
th
 Congress and finds that the mode of Democratic I-
Scores is 2%, (86 Democratic Congressmen voted with their party in 98% of all votes during the 110
th
 
Congress), whilst the mode of Republican I-Scores is 7% (at the significantly lower number of 33 
legislators). As noted above, the mean-average for each party is 3.663% for the Democrats and 
9.343% for the GOP. The Democrats evidently spike in the 1-3% (inclusive) range whilst the 
Republicans have a much broader range of I-Scores from 0 to 25%. The Democratic range is from 0 
to 18%, though 81.74% of their Caucus appear in the lowest five percentage points for I-Scores. On 
the other hand 80.97% of the Republican Conference appears in the 0 to 12% I-Score range. 
Historically speaking these I-Scores are quite low, but the gap between the Republicans and the 
Democrats is interesting as is the fact that I-Scores still exist in some number, validating an approach 
based on remaining party variety and voting independence. The range of I-Scores perhaps gives 
credence to the argument that intra-party divisions are due to the large range of constituencies and 
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factions within the Republican Party, and the fact that these groupings are uniquely ill-at-ease with 
each-other, often with little in common.
259
 Democrats, on the other hand, are demonstrably more 
homogenous; something that  Cantor and Herrnson found as early as 1997
260
  and which Smith’s 
analysis of DW-NOMINATE confirms; Smith finds that (in the words of Mathews) ‘[Democrats 
have] grown more ideologically coherent than the Republicans’.261 
I now consider those legislators with the highest and lowest I-Scores. Out of the 100 
congressmen with the lowest I-Scores, 99 are Democrats and 1 is a Republican. The only two 
congressmen who achieved the dubious distinction of a 0% I-Score are Marcia Fudge (D-OH) and 
Charles Norwood (R-GA); though the next 175 lowest I-Scores all belong to Democrats. At the other 
end of the spectrum, of the 100 congressmen with the highest I-Scores, 18 are Democrats whilst 82 
are Republicans.  
 
I-Scores and All House Delegations. 
 In this section I have broken down the I-Scores in the 110
th
 Congress by state delegation. This 
is to identify which states were the most independent, which parties within each delegation were most 
independent, how elite behaviour changes in the face of district ideology, and to demonstrate  
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practically how the I-Score helps shed light on both realignment and elite-level party sorting. Neither 
of these processes are “finished”, and exceptions to realignment/sorting still remain; preserved largely 
by the effects of incumbency
262
 and moderate voting to offset the electoral costs of party loyalty.
263
 
Using the I-Score, we can identify where the regional variations exist in party cohesion, which states 
have the best record for independent/moderate-voting and where moderate pockets of legislators still 
exist (despite the realignment of the past half century). Albeit in a different political age, Cohen and 
Nice also considered party unity by state delegation as a measure of polarization and its mechanisms 
(realignment and party sorting).
264
 This validates breaking down the analysis into state-delegation 
blocks, but in this case I will be considering the opposite of party unity, to measure independent-
moderate voting at the end of the polarization process, whereas Cohen and Nice wrote about it at its 
inception. I consider the Senate, along similar lines, subsequently.  
Firstly, Figure 2.7 ranks all states by how independently their House delegation voted 
(including legislators of both parties within each state delegation). The highest I-Score average for a 
state delegation is from Delaware, where that state’s sole congressmen (Mike Castle (R-DW), voted 
against his party 18% of the time. As the representative of a district-at-large for a state that has voted 
Democratic in every presidential election since 1992, it is unsurprising that Congressmen Castle voted 
moderately and against his party leadership in almost every 1 vote out of 5. This places him among 
the most independent voting of all congressmen in the 110
th
 Congress. As Castle represents a district 
at large he has to appeal to progressive/liberal and centrist voters in the same way a Republican 
Senator from a “blue” state might have to. For most congressmen representing ordinary districts from 
states with fuller House delegations, I anticipate this behaviour being considerably less common at the 
present time. The least independent delegation was from another North Eastern state, Rhode Island, 
where that state’s two Democratic members each voted with their party in 99% of all votes. As noted 
above the cross-party average I-Score in the 110
th
 House was 6.503%, whilst the mean for all House 
delegations was the narrowly higher 6.55%. The median state in terms of House delegation voting 
averages was Oklahoma at an I-Score of 6%. Oklahoma was also significant in other ways I shall 
identify next.  
Of all of these House delegations to the 110
th
 Congress, thirty-six contained members from 
both parties. I have identified the average I-Score of these thirty-six delegations (as above) but also 
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the average I-Score for each party within each delegation (see Figure 2.8). On immediate examination 
of Figure 2.8 it is clear that the Republicans are the highest independent-voters of 34 out of 36 
delegations featuring members from both parties. The Democrats are the most moderate-independent 
group of only two delegations, the aforementioned Oklahoma and the deeply Republican state of 
Utah. The sole Democratic member of Utah’s House delegation, Jim Matheson, voted against his 
party leadership in 12% of votes; over three times the national I-Score average for the Democratic 
Party during this Congress. According to the Cook PVI report Matheson’s district, the Utah 4th, had a 
rating of R+16
265
 by the 113
th
 Congress; making it one of the most conservative seats in the country 
held by a Democratic congressman. Jim Matheson was one of the few remaining ‘Blue Dog’, fiscally 
conservative Democrats in the Congress (whose caucus I review in Chapter Three). 
 
Case Studies of Regional Variations in the 110
th
 Congress: Florida. 
 
In the analysis above I have considered the most and least ideologically Democratic and 
Republican states in the House. Now I will consider two ‘swing states’ and the trends found in their 
congressmen’s I-Scores. The House delegation from Florida for the 110th Congress consisted of nine 
Democrats and sixteen Republicans. Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of I-Scores within this 
delegation and it is immediately obvious that the Republicans, on average, have higher I-Scores than 
do the Democrats, but also that the range of I-Scores among the GOP members is much greater. The 
Republicans of the Florida delegation have a 10% range of I-Scores (from 5% independence to 15% 
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independence) compared to the Democrats who have a narrowly smaller 6% range (from 2% 
independence to 8% independence). Whilst the difference in range between each parties mean I-
Scores is only 4%, the distribution of I-Scores point to a much tighter pattern of party unity and 
discipline in the Democratic Caucus, mirroring the national results. This fits the general finding that in 
the 110
th
 Congress Republicans exhibited a greater ideological variety (according to I-Score 
heterogeneity) than the Democrats did. In Chapter Three I consider which groups of legislators drive 
or diminish this heterogeneity, which in turn increases mean party polarization by roll call vote (a key 
metric of polarization found throughout the literature).  
Within the Florida delegation, we find that of the ten most independent members, nine were 
Republicans; but of those ten the member with the lowest I-Score (8%) was a Democrat; Tim 
Mahoney (D-FL). Conversely, of the ten least independent members we find that seven were 
Democrats; and of those ten the three with the highest independence scores were all Republicans. This 
is not quite as striking as the national rankings of highest and lowest scores-by-party, but it is broadly 
consistent with Democrats occupying the more conformist points of the distribution. Figure 2.10 
displays this distribution very clearly; all Florida congressmen are ranked in order by I-Score and 
towards the higher levels of independence we find a strong preponderance of Republicans, and 
towards the lower figures we find a much larger Democratic presence. The average I-Score for the 
entire House delegation, including both parties, is 7% so I take this to be the midpoint. This point is 
occupied by two Republican congressmen, Rik Keller (R-L) and Gus Bilirakis (R-FL). Looking on 
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Figure 2.10- Florida House Delegation I-Scores, 110th Congress. 
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either side of this middle ground (and excluding the two Republicans we find sitting right on it), we 
find eleven Republicans and one Democrat on the more independent half of the distribution; whilst on 
the other side of the midpoint towards the lower I-Scores, we find eight Democrats and three 
Republicans.  
The Republicans in Florida have an average I-Score of 9%, which is a full 6% above the 
Democrats’ score of 3%. Whilst I am keen to move this research beyond the study of party mean 
points, they are useful in this case to demonstrate that ideological disunity (and therefore variety) still 
exists, before progressing to more advanced I-Score analysis in Chapter Three. This might be an 
indication of more ideological variety within the Republican Party than the Democratic Party. I 
consider a real-world example of this variety in Chapter Four. The I-Score figures and analysis from 
Florida broadly fit the national picture found earlier in this chapter; that Republicans were more 
rebellious than Democrats during the 110
th
 Congress and more independent/moderate in their voting. 
The topography of the ideological variations in Florida mirrors the landscape of the national 
parties in Congress and provides an insight from a crucial ‘battleground’ or ‘bellwether’ indicator-
state. The similarity between Florida’s House delegation and national averages bear out the method of 
using so-called “swing states” in analysis of national patterns. With this correlation between the 
regional and the federal in mind, I proceed now to consider Ohio. 
 
Case Studies of Regional Variations in the 110
th
 Congress: Ohio. 
Ohio conforms to the pattern found in the Florida data, and confirms a number of key 
observations which inform our understanding of the entire House. In the 110th Congress, Ohio was 
represented by eight Democrats and thirteen Republicans. So, whilst the GOP held a majority within 
the congressional delegation, both parties had reasonably proportionate (and comparable) 
representation within the state delegation. 
In presidential elections and national politics Ohio is widely considered to be one of the most 
crucial swing-states
266
 and the last candidate to be elected or re-elected president without winning 
Ohio was then-Senator Kennedy in 1960, half a century ago. Furthermore, no Republican has ever 
won the presidency without taking Ohio.
267
 Ohio voters have successfully predicted the winner of 
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fourteen consecutive presidential elections; an impressive record. For our purposes this means that 
Ohio is a very good barometer for national politics. It is, if you like, a microcosm of America’s 
political landscape. This suggests that the Congressmen elected from Ohio’s twenty-one 
congressional districts are likely to be a reliable, sample with lessons that can be drawn for the entire 
House of Representatives, provided that the data is analysed carefully and conclusions applied 
diligently.  
From Ohio we find that, as in Florida, the Republicans have significantly higher I-Scores than 
the Democrats. The average of all Democratic I-Scores was just 3.75% compared to the Republicans’ 
I-Score of 9.23%. This is nearly identical to the Florida average scores, and extremely close to the 
national scores of 3.66% for the Democrats and 9.343% for the Republicans. Additionally, the 
Republicans have a much greater range of I-Scores than the Democrats. The Republicans had an I-
Score range from 3% to 16%. In contrast the Democratic range was a substantially limited 0-9%. The 
most independent voting record of the Ohio delegation belongs to Steven LaTourette (R-OH), the 
Republican Congressman who voted against his party line 16% of the time. The least independent 
score from the Republicans of the Ohio delegation was 3%, belonging to Robert Latta (R-OH). 
However this was something of an outlier as the two next lowest scores were 6 and 7 percent. In Ohio, 
as was the case nationally, the most conformist Congressman was a Democrat; Marcia Fudge (D-
OH).
268
 The most independent Democrat was only equal to the average Republican level of 
independence; this was (Denis Kucinich (D-OH) at 9%. By contrast five Democrats had scores at or 
below 3%. 
The I-Score analysis shows that the Ohio Democratic contingent are much more tightly 
ideological than their Republican colleagues, and the Democrats exhibited significantly less 
ideological range; exacerbating the distance between party mean points found in DW-NOMINATE.
269
  
Of course the implication of this is that the Democratic contingent have higher levels of party unity 
than do Ohio Republicans, and therefore were more ideological in the 110
th
 House. It is concerning, 
from the perspective of polarization, that moderate (or ideologically mixed) states are electing 
representatives who drive down I-Scores and reinforce party unity, which is one of the crucial 
preconditions of polarization.  
 
I-Scores in the 110
th
 Senate. 
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 On average the 110
th
 Senate voted against party leadership in 11.078% of votes. As with the 
House, the incumbent Majority (the Democratic Party) were more conformist in their voting, crossing  
the floor in only 7.059% of votes; whilst the Republican Minority voted against their party in 
15.098% of all votes. From this it may well be that the emerging theory of tighter party-line voting 
whilst in the Majority also applies to the Senate, (see Chapter Three). This theory could not be tested 
with DW-NOMINATE and only analysis of party (dis)/unity could examine this question; I-Scores 
contribute something unique here, over party unity scores, because I-Scores emphasise the important 
outliers and their effect on mitigating polarization, rather the dominant majority of party conformists.  
 From these figures we can tease out two trends, which also presented themselves in the prior 
analysis of the House. Firstly, in the 110
th
 Congress, the Republican Party was more rebellious than 
the Democratic Party and thus, according to the correlation found by Clinton et al, it was more centrist 
in this Congress. These I-Scores are still relatively low, making it especially important that high I-
Scoring legislators are studied now whilst appreciable numbers of them still exist (even in their 
historically diminished numbers). Nevertheless, given the factionalist nature of the modern 
Republican Party
270
 and the prerequisite of ideologically united parties for polarization,
271
 the internal 
dynamics and disobedience of large sections of the party should be of current interest to academics, 
even, (or perhaps especially), in this comparatively homogenous era. By only considering the average 
ideological scores of the two parties to measure polarization, a vital part of the puzzle is being missed. 
Variety does still exist within the two parties, though in the 110
th
 Congress this variety lay with the 
Republican Party and not with the more conformist House and Senate Democrats. The second trend is 
that Majorities are more ideologically united than Minorities; I test this more exhaustively in Chapter 
Three.  
 As with the House, a partisan disparity in I-Scores emerges. Of the ten most independent 
voters in the 110
th
 Senate, all are Republicans. Whilst at the other end of the scale the bottom thirty-
two I-Scores are all held by Democrats, with Patty Murray (D-WS) and Dick Durbin (D-IL) holding 
the joint lowest I-Scores of the entire Senate (2%). Interestingly Bernard Sanders (I-VT), technically 
an Independent (though one who caucuses with the Democrats), voted along Democratic party lines 
95% of the time with an I-Score of just 5. Then Illinois Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) voted with his 
party in 96% of all votes, giving him an I-Score of just 4%. This places Senator Obama 85
th
 in the 
Senate for independent-moderate voting. The least independent Republican was Johnny Isakson (R-
GA) with an I-Score of 7%; which still places him above thirty two Democrats. The most independent 
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Democrat was Ben Nelson (D-NE) with an I-Score of 19%, placing Senator Nelson twelfth highest in 
terms of independent-moderate voting. Also of note was Nelson’s fellow Nebraskan Senator, Chuck 
Hagel. Senator Hagel voted against his party in 21% of votes, foreshadowing his bipartisan role as 
President Obama’s Secretary of Defense and the dubious distinction of being the first DoD nominee 
to have their confirmation filibustered- and then by his own party.
272
 This incident goes to show how 
important the study of intra-party splits is, particularly in a time of relatively high polarization when a 
few votes can be extremely significant to nominations and legislation.  
Whilst the Republicans were significantly more independent than the Democrats during the 
110
th
 Congress, it was not to last long. To put the 110
th
 Congress into some broader context, I will 
briefly consider the fate of the most moderate legislators in the Senate. Of the top ten most 
independent senators (all Republican) very few now remain. Olympia Snowe retired and was replaced 
by Angus King (I-ME), an independent with a mixed history
273
 but who votes along Democratic party 
lines in 94% of votes (in the 113
th
 Congress).
274
 King is reportedly considering a defection to the GOP 
for the purpose of committee assignments after the 2014 midterms,
275
 but holds an ACU rating of just 
13/100.
276
 As The Washington Post notes, King is a ‘more reliable Democratic vote than 11 
Democratic senators including Mary Landrieu (D-LA), Mark Warner (D-VA) and Joe Manchin (D-
VA).’277 Should King successfully defect after the midterms he would become the most independent 
voting member of the Republican caucus, if they were to accept him. Maine’s other senator, Susan 
Collins still sits in the Senate. Next on the list is Arlen Specter (R-PA) who defected and went on to 
vote with the Democratic party line in 71% of votes in the 111
th
 Congress. Gordon H. Smith (R-OR) 
with an I-Score of 28% lost his re-election bid and was replaced by Jeff Merkley (D-OR) who voted 
with the Democratic party 95% of the time and had an I-Score of just  5%. George Voinovich (R-OH) 
was succeeded upon retirement by Rob Portman (R-OH). Portman held an I-Score of 10% in the 112
th
 
Senate, whereas Voinovich voted against his party line 31% of the time in the 111
th
 Congress. Richard 
Lugar (R-IN), who crossed the floor in 21% of votes, remained an independent voter but increasingly 
voted with his party (18% I-Score in the 111
th
 Congress, and 16% in the 112
th
). Lugar was defeated in 
a Republican primary by Tea Party candidate Richard Mourdock, who then lost the general election to 
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Democrat Joe Donnell, who voted with his party in 91% of all votes in the 113
th
 Congress.  Norm 
Coleman (R-MN) lost his re-election bid to Al Franken (D-MN), who went on to vote with the 
Democratic Party in 97% of all votes during the 111
th
 Congress, resulting in an I-Score of just 3%, 
and making him the 15
th
 most liberal Senator in the Democratic Party. Chuck Hagel (R-NE), 
referenced above with an I-Score of 21%, was replaced by Mike Johanns (R-NE) who voted 
independently in just 8% of votes. Tom Coburn (R-OK) remains in the Senate to this day but is now 
due to retire. He had a strangely fluctuating roll call record, in keeping with his unique brand of 
independent (though staunchly conservative) voting.
278
 In the 110
th
 Congress Coburn voted against his 
party in 20% of votes, by the 111
th
 it was just 9%, by the 112
th
 it was 15% but by the 113
th
 Congress 
his I-Score had dropped again to 11%. The late Ted Stevens (R-AK) was beaten in 2008 by Mark 
Begich, who had an I-Score of just 6% in the 111
th
 Congress.  
In two of these cases, Senators Lugar and Stevens, incumbency was not enough to hold-off 
the election of a far more ideological candidate. What Bafumi and Herron call the ‘leapfrogging 
effect’279 is actually an intra-party problem as much as an inter-party one. From the ten examples 
above it is clear that ideological Democrats don’t just replace ideological Republicans as Bafumi and 
Herron describe. In fact ideological Democrats replace moderate Republicans, and extreme 
Republicans replace their more moderate fellow Republicans. Even senators like Rob Portman, 
sometimes considered a relatively moderate senator,
280
 have far less independent, and therefore far 
less moderate voting records than their predecessors. This process of replacement is both a symptom 
of polarization (as a result of realignment and elite-sorting),
281
 and a cause (because it increases party 
unity). I consider the full historical context of this I-Score decline in the next chapter.  
 
I-Scores and all Senate Delegations. 
The figures from the 110
th
 Senate are just as compelling as those from the House. Of the 
fifteen senate delegations equally split between parties, i.e. those states represented in the senate by 
both a Democrat and a Republican,
282
 thirteen had more independent-voting Republicans than 
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independent-voting Democrats (see Figure 2.10). The only two Democrats from mixed delegations 
more moderate than their Republican counterparts hailed from Louisiana and Missouri, both Southern 
Republican strongholds. These two Senators, Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and Claire McCaskill (D-MS), 
had I-Scores of 17% and 16% respectively. This places both senators 1 and 2 points above the average 
Republican I-Score, and over double the average Democratic I-Score for the 110
th
 senate. In fact these 
two Senators alone count for 0.4 of the Democratic Party’s average Senate I-Score. Without Louisiana 
and Missouri, the Senate Democrats fall from an I-Score of 7.0588% to 6.6735% (see Chapter Three 
for a detailed breakdown of what I call the ‘modifier effect’ of ill-sorted legislators from ideologically 
incongruous regions). In these two cases we can likely attribute their moderate, centrist voting to what 
Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young identify as the ‘electoral costs of party loyalty.’283 Though they were 
writing about the House, the principle Carson et al. identify is equally valid to the case of these two 
Southern Democratic Senators. Namely, ‘party unity is almost twice as costly for members from 
moderate districts compared to lopsided districts [or in this case, ideologically incongruent states].’284 
Carson et al. also find that ‘many legislators face electoral penalties for voting too often with their 
parties on divisive issues.’285 This explains Landrieu and McCaskill’s moderate voting.  
Of all senate delegations irrespective of party control, Maine (represented by the 
aforementioned Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins) was the most moderate with a delegation average 
I-Score of 33.5% (see Figure 2.11). The New York and Illinois delegations were tied for least 
independent, each with an average I-Score of just 3%. The four senators from these two states were 
Dick Durbin (D-IL), Barack Obama (D-IL), Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY). 
Clinton and Schumer both scored 3% I-Scores, whilst Obama held a score of 4% and Durbin a score 
of just 2%. Of course the most striking thing about this group is that it includes the two major 2008 
Democratic candidates for President. By contrast, John McCain (R-AZ) voted against his party 12% 
of the time in the 110
th
 Congress. I hypothesize that McCain’s relatively low I-Score (for a supposed 
maverick Republican) was due to the neoconservative policies of the Bush White House, which he 
supported. This is just a point of conjecture however. In the case of then Senator Obama, it is 
worthwhile noting his very high level of party cohesion. Given his rhetoric about uniting America
286
 
and putting aside partisan division, Obama had a strikingly conformist voting record.  
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Returning to a state-by-state breakdown of the 110
th
 Senate, the GOP had a delegation I-Score 
mode of 12%, a range of 26% and a median of 13.5%. The Democrats had a mode of just 4%, a range 
of 16% and a median of 6%. In all of these averages the Republicans have a higher I-Score than the 
Democrats, however the most interesting figure might be the range of I-Scores in each party. By ten 
percentage points the Republicans had a greater variety within the I-Scores (26%). This points back to 
a very conformist Democratic Party; which is at least in part down the their holding the Majority after 
a long period in the “wilderness”. See Chapter Three for more analysis of the ‘Majority effect’. 
The five most moderate Democratic delegations were from Nebraska (I-Score 19%), 
Louisiana (I-Score 17%), Indiana (I-Score 16%), Missouri (I-Score 16%) and Arkansas (12.5%). Each 
is a traditionally Republican state and all of them voted for George Bush in the 2004 election. It 
makes sense, therefore, that these states’ Democratic senators should behave moderately. As Carson 
et al. note these legislators could face electoral reprisals for voting too often on liberal, Democratic 
Party lines. On the other side of the aisle, the five most moderate Republican delegations were from 
Maine (I-Score 33.5%), Pennsylvania (I-Score 30%), Oregon (I-Score 28%), Ohio (25%) and 
Minnesota (21%). The two most moderate Republican delegations, Maine and Pennsylvania, both 
came from the North East and both have extraordinarily high I-Scores, even by the standards of the 
highly independent-minded Republican Minority of the 110
th
 Congress. Historically the North East 
has been a vital source of Republican moderates and ‘Rockefeller Republicans’. These I-Scores show 
that even in this highly polarized time that is still the case. North Eastern states were still supplying 
GOP moderates (albeit in ever decreasing numbers, see Figure 2.3).  
To demonstrate the importance of broad-based parties and a high range of I-Scores to more 
representative, democratic parties let us quantify the impact of the North Eastern moderates to 
Republican party, and also the remaining Southern legislators to the Democrats. I call this a ‘modifier 
effect’ and explore the effect fully over the whole period in Chapter Three. If we remove all North 
Eastern states with GOP Senators from the Republican averages
287
 we find the total GOP I-Score 
average for the Senate dips slightly from 15.10% to 13.985. However the range of I-Scores within the 
Republican Party drops significantly from 28% to just 21%. Conversely for the Democratic side of the 
aisle, if we remove all Southern Senators
288
 we find that the range of scores is unaltered (owing to 
Nebraskan Senator Ben Nelson’s I-Score of 19%), but the average scores fall by 0.9%. So, the 
remaining North Eastern Republicans moderate their party as a whole by 1.2%, whilst the Southern 
Democrats moderate their party by slightly less at 0.9%. I weight these modifiers in Chapter Three. 
  
                                                          
 
287
 In the 110
th
 Congress these are Maine, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Iowa. 
288
 These Senators are from Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri and Virginia. 
  
 
71 
 
 
  
0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00%
Colorado
Florida
Iowa
Indiana
Louisiana
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
New Mexico
Nevada
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Virginia
Figure 2.11- Average I-Scores Within Party-Mixed Senate Delegations. 
Dem Average:
GOP Average:
State Average (I)
  
 
72 
 
 
  
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Illinois
New York
New Jersey
Washington
Rhode Island
Hawaii
Maryland
Michigan
Massachusetts
Vermont
California
Delaware
Georgia
Wisconsin
West Virginia
Connecticut
Nevada
North Dakota
Texas
Colorado
South Dakota
Iowa
Florida
Montana
New Mexico
Alabama
Idaho
Kentucky
Kansas
North Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Wyoming
Arkansas
Virginia
Minnesota
Mississipi
Arizona
Ohio
Louisiana
Missouri
South Carolina
Oregon
New Hampshire
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Indiana
Alaska
Nebraska
Maine
Figure 2.12- Average Bipartisan I-Scores Within All Senate Delegations. 
State Average I-Score:
  
 
73 
 
 
From the five most moderate state Senate delegations (see Figure 2.12), Maine, Nebraska, 
Alaska, Indiana and Pennsylvania there were three Democratic Senators and seven Republicans. From 
the least independent-moderate state delegations, (Illinois, New York, New Jersey, Washington, 
Rhode Island), there were no Republicans and ten Democrats. On a state-by-state basis it is clear that 
the Republicans were more independent than the Democrats during the 110
th
 Congress. The fact that 
such consistent partisan differences in I-Scores exist points to the dangers of using DW-NOMINATE 
(or other one-dimension roll call) mean points as a sole measure of polarization, without also taking in 
other contextual and quantitative evidence. The I-Score is explicitly based on real world voting data 
and finds significant differences between Democratic and Republican voting behaviour in the 110
th
 
Congress which a comparison of ideological mean points would not reveal, and a party unity analysis 
might not emphasise; geared as they are to using party cohesion to demonstrate polarization. 
 
Comparing the Senate and the House. 
I will briefly consider some general points of difference (as regards polarization and party 
unity) between the House and the Senate. The Senate was designed to be a less combative and more 
deliberative body than the House, and meant to be a ‘stable institution of government.’289 In essence, 
the Senate was designed to be less partisan than the House; the House was to be democratic, the 
Senate to be republican.
290
 Historically this balance was achieved with the method in which Senators 
were selected by the States, via election from the State Legislatures. With the passage of the 17
th
 
Amendment and their election by popular vote, the Senate became more susceptible to public opinion. 
Since the Gingrich Revolution, many academics have noted how the Senate has become increasingly 
partisan.
291
 By 2011 Theriault and Rohde conclude that ‘the political parties in the Senate are almost 
as polarized as they are in the House.’292 There is a very large literature on this subject, both on the 
causes
293
 of heightened Senate polarization and on its effects.
294
In an age of diffuse, elite–level 
ideological-partisan affiliation like the 1950s, when there was broad overlap between the parties and 
low scores of party unity, the aspiration of a bipartisan Senate was plausible. But ‘since 1973, the 
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Senate has become 29 percent more polarized and House polarization has increased 47 percent.’295 
But in an age of extremely high and rising polarization, the evidence shows that the Senate has 
followed the same trend as the House. In part this is due to ideological House members moving up to 
the Senate.
296
 In the 110
th
 Congress the Senate had a cross-party I-Score of 11.078% and the House a 
cross-party I-Score of 6.503%. Both parties in the Senate were more independent in their voting than 
their House colleagues of the same party. Clearly the Senate was still slightly more moderate than the 
House (by 4.575%) during the 110
th
 Congress, but if the trend to greater polarization seen over the 
past thirty years continues, then one imagines that the Senate will soon conform to House standards. 
Given the truly extraordinary polarization of the Obama era,
297
 I anticipate finding an accelerated 
movement in this direction. Many academics now see the levels of polarization in both chambers 
converging at a worryingly high level.
298
 Indeed Snyder and Groseclose (back in 2000) found ‘strong 
evidence of party influence in both the House and the Senate [and no] systematic differences in 
[party] influence between the House and the Senate’.299 In other words, party unity has a similar grip 
on both chambers; this correlates with the decline of I-Scores in both chambers. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
The Democratic majority elected in the 2006 midterms were in large part seated due to public 
disapproval of Republican President George W. Bush’s Iraq War and his deeply unpopular second-
term. Sixty or so conservative or moderate districts who had voted for Bush in 2004 contributed to the 
2006 Democratic landslide.
300
 From this we would expect to find a Democratic Party with a large 
contingent of centrists in the House with low levels of party loyalty (as we do in the Senate with 
Senators Landrieu and McCaskill). This would conform to the analysis of electoral costs for 
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legislators from contested districts with high party unity by Carson et al.
301
 Instead the Democratic 
Party is extremely conformist and exhibits very high levels of party unity. Of the 100 most 
ideological, tightly partisan I-Scores in the entire House, irrespective of party, 99 were Democrats and 
only 1 was a Republican. On the other hand, the Republicans, led in the Executive Branch by an 
unpopular president and ousted after a long period of rule, demonstrated very low levels of party 
unity; at least by modern standards.  
The very low I-Scores found in the Democratic Party during the 110
th
 Congress come at a 
time when increasingly ideological leadership choices were made by congressional Democrats. 
Becker and Moscardelli find that that congressional leaders have been selected from the most 
liberal/left wing of the Democratic Caucus.
302
 These leaders were the beneficiaries of higher party 
cohesion, which created an environment where more ideological leaders could be selected without the 
risk of schism. This, in turn, can worsen polarization. In Ohio and Florida, Democrats are 
demonstrably less independent than their Republican counterparts and this closely matches the pattern 
found at the national level during the 110
th
 Congress (within a single percentage point). The picture 
being painted from Ohio and Florida, found within the 110
th
 Congress as a whole, is that 
Congressional Democrats did not exhibit the same variations in voting loyalty in the way that 
Republicans did. From my analysis of the I-Scores it is clear that whilst both parties have become 
more ideological, the Democrats were (in the 110
th
 Congress) far less independent and heterogenous 
than the Republicans were. In the next chapter I consider a number of factors which explain (and 
predict) when a party will become more or less conformist; including control of the Majority and the 
presence of poorly sorted or ideologically incongruous Northern Republicans/Southern Democrats.
303
  
Although I identify (and criticise) an emphasis in the literature on ideological mean points 
and seek to offer something new, much of this past chapter has concerned itself with similar, I-Score 
averages. This has been to show that ideological variety does still exist in some way, and that even if 
it is historically low there are still large segments of Congress which vote independently and therefore 
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moderately. Now that the presence of ideological variety and moderation (measured in I-Scores) has 
been shown, and the methodology demonstrated, I will consider in Chapter Three what is driving the 
decline of I-Scores and where they may yet be resurgent. This will further clarify what is being 
missed about polarization by placing perhaps too much emphasis on the difference between 
ideological average points.  
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CHAPTER THREE: Regions, Caucuses and Ideological Variety. Modifying Party I-Scores 
from the 102
nd
 to the 112
th
 Congress. 
 
Chapter Abstract 
The purpose of the preceding chapter was to introduce my methodology and 
demonstrate some of the unique insight it provides. It also demonstrated the presence of 
significant independent-voting behaviour. Now I will turn to different groupings within 
the two parties, in both the House and Senate, from different regions and ideological 
backgrounds, to establish which “clusters” of legislators provide the most in raising 
average party I-Scores and thus providing ideological moderation, and variety. I 
consider a period beginning with the 102
nd
 Congress and ending with the 112
th
, a period 
which sees striking, elite-level sorting of North Eastern Republicans and Southern 
Democrats, the rise and relative decline of the Blue Dog Coalition and the start of the 
Tea Party. I begin with an overview of I-Scores across the whole period, before 
considering the Tea Party, the Blue Dog Coalition, Southern Democrats, Northern 
Republicans and finally an I-Score analysis of how Majority party status effects party 
unity. With all of these groups I consider, through the I-Score methodology, how they 
affect the behaviour of their parties. I term these modifying (or polarizing) effects 
‘modifiers’ and quantify how each of these groups, regions or caucuses influences party 
unity behaviour through their own independent voting. 
 
I-Scores Over Time: The 102
nd  
to 112
th
 Congresses. 
As Figure 3.1 shows from the DW-NOMINATE scores, polarization in terms of distance 
between party mean points has increased steeply since the 102
nd
 Congress. There is a broad consensus 
that polarization at the elite level exists and has increased in the past twenty years, though some (like 
Hetherington)
304
 note that, historically speaking, things have been worse. Given the correlation 
between high party unity and polarization,
305
 we would anticipate finding I-Scores decline over a  
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Figure 3.1- Average DW-NOMINATE Scores, House and Senate (1947-2011). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
taken from https://my.vanderbilt.edu/joshclinton/files/2013/06/CKL_Mayhew-Conference.pdf accessed on 17th 
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similar period. Figure 3.2 shows bipartisan I-Score averages from the 102
nd
 Congress to the 112
th
. 
Since 1991 House I-Score averages (of both parties) fell from just under 14% to a low of just 4% in 
the 109
th
 Congress. Since the 109
th
 Congress there has been a modest resurgence in independent 
voting and the 112
th
 House’s average stood at 8.979. In the Senate, a similar picture emerges though 
the drop is far more gradual, at six points from the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 congress. As the DW-NOMINATE 
party mean scores become more polarized, independent voting decreased, despite a brief surge in the 
107
th
 Senate, perhaps attributable to the split party control of the senate ameliorating the effects of 
Majority control driving up party cohesion (see ‘The Impact of Majority House/Senate Control on 
Average Party I-Scores’).  
Figure 3.3 shows the Republican and Democratic average I-Score in the House over the past 
twenty years, from January 1991 and the start of the 102
nd
 House. The Republican I-Scores are quite 
volatile, and exhibit sharp spikes. From the entire period of the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 Congress, the 
Republican Party had a maximum average I-Score of 16% in the 102
nd
 Congress, and a lowest 
average I-Score of 4% in the 109
th 
Congress. The Democratic scores decline more evenly, until a 
sharp increase during their time in the Minority of the 112
th
 Congress. I will explore the relationship 
between party cohesion and majority status over this twenty year period subsequently, having touched 
on it in relation to the 110
th
 Congress in Chapter Two. It is worth noting that the ousted GOP of the 
110
th
 Congress was far more rebellious than the Tea Party infused 112
th
 House GOP Conference. In a 
rigid two party system this is, in fact, to be desired. The wider the distribution of I-Scores and 
ideologies, the more representative Congress is as a whole. This is especially valid considering the 
record numbers of voters identifying as independents.
306
 In a political system where the law (from 
local to Federal levels)
307
 explicitly favours two parties, ideological breadth should be preserved. It is 
therefore a negative development that I-Scores are in a general pattern of decline, as the trend lines in 
Figure 3.2 attest to. As party DW-NOMINATE mean points polarize, decreases in I-Score mean more 
legislators conform to the relatively (and historically) extreme ideology of their parties. 
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Figure 3.2- Bipartisan I-Scores in the House and Senate, 102
nd
 to 112
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  Congress. 
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I-Score Averages, 102nd-112th Senate. 
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The Democrats’ score fell to just below the 4% mark in the 111th Congress, at a time of high 
polarization when the Democratic Leadership and President Obama passed several pieces of 
legislation with little to no Republican support (see Chapter Four on the ARRA and ACA). The 
polarization of the two parties on legislation like these two bills is another real-world example of why 
Majority status parties are more likely to exhibit higher levels of party unity than Minority parties. 
This is because every vote is crucial when opposition party votes cannot realistically be expected, 
meaning party unity is crucial to achieve large pieces of legislation which offer ‘cartel’308 benefits to 
the whole caucus. When gifted with rare control of both chambers and the White House
309
 (with only 
a precarious grip on the Senate), the Democrats literally counted on every vote to pass legislation 
which even moderate Republicans did not support (such as the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, see Chapter Four).  
Approaching the figures chronologically now that an overview of each party has been 
considered, we find interesting correlations between historically high periods of polarization and 
commensurately low I-Scores. This further demonstrates the reliability of the methodology, whilst the 
I-Score itself lets us consider the unity, cohesion, loyalty and ideology of the two parties in Congress 
in a novel way (and with a single measure); building upon the understandable proliferation of party-
mean point analysis of polarization that exists within the literature. One such historic high was the so-
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called Gingrich revolution.
310
 In the Republican backlash of 1994 against President Bill Clinton, 
Gingrich’s incoming conservatives saw the GOP House I-Scores drop from 16% in the 102nd 
Congress to 10% in the 104
th
. To put this in context, the House Republicans dropped more points in 
the space of two congresses as the average bipartisan Senate scores fell in twenty years. Such an 
abrupt drop is clearly (given the other evidence) a sound example of low I-Scores indicating high (or 
relatively extreme) ideology. Again, as with prior examples, this supports the link made in this paper 
between independent voting and political moderation. As the GOP lurched to the right under Speaker 
Gingrich,
311
 the I-Scores fell quite sharply. The only other drop in independent voting of a comparable 
size is the Democratic fall from 10% in the 107
th
 Congress to just below 4% in the 110
th
. It is also 
worth noting in this period that the Democratic Minority of the 109
th
 House was only slightly (less 
than a single percentage point) more independent/moderate in its voting than the Democratic Majority 
of the 110
th
 House. This lends further credence to an explanation of I-Scores that stresses the greater 
breadth of ideological opinion within the House Republican Conference than the Democratic Caucus: 
because in the Minority the Democrats were virtually as conformist as they were in the Majority of 
the subsequent Congress. In Chapter Two I briefly discussed a ‘regional modifier’- the percentage 
impact of certain regional groups of moderates on their congressional parties as a whole, a theme I 
develop in this chapter in far more detail. I will also consider whether there is a ‘majority-minority 
modifier.’ In other words, can the impact of holding Majority Status be quantified, and in which party 
does this status have most impact in limiting independent voting, thus fuelling polarization?  
In the early years of the period being considered here, around the time of the 102
nd
 Congress, 
there was a sizeable block of academic opinion still advocating the ‘Party ID decline’ theory. Analysis 
of the NES series showed that party relevance to the public declined ‘between 1952 and 1972, but that 
it rose well above the 1952 level by the 1980s only to drop dramatically again in 1992.’312 Because of 
this drop, many academics were anticipating an end of the two party system like that described in the 
1970s.
313
 Ross Perot’s candidacy further reinforced a picture of the declining salience of political 
parties to the American public. In truth of course, Perot’s role in the 1992 election was unique, and 
only possible because of his own personal wealth allowing him to ‘draw on resources rivalling those 
of the major parties.’314 Thus, Perot was something of a red-herring for academics arguing for party 
decline. After 1992, the ID decline theory began to fall apart. Writing in 2001, and drawing from the 
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same NES studies that the decline theory originated from, Hetherington showed that in fact ‘a 
movement towards greater partisanship is… evident’315 not least of which because ‘Americans in the 
1990s [were] more likely to think about one party positively and one negatively [and] less likely to 
feel neutral toward either party… than they were ten to thirty years ago.’316 Nonetheless, during the 
independent peak of the 1990s, the 1992 presidential election, the House voted against party lines 
14% of the time, and the Senate voted against party lines 16% of the time. At the time of writing, 
these average figures have never been surpassed. Perhaps some of the independent, non-party 
sentiment had filtered into congress from the electorate (given these relatively high levels of party 
disunity). Nonetheless, since 1992, I-Scores have declined and polarization has risen. By 2013, 
Congressional Quarterly noted that ‘Senate Democrats voted unanimously on 52 percent of the [party 
unity votes in 2013- an all-time high for either part in either chamber, up from 40 percent in 2012.’317 
Whilst the 112
th
 Congress has been promisingly independent in its voting behaviour compared to its 
immediate predecessor, particularly on the Democratic side with an uncharacteristic 10-point I-Score, 
the average I-Score for the entire House is still five points below its peak from the 102
nd
 Congress. 
Whilst the I-Score drops across the period may only appear slight, they are sizeable (and consistent) 
reductions from figures which were not particularly great anyway (when compared to the 1960s for 
instance). I will now consider several clusters of legislators which have had a significant effect on I-
Scores through their ‘pull’ or ‘modifier’ effect on net party unity. 
 
The Tea Party. 
Following the 2008 economic crash and a sequence of deeply controversial Obama 
Administration policies (like the $1 trillion stimulus package and perhaps most importantly The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act),
318
 the grassroots movement known as the “Tea Party” 
took shape. I consider this phenomenon here, to assess their impact on the Republican Party and 
congress as a whole in terms of I-Scores. The Tea Party is overwhelmingly a Republican 
phenomenon,
319
 but as with many grassroots “organisations” it is actually quite diffuse ideologically. 
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Arceneaux and Nicholson note that ‘in spite of appeals to freedom and liberty… a strong authoritarian 
pulse exists among its most ardent supporters,’ that they are ‘strongly opposed to tax increases… [but 
are not] simply libertarians’ and that despite ‘evidence [of] racial resentment… racial animus does not 
appear to be the primary force behind [Tea Party] opposition to government aid.’320 In other words it 
has all of the contradictory philosophical features you would expect from a grassroots structure that 
doesn’t have much in the way of centralised leadership.321 The Tea Party are principally imagined as 
being to the right of the Republican Party
322
 and thus Gervais and Morris describe them as 
‘ideologically oriented toward limited government and lower taxes.’323  
We would anticipate then that between the 111
th
 Congress (which passed the most hotly 
contested elements of the Obama agenda) and the Tea Party infused 112
th
 Congress the GOP should 
become more ideological. There is a minute increase in average, Republican DW-NOMINATE scores 
between the 111
th
 Congress and the 112
th
 but this increase is actually far less than the corresponding 
Democratic Party increase in ideology scores across the same period. What then for the widespread 
assumption that the Tea Party drags the aggregate GOP to the right? Well aside from the 
inflammatory rhetoric of many Tea Party candidates, the DW-NOMINATE scores (arguably the 
bedrock on which modern American political science rests) already show that the average Republican 
score increases by just a fraction, far lower than the Democratic DW-NOMINATE scores over the 
same two congresses, and in fact the 112
th
 Congress with its Tea Party Caucus becomes more 
ideological at a slower rate than the two preceding congresses did. Perhaps this tiny increase is 
attributable to the Tea Party; in which case their influence on actual roll call behaviour has been 
drastically overstated (at least in the 112
th
 Congress- the point at which my dataset ends). In any case, 
the fact that the Democrats polarized from the centre at a greater speed points to deeper problems than 
the likely transient impact of the Tea Party.
324
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My analysis of independent voting supports this finding of the Poole and Rosenthal DW-
NOMINATE series. Additionally, I find that far from fracturing the GOP as the media describe
325
, the 
Tea Party Caucuses’ average I-Score was actually less than the congressional Republican Party as a 
whole. Excluding Tea Party endorsed congressmen; in the 112
th
 House we find a Republican average 
I-Score of 8.13, whilst the Tea Party Caucus itself has an average of 8.11. This Tea Party conformity 
might be because they have shifted the ideological basis of the party (though only narrowly at the elite 
level during the 112
th
 Congress) and thus conform more tightly to the new, more right-wing agenda of 
the party leadership in opposition to the Obama administration. If we had the data to plot I-Scores on 
multiple dimensions, which sadly lies beyond the scope and size of this paper but which would be a 
logical advancement of the method, we might find that on some issues the Tea Party has far higher I-
Score than the average of the total Republican conference (see Chapter Four for an issue-specific 
breakdown of polarization along three key themes). Future studies could make use of an ‘issue I-
Score’ to assess this. 
In summary then, the Tea Party modified the GOP I-Score towards greater conformity by just 
-0.02% in the 111
th
 House. Interestingly, the bridge between the 111
th
 and 112
th
 House is the only case 
where the Minority Party transitioned into the Majority and became more independent in their voting. 
Usually majority status leads to tighter party conformity (presumably due to increased leadership 
incentives to pass legislation). However in this case the Republican Minority of the 111
th
 House voted 
against party lines 7.503% of the time, but when they held the Majority in the 112
th
 House they voted 
against party leadership in 8.118% of cases. This may point to an interesting conclusion. Whilst the 
Tea Party Caucus only modified the average GOP scores of the 112
th
 House by -0.02%, the jump of 
0.615% between the 111
th
 House and the 112
th
 could point to a broader “Tea Party” effect. Given the 
febrile political climate in which the 112
th
 Congress was elected, perhaps Republicans who were not 
formally endorsed by the Tea Party saw an electoral incentive to vote against the party line of Speaker 
Boehner. If this is the case, then it would be impossible to quantify the true effect of the Tea Party 
“environment” on I-Scores in Congress. At least, however, I-Scores point to a Tea Party Caucus that 
was relatively ineffectual. It is also worth noting that the net decrease in GOP independence scores 
between the 110th and 112th congresses is significantly less than the increase in Democratic I-Scores 
between the 111th and 112th Congress. In other words, for the Democrats, holding the Majority 
seems to have a bigger impact on I-Score averages than the infusion of the Tea Party into the GOP did 
on Republican I-Scores. This gives the impression that the Tea Party are something of a historical 
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blip, and that their aggressive rhetoric masks a limited long-term impact. In summary, the Tea Party 
seem to be something of an anomaly. They are considered more right wing that the GOP average, yet 
the DW-NOMINATE scores for the 112
th
 congress increased only slightly, and the Tea Party 
members were actually fractionally more independent than the average Republican. Given the very 
small difference between the two scores they are not significant. 
As Poole and Rosenthal argue, ‘legislatures become more polarized not when individual 
politicians adopt more extreme views, but when they are unseated by more extreme politicians. 
Polarization… is an effect of replacement, not conversion.’ 326  Since that was written however, 
Republicans have exerted significant energy in moving right to confront Tea Party challenges just as 
liberals have ousted moderate or conservative Democrats.
327
 This may explain why the Tea Party 
actually conformed to the majority of House votes; even if the Tea Party’s numbers preclude 
significant drag on Republican roll call votes, the threat of a primary challenge from the right may 
have contributed to a rightward move in the GOP ideological mean score (as recorded in the DW-
NOMINATE series, even if this move was less than the Democratic change over the same period).  
Next, I will consider the I-Scores of another group, this time of Democrats, who also reveal something 
of how polarization has happened and among which groups of legislators its effects are felt most 
strongly.  
The Blue Dog Caucus.  
 Conservative southerners once formed a large wing of the Democratic Party. As late as 1988 
‘25 percent of Democratic identifiers considered themselves to be conservatives.’328 Resistant to the 
ongoing process of party sorting into ideologically ‘correct’329 parties, these conservative Democrats 
remained in the ‘increasingly liberal’ 330  Democratic Party for a number of reasons including 
‘symbolic values [and] “party ethos.”’331 At the elite level, in the early 1990s, several conservative 
Democrats remained in Congress- giving these voters elite-level representation. Eventually, through 
                                                          
 
326
 Ellenberg, ‘Growing Apart/ The mathematical evidence for Congress’ growing polarization’ in Slate, (26th 
December, 2001).  
327
 Although this phenomenon is relatively new, a significant literature already exists on this topic. For example, 
see Boatright, Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of Congressional Primary Challenges, (Michigan, 
2013) or Dumbrell, Issues in American Politics: Polarized Politics in the Age of Obama, (Routledge, 2013), p. 
118. 
328
 Carmines and Berkman, ‘Ethos, Ideology, and Partisanship: Exploring the Paradox of Conservative 
Democrats’ in Political Behaviour, Vol. 16, No. 2, (June, 1994), p. 203.  
329
 Fiorina et al., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 3
rd
 Edition, (Longman, 2011). 
330
 Carmines and Berkman, ‘Ethos, Ideology, and Partisanship: Exploring the Paradox of Conservative 
Democrats’ in Political Behaviour, Vol. 16, No. 2, (June, 1994), p. 203. 
331
 Carmines and Berkman, ‘Ethos, Ideology, and Partisanship: Exploring the Paradox of Conservative 
Democrats’ in Political Behaviour, Vol. 16, No. 2, (June, 1994), p. 204. 
  
 
87 
 
 
replacement, retirement, adaptation
332
 or defection these numbers plummeted. As Jacobson notes, 
‘moderates who do manage to get elected are the first to exit when national forces create headwinds; a 
large majority of the centrists Democrats elected to the House in 2006 and 2008- virtually all of them 
from balanced or Republican-leaning districts- are now gone’.333 High profile defections like those of 
Nathan Deal (D-GA), Gregory Laughlin (D-TX), Mike Parker (D-MS), Billy Tauzin (D-LA) and 
Jimmy Hayes (D-LA) led to a much more homogenous Democratic Party by the early 2000s. Their 
incongruence with the rest of the Democratic Party can be shown quite clearly by their I-Scores. In 
the 104
th
 Congress these five men had an extraordinary average I-Score of 79%; compared to a 
Democratic average of 17.258% for the same period. These five men alone increased the whole 
Democratic House average by 2.2%. For comparison, this meant they modified their party’s House I-
Score average by 110 times more than the entire Tea Party Caucus did for the Republicans during the 
112
th
 Congress. These five defectors are perhaps an inevitable result of what Abramowitz called the 
‘high level of disloyalty on party votes [of Southern Democrats to the party leadership.’334 These five 
examples are clear examples of the outliers Bullock talks about when he discusses the effects of 
incumbency in delaying ‘realignment,’335 or what we might now term ‘sorting’. It is clear from the 
existence of party disunity towards the end of the period that the incumbency of poorly-sorted 
legislators who do not fit into the ideological makeup of the modern parties also delays the party 
movement towards high party cohesion. 
Attempting to buck this trend with their consistently high (compared to the Democratic 
average) I-Scores, is the Blue Dog Caucus, formed in 1995 by ‘fiscally conservative Democrats that 
are deeply committed to the financial stability and national security of the United States.’336 Since 
their founding in 1995 however, the Caucus’ numbers have plummeted 337  as party sorting, 
replacement, conversion and defection filtered the parties. In the 112
th
 Congress The Washington Post 
archive records twenty six House Democrats as caucusing with the Blue Dogs with a range of I-
Scores from 49% to 5%. The most independent member of the entire Democratic House was a Blue 
Dog, Dan Boren (D-OK) with an I-Score of 49%; making him the second most independent member 
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of the entire 112
th
 House after GOP congressman Dean Heller (R-NV) with an astonishing I-Score of 
59%. In the 112
th
 House the Democrats had an average I-Score of 9.84%, whilst the Blue Dog caucus 
had an average of 24.42%. If one excludes the Blue Dogs from the Democratic average, (given their 
current state of collapse this seems a reasonable indicator of where things will go, barring some 
unpredictable change in Congress), we find an I-Score of 7.88%. The Blue Dog modifier in the 112
th
 
House is 1.96%. By comparison, the minute 0.02% modifier of the Tea Party Caucus means that the 
Blue Dogs make the House Democrats 1.94% more conservative than the Tea Party makes the GOP.  
This does strengthen the case for viewing the Tea Party as a transient feature of US politics; 
one which makes the atmosphere more polarized with its fiery, American Revolution-rhetoric, but 
which actually exerts little quantifiable influence on the elite of the Republican Party, bar primary 
challenges which are, in any case, increasingly unsuccessful at the primary stage, much less in general 
elections.
338
 It is noteworthy that several Blue Dogs have faced ideological primary challenges of their 
own, though of course from the liberal left.
339
 
The Blue Dogs seem increasingly out of place in the modern, homogenous Democratic Party. 
Whilst their influence is impressive, their numbers are not, and it may well be that the caucus faces 
imminent extinction as the inexorable process of replacement, retirement and defection (sorting) 
continues. Jenkins and Monroe describe the endangered position of moderates like the Blue Dogs in 
the terminology of Cox and McCubbins ‘Party Cartel Theory.’340  Jenkins and Monroe find that 
‘majority-party [members]… closest to the floor median are hurt on a pure policy basis by the cartel 
arrangement.’341 In other words, moderates from contested districts face higher risks of electoral 
punishment for supporting legislation at odds with their median district ideology. This is ameliorated 
by party leadership via ‘side payments in the form of campaign contributions’342 however given the 
precipitous decline in the two moderate regional groups I have considered below (Southern 
Democrats and Northern Republicans), this mitigation of electoral dangers seems to be increasingly 
less significant- further endangering surviving moderates. This electoral danger for moderates must be  
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particularly potent in a highly polarized environment where party cohesion to more 
liberal/conservative leadership is increasing (on average since the 102
nd
 Congress).  
Figure 3.4 shows just how significant the Blue Dog Caucus was in the 112
th
 House for 
moderating the Democratic Party, in terms of I-Scores. But it also shows how increasingly 
insignificant they now are numerically and how out of sorts they were in the Democratic Party. Given 
the various structural factors which build-in advantages for the two main parties, and the 
impenetrability of the two-party system for third party challengers, I argue that variety within the two 
parties, both moderation and even at the price of ideological extremism, are both vital to a 
functioning, representative democracy. The Blue Dog Caucus has provided much needed variety to 
otherwise homogenous parties, and continued the tradition of the Democratic Party having a sizeable 
wing of fiscal conservatives. Sadly, elite-level party sorting on the left is culling Democratic 
moderates just as Tea Party challengers are purging Republican moderates, and this important caucus 
appears to be in near-terminal decline.  
 
 
Regional I-Scores from the 102
nd
 to the 112
th
 Congress (Southern Democrats). 
Above in Chapter Two I note the importance of two specific regions to moderating their two 
parties, and thus delaying the elite-level sort which has led to the low I-Score levels of the present 
day. These regions are the North East, and the South. Going (more or less) by the US Census bureau 
definition the South includes Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, 
Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. The North East 
consists of Maryland, Delaware, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
343
 In this section I just consider the House; 
given its biannual elections it is a better measure of public opinion,
344
 realignment and elite-level 
party sorting than the Senate, which is relatively insulated from these effects by its six-year terms.
345
 
Here I will establish how far the Southern Democrats moderated average Democratic votes in the 
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House, and consider to what extent they provided independent/moderate voting and ideological 
variety in a political climate where tight cohesion is on the rise. Firstly, over the entire period of the 
102
nd
 to 112
th
 House, how have Southern Democratic I-Scores compared with the averages of the 
entire Democratic Party? Figure 3.5 shows us several interesting trends. I have plotted the I-Scores of 
Southern Democrats in each Congress against the average of the entire House Democratic Party from 
the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 Congresses. First of all, in every single congress the Southern Democrats had higher 
mean I-Scores than the Democratic Party as a whole. This hints at the political pull of the southern 
block, and given what we have established already about the influence of the Blue Dog Coalition at its 
height and the overlap between this fiscally conservative caucus and the southerners of the 
Democratic Party, we can safely identify that southern moderates exert some ideological power over 
the Democrats. This power is certainly still present from the start of the 102
nd
 – 112th Congress period, 
and even to some extent at the end. The greatest difference between the Southerners and the entirety 
of the Democratic House Caucus was in the 104
th
 Congress, where the southern average was almost 
ten points higher than the Democratic average. This was the Congress in which the aforementioned 
Blue Dog Caucus was formed, and given the disparity between the Southern block (much of the Blue 
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Figure 3.5- House I-Score Averages, All Democrats v. Southern Democrats. 
All Dem I-Scores: Southern Dem I-Scores:
  
 
92 
 
 
Dog Coalition was drawn from the South) and the rest of the party, it is unsurprising that these fiscal 
conservatives formed their own caucus at this point. The point of least difference between the South 
and the Democratic Party average came, unsurprisingly given the inexorable process of polarization at 
this time, much later in the 110
th
 Congress. In the 110
th
 Congress, Southern Democrats were only 
1.95% more independent in their voting than their party average. The gap between the South and the 
rest increased slightly to 2.728% in the 111
th
 Congress, before the South gained a significant 7.6% 
lead over the Democratic Caucus average in the 112
th 
Congress. The next noteworthy trend from 
Figure 3.5 is that in every single congress from 1991 onwards when the Democratic Party I-Scores 
increased, the Southern scores increased; and every time the Democrats’ I-Scores fell, the Southerners 
I-Scores fell. To identify the aforementioned ‘Southern modifier’, i.e. the degree to which the 
southern block influenced the party as a whole, I begin by tracing the difference between the Southern 
contingent and the whole party over time (as in the case of the figures cited above). Figure 3.6 shows 
the difference between the average I-Score for the whole Democratic Party and the average I-Scores 
for that party’s southern contingent. As noted the greatest spike is in the 104th Congress. Many of 
these independent/moderate/conservative Democrats in fact defected to the Republicans (see above 
for several noteworthy examples from the Blue Dog Caucus).
346
 As the numbers of southern 
Democrats plummeted (see Figure 3.7), the survivors became much more willing to break with the 
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party line; likely to maximise their electoral chances in competitive districts and avoid what Carson et 
al call the ‘electoral costs of party loyalty.’347 Similarly to my analysis of the Blue Dog Caucus, I will 
consider the I-Scores of the southern Democrats against the I-Scores of the Democratic Party as it 
would if it had no southerners at all. Because we have established that Southerners are (on average) 
more moderate than the mainstream of the Democratic Party elite, this is the best way of actually 
quantifying the southern influence on the party. I have already considered a comparison of southern 
scores and all Democratic scores, but by removing the southern states from the Democratic average 
figure, we can gauge how statistically important the southerners are to moderating the party, and 
perhaps most crucially, to providing ideological variety. How much ‘pull’ do the southerners actually 
exert, once I-Scores are weighted for the numbers of Southern Democrats? Figure 3.8 shows three 
averages over the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 congresses. Firstly, the Democratic Party’s scores in the House 
without any southern states represented; secondly, southern Democratic scores on their own; and, 
thirdly, all Democratic scores. This is distinct from Figure 3.5 which just shows southern Democratic 
scores against all Democratic scores, because it allows us to weight the influence of the southerners. 
In every single congress from the 102
nd
 through to the 112
th
, the average of Southern I-Scores was 
higher than the average of ‘Democratic Party minus southern state’ I-Scores. This approach may have 
some forecasting potential as well; we know that numbers of southern democrats are in a long term 
decline, Fiorina et al. have set out their comprehensive theory of party sorting on the mass level, the 
retirement and replacement of old southerners means that the process of realignment is finally 
overcoming the obstacle of office-holders with their incumbency advantage, therefore ‘elite sorting’ is 
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Figure 3.7- Number of Southern Democrats in the House of 
Representatives. 
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now taking place. I have also established a consistent trend for higher levels of party unity and 
correspondingly low I-Scores. Therefore considering the Democratic Party without its historically 
moderate-to-conservative southern wing makes for an unfortunately relevant exploration of how the 
party is likely to look in the near future, should current trends continue. That said, many southern 
Democrats represent small pockets of liberal voters in Southern states, so the extinction of the entire 
southern wing of the party is extremely unlikely. Instead these members will likely become more 
liberal as they represent gerrymandered urban districts with little-to-no rural areas. It is possible that 
the southern wing of the party will still exist, it just simply won’t be conservative and/or centrist 
anymore. For instance, southern Democrats in the 111
th
 Congress included congressmen like Charlie 
Gonzalez (D-TX) and Al Green (D-TX) who had I-Scores of just 1%; placing them on the same I-
Score percentile as Californian, New Yorker and Rhode Island liberal Democrats. Obviously we 
cannot infer that a district is conservative or liberal based solely on its state, (as shown by the startling 
loyalty of those southern Democrats named above). However we can draw from this that redistricting 
has had a tremendous effect in tightening party unity. On the Democratic side, even in the South, 
liberal constituents are grouped together and elect increasingly liberal representatives, who chose 
increasingly liberal leadership once in Congress. This is the cycle of decreasing I-Scores. This occurs 
on both sides of the aisle. Given this degenerating I-Score cycle, and the continued decline in 
Southern numbers, the increasing party unity of the surviving representatives is probable.  Figure 3.9 
shows the historic significant of the southern wing, with an eye towards what will happen to the larger 
party when this historically vital constituency is no more, or else is severely weakened. As with 
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Figure 3.5, which compared all Democrats (including the South) with just southerners, Figure 3.8 
shows the impact of removing the southern conservative branch from the party as a whole. My 
analysis also finds that where I-Scores for the non-southern democrats rise, the I-Scores for southern 
democrats rise too. Equally when they drop for the non-southern congressmen they drop for the 
southern ones. This seems to strengthen the explanation for party unity as a function of majority 
House control because even ill-sorted members respond to majority control with slightly lower I-
Scores and higher party cohesion. The difference between ‘All Democrats’ and ‘Democrats Minus 
Southerners’ in Figure 3.8 also reveals the precise extent to which the baseline scores are pulled up by 
the presence of the southern contingent. The impact is not gigantic, but it is consistent across the 
entire twenty year period. The southern moderate/conservative branch of the Democratic Party exerts 
a pull of 1 or 2% on the I-Scores of the whole party across the twenty year period from the 102
nd
 
congress. See Figure 3.9 for the “Southern Modifier,” weighing the ‘All Democrats’ line in Figure 3.8 
against the ‘Democrats Minus Southerners’ line to quantify how much actual impact they have on 
moderating the whole party average I-Score. This accounts for their actual impact in Democratic 
mean I-Scores, rather than just showing the difference between the South and the rest as in Figure 3.5. 
Unfortunately, after weighting the Southern average for how many of them there actually are and then 
considering the difference between ‘All Democrats’ and ‘Democrats Minus Southerners’ we find that 
the large differences between the two groups actually have very little impact- owing primarily to the 
very low numbers of Southern Democrats still in Congress during this period. For instance, during the 
104
th
 Congress the Southern Democrats had an average gap of 12% from the rest of their party, but 
after weighting this only translates into a 4% “pull” on the whole party average. That such a small 
coalition can have any effect at all is impressive, and certainly worthy of academic study, but we can 
0.00%
2.00%
4.00%
6.00%
8.00%
10.00%
12.00%
14.00%
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
I-
S
co
re
 A
v
er
a
g
es
 
 
Figure 3.9- Weighted 'Pull' of Southern Democrats. 
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see that as time goes on the ‘Weighted Impact’ line of Figure 3.9 shows that the Southerners have 
very little pull. To extend the allegory, they are a small, low mass trying to exert a gravitational pull 
on a much larger body (the Democratic Party as a whole). The southerners can create “waves” 
(registering at less than 2% in all congresses save the 104
th
 and 112
th
), but they cannot change the 
direction of the party as a whole without much greater numbers than they have now. Any ideological 
moves further away from the left would likely result in successful primary challenges in a mirror 
image of the Tea Party threat to the Republican establishment. 
In a time when party cohesion is at record highs (a symptom, cause and measure of 
polarization), any group or caucus which mitigates against party unity and injects some independent 
voting into Congress must be welcome. As with other trends, the 112
th
 congress offered some hope 
for great party disunity and commensurately high independence; the I-Scores of the southerners 
rocketed up, mirroring and exceeding an increase in I-Scores in that congress. It is interesting to note 
this rise in southern Democratic I-Scores during the 112
th
 Congress. Despite the increase in difference 
between the south and the rest of the caucus, the Democratic Party as a whole became markedly more 
rebellious in the 112
th
 Congress (likely in part a result of losing the Majority status).
348
 The Southern 
Democrats therefore conform to the pattern alluded to by the data on the 110
th
 Congress in Chapter 
Two, that majority parties are (almost always in this period) more conformist than minority ones. 
However, despite this influence, like the Blue Dog Caucus, the numbers of Southern Democrats are 
declining. The linear trend of Figure 3.7 shows the pattern of decline in Southern Democratic 
numbers. Since the 102
nd
 Congress first met in January 1991, the southern block has declined by over 
half from 80 members to a lowly 38. Brief increases of southern numbers during the 108
th
, 110
th
 and 
111
th
 congresses have not changed the trend of decline, and I wager that the “referendum effect” on 
President Obama has been a significant obstacle on down-ticket races for conservative-moderate 
Democrats in competitive districts.
349
  
Across this twenty year period, a state by state breakdown shows which states are more 
conservative/moderate/independent, compared to the Democratic baseline. Taking the simple average 
of every state’s I-Score over the period of the 102nd to 112th congresses, we can put the states into a 
roughly coherent hierarchy of which had the most independent, and therefore most moderate (or in 
this case centrist-conservative) delegations over the entire twenty years. For the sake of comparison, I 
have also included an average of all Democratic House members over that same period. The 
Democratic “average of averages” is less moderate than every state save North Carolina, which it 
beats by 0.643% (see Figure 3.10). Figure 3.10 visualises simply why the Southern Democrats are 
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such an important component of American politics. In a two party system with an extremely high 
threshold for third party candidates/parties,
350
 variation within the two dominant groups is preferable 
to tight party unity and low independence scores (and far more proportional to the American 
electorate as a whole). Representing a broader range of ideological opinions in Congress, rather than 
simply the two doctrines espoused by the party leadership in Congress, should be the aim of a 
democratic system. The Southern Democrats are a key part of that system but are being driven out of 
politics by the partisan-polarization of the current climate. I will consider another incongruent group 
now, North Eastern Republicans.  
 
Regional I-Scores from the 102
nd
 to the 112
th
 Congress (Northern Republicans). 
As with the above sections on the Blue Dog Caucus and the Southern Democrats, I will limit 
my analysis here to the House only. Future studies could develop the I-Score methodology by 
considering Senate and House comparisons within (and between) the various groupings I consider 
here. For our purposes though, the House is a much better barometer of short-term peaks and troughs 
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Figure 3.10- Average Southern Democratic I-Scores, 102nd-112th House 
  
 
98 
 
 
in I-Score behaviour. The Senate is more insulated from these effects, as indeed it was designed to 
be.
351
 The North Eastern (sometimes just called Northern or Eastern) wing of the GOP was 
traditionally the ‘liberal’352 branch of the Republican Party and home to groups like the Rockefeller 
Republicans. A lively policy debate existed within the GOP
353
 as a broad ideological coalition co-
existed under one party. The 1964 defeat of radical Barry Goldwater led to a period of moderate 
Republican rule under Richard Nixon,
354
 but eventually the conservative wing of the GOP seized the 
advantage under Ronald Reagan and George Bush Senior, finally achieving a conservative majority in 
Congress with Newt Gingrich and his “Contract with America” in 1994. As a result of this elite 
sorting of the Republican Party, the once substantive liberal wing, concentrated primarily in the 
North, was virtually wiped out. These Northern states, Maryland, Delaware, New York, Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 
saw a precipitous collapse in their Republican representation. Figure 2.3 in Chapter Two, shows this 
trend of decline in full. Along similar lines to my analysis of the Southern Democrats, I will show 
here how the Northern Republicans have historically moderated the more conservative tendencies of 
their party by finding a ‘Northern Modifier’ to quantify the effect the Northern contingent had on the 
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Domestic Affairs’ taken from http://millercenter.org/president/nixon/essays/biography/4 accessed on 5th May 
2014.  
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112
Figure 3.11- Comparison Between All Republicans, All Republicans Minus 
Northerners, and Only Northern Republicans. 
Republicans Minus
Northerners:
Northern
Republicans:
All Republicans:
  
 
99 
 
 
Republican Party as a whole. Firstly then, how do Northern Republican scores compare to the 
Republican Party without its liberal/moderate Eastern wing?  
Figure 3.11 shows a similar pattern to the corresponding analysis of Southern Democrats. 
Except in the 105
th
 and 106
th
 congresses, when the ‘Republican minus Northerners’ I-Scores go up, so 
too do the Northern I-Scores. Equally, when the ‘Republican minus Northerners’ scores go down, the 
Northern figures drop. Aside from the two congresses mentioned, there is a tight correlation between 
the movement of the Northern scores and the movement of the party as a whole. However, whilst the 
northern scores might rise and drop with the party average, they are significantly higher than the GOP 
mainstream. The two greatest differences between the Republicans without the Northern congressmen 
and the Northern contingent alone occurred in the 102
nd
 and 110
th
 congresses. In these two cases the 
gap was 7.56 and 6.86 I-Score points respectively. The lowest difference between the two groups was 
in the 112
th
 congress, where the gap was only 2.38%, a testament to the efficacy of elite level sorting. 
 
From Figure 3.12, we can see that the Northern Republicans are significantly more 
independent (and therefore more moderate according to the correlation found by Clinton et al) than 
the party average. However when we consider the difference between ‘Republicans Minus 
Northerners’ and ‘All Republicans’, we can see that the effect, once weighted, of this Northern 
contingent starts at a low level and grows increasingly diminished by the time of the 112
th
 Congress. 
Over the entire period the North Eastern Modifier is an average of just 0.82%, compared with a 
difference between ‘All Republicans’ and ‘All Republicans Minus Northerners’ of 4.59%. As with 
Southern Democrats, we can already see how the Northerners’ limited numbers mitigate the impact of 
their high I-Scores, though their mitigating effect is consistent. Figure 3.11 shows just how high the 
Northern scores are compared to the party average however when weighted (as in Figure 3.12) the 
analysis reveals how insignificant the Northern Modifier (the degree to which Northern I-Scores 
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Figure 3.12- The Wighted Impact of Northern Republicans on Party I-
Scores. 
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moderate the whole Republican House Conference) now is. In every single Congress from the 102
nd
 
onwards, the Northern Republicans moderated their party by less than 2%. Despite some large gaps 
between the average scores of the Northerners v the ‘GOP minus Northerners’ group, (7.56% and 
6.86% in the 102
nd
 and110th Congresses respectively), the modifier starts low and then stagnates as 
Northern GOP numbers decrease (again see Figure X in Chapter Two). Again I reiterate the argument 
that a range of ideology is normatively good for a democracy, particularly one which operates in a 
rigid two-party system. The sadly shallow (though consistent) effect of the Northern Republicans, 
despite their proven independence from party control and (relatively) high I-Scores, is a new way of 
measuring polarization, not in terms of differences between parties, but differences within them. By 
simply comparing DW-NOMINATE party mean points (for instance) to demonstrate that polarization 
is taking place, we risk obscuring how polarization occurs and within which ideological groups it is 
taking place. We also risk obscuring which groups and caucuses are driving the process, either 
through the success in radicalising parties, or their failure in moderating them. With so much attention 
on the Tea Party I wonder if the more important story, the contribution of remaining southern 
Democrats and northern Republicans, has been somewhat (if not entirely) neglected. Given that the 
Tea Party only modified Republican I-Scores by -0.02% in the 112
th
 Congress, perhaps the modifying 
effect of the Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans (2.3% and 0.28% respectively) should be 
considered more prominently in the analysis of polarization. The Tea Party may only be a temporary 
presence, but the decline of these two large regional constituencies is far more significant. We can see 
this as, even given their historically low, stagnating modifier effects, these two groups still score 
higher than the Tea Party does in influencing their parties in hard, quantifiable I-Score averages.  
 
Comparing Regional and Tea Party Modifiers: Who Influences Party I-Scores Most? 
 
 
  
 
Congress: 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 
Southern Democrat 
Modifier: 1.00% 0.77% 3.90% 1.52% 1.51% 0.97% 1.30% 1.36% 0.60% 0.68% 2.30% 
Northern Republican 
Modifier: 1.66% 1.39% 0.68% 1.02% 0.84% 0.44% 0.44% 0.87% 1.00% 0.35% 0.28% 
Tea Party - - - - - - - - - - 
Minus 
0.02% 
Figure 3.13 above compares the modifier of the Southern Democrats, the Northern 
Republicans and the Tea Party. As the data for my study only considers a range from the 102
nd
 to the 
Figure 3.13- Comparison of Southern Democrat, Northern Republican and Tea Party Weighted 
I-Score Modifiers (%). 
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112
th
 congress, change after that time cannot be considered, but would present an opportunity for 
further study on how different caucuses affect I-Score and intra-party polarization. The numbers 
marked in bold are the larger of the two (or three) modifiers considered, whilst those in italics are 
smaller. In eight of the eleven congresses I consider, the southern Democrats moderated their party 
more than the Northern Republicans moderated theirs. The limited impact of the Tea Party (at least in 
quantifiable I-Score terms) can be seen in their very low minus 0.02% modifier during the 112
th
 
congress; this is the lowest modifier for any regional grouping/caucus I considered across the entire 
period. This indicates that the Tea Party was almost identically positioned on the conformist-
independent axis as the rest of the Republican Party and if anything made it more conformist, albeit 
by a statistically insignificant amount. Given the small increase in DW-NOMINATE scores for the 
GOP between the 111
th
 and 112
th
 congress the Tea Party seems to have had relatively little outright 
impact on the Republican House I-Scores in the 112
th
 congress (perhaps due to their relatively small 
numbers compared to the entire congressional Republican Party). As with what we see in Northern 
Republican influence on the House Republican average, even wild variations in I-Scores between 
groups can have very little impact on the party as a whole if the numbers of the minority caucus are 
insufficient to pull the average I-Scores away from party conformity/unity. What is clear however is 
that the modifying effect of both Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats is in decline. Both 
groups have had a consistent, if limited, effect on their parties in the past twenty years. Elite level 
sorting, mirroring the mass trend described by Fiorina et al,
355
 is pushing the moderates out of both 
parties. It is crucial to emphasise that this is not just a Tea Party phenomenon whereby radical right 
candidates push out “establishment”, more mainstream Republicans. In fact, at the end of this period, 
the impact of the Tea Party on Republican I-Scores in the 112
th
 congress was almost negligible. Given 
the very small increase in DW-NOMINATE scores these two measures point to limited ideological 
achievements of the Tea Party caucus. Indeed, from the 111
th
 Congress to the 112
th
, the decline of 
Northern Republicans had a far larger detrimental effect on Republican I-Score diversity than did the 
meagre minus 0.02% contribution of the Tea Party towards party homogeneity. This is not to say that 
the Tea Party has had no effect, far from it; their ability to block nominations, filibuster, deploy 
extremist rhetoric all contributed to the further toxification of the 112
th
 congress from the already 
polarized 111
th
, but the scope of the rebellion is very small, and likely transitory (though as I 
acknowledge my data for this study only extends to the 112
th
 congress). Given the obstacles to a third 
party in the American electoral system,
356
 diversity within the two parties so that they can represent a 
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broader range of American public opinion (of which there is a particular deficit in the centre) is 
crucial. It is clear that this philosophical diversity is decreasing, as gerrymandering leads to more 
ideological representatives being elected, tightening party conformity in both parties and both 
chambers allowing a stronger and more polarized party leadership to dominate. Whilst much public 
(and press) attention has focused on the Tea Party, the decline of the Southern Democrats and the 
Northern Republicans actually has far worse long-term consequences for American politics and 
policy-making in Congress. This is clear from the dwindling potential of these two regional groups to 
modify the average I-Scores of their respective parties. Future analysis of I-Scores could consider 
modifiers based on legislator ethnicity, committee membership and/or seniority, legislator experience 
and Senators who previously served in the House (among other factors) to further breakdown which 
segments of Congress are driving increases in party unity and which clusters are still resisting with 
relatively high I-Scores. The modifiers I develop here, and the examples I suggest of further research, 
demonstrate the contributions of I-Scores to the literature, and distinguish I-Scores from typical 
measures of party unity (both in methodology, analysis and the emphasis they place on the important 
dissenters). Though the modifiers of these moderate groups are shrinking along with their numbers, 
the fact that they still exist as late as the 112
th
 congress, and that the 112
th
 saw a general increase in I-
Scores, both make these dissenter-groups worthy of study; and indeed, vital to understanding how 
congress has ‘sorted’ at the elite level into the two polarized blocks seen today. If there is to be any 
move back to heterogeneous parties,
357
 careful monitoring and study of these high I-Scoring groups is 
vital to explaining it, whilst the methodology itself provides the means to do this. 
 
The Impact of Majority House Control on Average Party I-Scores.  
I have referred several times to the theory or expectation that parties in the Majority exhibit 
stronger party unity, and lower I-Scores. I expand upon this now and present I-Score evidence for it. 
This tighter party unity may well be a result of Lawrence et al.’s finding that of all models to explain 
party loyalty in Congress a ‘model based on majority party agenda control works well’.358 To control 
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this agenda, high levels of party unity are required; which then yield cartel benefits
359
 in the form of 
legislation passed. Rather than presenting Republican or Democratic I-Scores, I organise the data 
irrespective of party label into ‘Majority Party’ or ‘Minority Party’ (see Figure 3.14). I find that from 
the 102
nd
 to the 112
th
 Congress the Majority Party in the House has an average I-Score of 7.75%, 
whilst the Minority Party has an average I-Score of 10.966%. Whilst this does not seem a particularly 
large difference, it does lead to some interesting results, and it is consistent. In every single Congress 
from 1991 to 2013, the Minority Party has had a higher I-Score than the Majority Party. There are no 
exceptions to this rule in the period of my dataset (102
nd
 to the 112
th
 congresses). The closest the 
Minority Party came to having an equal or higher I-Score than the Majority was in the 109
th
 Congress, 
when the Democrats ranked at 4.244%, compared with the Republicans 3.82%. From the 109
th
 
Congress through to the 111
th
, the Democrats ranked 4.244% (Minority), 3.663% (Majority) and 
4.23% (Majority); indicating that the high levels of party unity found in the 109
th
 Congress’ 
Democratic Minority were part of a broader, six-year period of more conformist Democratic voting. 
These last two years in the minority (the 109
th
 Congress) and the six year period as a whole (109
th
 to 
111
th
 Congresses) are in stark contrast to the Democrats’ “wilderness” period from the 104th Congress 
to the 108
th
, when they achieved I-Scores of 17%, 13%, 11%, 10% and 8%. Controlling the house has 
a clear relationship to lower I-Scores; but within this trend another can be seen. Though I-Scores are 
in a period of decline (see Figure 3.2), Figure 3.14 finds one unusual, though not explicitly anomalous 
result. Though the trend of Majority status meaning lower I-Scores remains unbroken, the 112
th
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Figure 3.14- Average House I-Scores by Majority/Minority Status. 
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Congress might indicate a change in fortune. In that Congress the House saw increased I-Scores in the 
Republican Party (despite them transitioning from Minority to Majority status) and a fairly dramatic 
increase in Democratic Party I-Scores (doubling from 4.23% to 9.84%) after a long period of party 
unity (from the 109
th
 to 111
th
 congresses in particular). Interestingly, the 112
th
 congress is the only 
time when the incoming Majority is more independent than the outgoing Minority. However, the 112
th
 
Congress had its own political landscape, at least partially shaped by the Tea Party
360
 and 
extraordinary levels of polarization around healthcare and the economy,
361
 so we cannot take the 112
th
 
congress alone as evidence for a U-turn in party cohesion. Further studies in the future could consider 
a later period from the 112
th
 congress to establish whether the trend from 1991 towards lower I-Scores 
is maintained or reversed; the data available at present does not permit such a study here, though the 
methodology does.  
There are some “common-sense” reasons for why this relationship exists, such as thwarting a 
Senate and/or White House controlled by the opposition party (i.e. the Democrats in the 110
th
 
Congress, or the Republicans in the 112
th
 Congress), pushing through an agenda whilst in possession 
of all three branches of government for only a short period of time (i.e. the Democrats in the 111
th
 
Congress),
362
 holding only a narrow majority of seats or simply one party being of a more narrow 
ideological range than the other. Indeed there is evidence aside from my own I-Score analysis to 
suggest that the Democratic Party has become more cohesive than the GOP. Using data from DW-
NOMINATE Dylan Matthews of the Washington Post finds that ‘the trend has been for Democrats-
especially in the Senate - to grow more unified as the Republicans stay the same’. …. ‘if anything, in 
recent years [Democrats] have grown more ideologically coherent than the Republicans.’ 363 Although 
my analysis of the House finds that Democrats were narrowly more independent than Republicans 
over the entire period (9.972 to 9.097) such a crude average cannot tell us much about continuity and 
change over a twenty year period which has seen record polarization (and within that trend extreme 
levels of party unity). Just taking the last six congresses, from the 107
th
 to the 112
th
, we find that the 
Democratic I-Score lead falls from 0.875 over the whole period to just 0.559 over the 107
th
-112
th
 
period, yet in the time from the 110
th
 Congress to the 112
th
 (inclusive) we find a Republican I-Score 
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lead of 2.41; quite a reversal. This suggests that the Democrats are becoming more conformist more 
quickly than the GOP are, despite the GOP’s Northern contingent collapsing and exerting just a 
meagre average 0.543% pull over the entire Republican House Conference.  
In other words, despite losing most of their Northern/North-Eastern representation in the 
House the GOP still exhibits a wider range of I-Scores than the Democrats do with their 
comparatively healthy Southern cohort (which exerted a 1.19% pull over the whole Democratic 
House Caucus over the period of the 110
th
-112
th
 congress). Both parties are becoming more 
conformist (save the upsurge in the 112
th
 congress, which may be anomalous), but the Democrats are 
becoming more conformist more quickly than the Republican Party is. The question to ask from this 
finding, therefore, is whether there is some feature of the Republican Party which makes them 
intrinsically more rebellious in their voting, and their Conference more ideologically varied than the 
Democrats? Clearly Majority status exhibits some “pull” over I-Scores as individual regional groups 
do (I calculate this below), but is there some contingent feature of the GOP which makes them less 
willing to follow the party line?
364
 In Chapter Four I consider one possible dimension for exploring 
this, along a libertarian-authoritarian voting axis. As for the Democrats in the House, they only 
controlled the House in four of the congresses I study, so when they were in power the party 
leadership had obvious reasons to control the party more tightly in order to further their agenda. I will 
turn to this question after discussing the impact of Majority control on Senate I-Scores.  
As with the sections above on ‘modifiers’ pulling aggregate party I-Scores, I will now 
consider whether ‘Majority-control’ and ‘Minority-control’ modifiers exist. I will quantify the 
difference over the entire period between a party in Majority and Minority, to see (on average), by 
how many I-Score percentage points a party changes its behaviour when it controls the levers of 
power in the House. Intriguingly, despite the Democrats being narrowly (less than a percentage point) 
less cohesive than the GOP over the whole period, we find that Majority or Minority status has a far 
greater impact on the Democratic Party than on the Republicans. Taking scores from the whole 
period, I find that on average Majority status modified the Democratic Party average by -2.243%; 
meaning that when in the Majority the Party loses (on average) 2.243% from its I-Score rating. 
Minority status on the other hand, increases the Democratic Party average I-Score by 1.282%. As for 
the Republicans, Majority status takes a slight 0.841% off their aggregate I-Score, whilst Minority 
status increases their disobedience to party leadership by 2.427 I-Score points. Worryingly, Majority 
status completely eclipses the I-Score contribution of the Southern Democrats, their average +1.45% 
contribution to stalling party cohesion is wiped out completely by Majority status inducing a -2.24 
                                                          
 
364
 Much has been made of this in the media in recent years, with intra-party debates over immigration, national 
security, drone warfare, warrantless surveillance to name but a few.  
  
 
106 
 
 
drop in Democratic I-Score behaviour over the same time frame. On the other hand the Northern 
Republican contribution of +0.82% is narrowly overtaken by a GOP “Majority Modifier” of -0.84%. 
When parties enter government, they become more, not less, extreme. Figure 3.15 shows how each 
“Modifier” has contributed to (or mitigated against) decreasing I-Scores of the party average in the 
House. 
 
This figure visualises how the advantages of the various regional moderates within the party 
are neutralized by Majority status. This is quite perverse given that to achieve majority status a party 
will often rely on electing moderates from competitive districts; and yet the I-Score contributions of 
these independent minded congressmen are completely undone by the impact of Majority control on 
the net average. To conclude for now, there are any number of reasons why a party would be more 
tightly regulated by the leadership in Majority status, and I find clear evidence that party cohesion 
increases in the House. In every single Congress of my dataset I-Scores fell below their opposition 
when a party entered the Majority. Clearly in the House, Majority status is a reasonable predictor of 
which party will be more independent in its voting; across the period of the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 congress the 
Majority was less independent every time. Is this true of the Senate? 
 
 
The Impact of Majority Senate Control on Average Party I-Scores.  
Having considered the House, our attention now turns to the Senate in order to ascertain 
whether holding the Majority affects the more independent-minded Senate in the same way it does in 
the House. To test whether holding the Majority has the same impact on Senate conformity as it does 
on House conformity, I have conducted the same analysis for the Senate as I ran for the House and 
considered Majority v Minority I-Scores irrespective of party. From this I find a similar result in the 
Southern Democrat Modifier:
Northern Republican Modifier:
Majority Modifier GOP
Majority Modifier Dem
Minority Modifier GOP
Minority Modifer Dem
Southern
Democrat
Modifier:
Northern
Republican
Modifier:
Majority
Modifier GOP
Majority
Modifier Dem
Minority
Modifier GOP
Minority Modifer
Dem
Series1 1.45 0.82 -0.841558442 -2.243840909 2.427727273 1.282194805
Figure 3.15- Relative Impact of Different Modifiers on Party Behaviour. 
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Senate as in the House. In all but two congressional sessions (the 105
th
 and 106
th 
senates) the Minority 
Party had a higher I-Score than the Majority Party. Figure 3.16 plots the average I-Scores of Majority 
and Minority parties in the Senate, and despite the two outliers the Minority Party was consistently 
more independent in its voting behaviour than their Majority counterparts. 
 
Interestingly, despite party cohesion increasing over time from the 102
nd
 congress, from the 110
th
 
congress onwards a large c.10% gap opened between the Senate Majority and the Senate Minority. As 
I advocated towards the start of this paper, by using qualitative information to inform the data 
analysis, I would attribute this phenomenon to the Democratic Majority in the 110
th
, 111
th
 and 112
th
 
Senates trying to push their agenda in a highly partisan environment where deals between the two 
parties were virtually unheard of. The Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) is perhaps the best example 
of this, (see Chapter Four). Meanwhile, individual Republican Senators sought to distance themselves 
from the unpopular Bush White House in the 110
th
 Senate (leading to high Minority Party I-Scores) 
and then in the 111
th
 and 112
th
 Senates, without control over the Executive Branch, they did not have 
as strong a policy-incentive for tight part unity; the Democrats’ hold over the House and Presidency 
meant that the Republican agenda was stalled, thus there were no legislative inducements for high 
party unity. It might be said then that losing the Majority status impacts on the ‘cartel’ behaviour 
described by Cox and McCubbins,
365
 perhaps loosening the bonds between members because one 
incentive (legislation and policy) is no longer within the gift of the party leadership. This is an 
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example of what Cox and McCubbins call the ‘benefits’366 of office-holding; when these benefits are 
lost I-Scores are the beneficiary and party unity declines (if only relative to the Majority Party). 
As for a party-by-party breakdown, on average, from the 102
nd
 to 112
th
 congresses, the 
Republican Party had a Senate I-Score of 13.026%. Whilst in the Majority their I-Score average over 
this period was over three points lower, at 9.782%. Whilst in the Minority however, their I-Score 
average was 15.730%. Clearly holding Minority rather than Majority status makes a significant 
difference in voting behaviour in the Senate as in the House. For the Democratic Party the average for 
both Minority and Majority status over the twenty year period was 10.369%, three percent lower than 
the comparable Republican Party average for both Majority and Minority status. The Democrats held 
the Senate in six of these eleven senates, so this could influence their total average; as they were in the 
Majority for two years longer than the Republicans were in the same time frame. Though, as noted 
above as two exceptions to the general rule of Majority status indicating lower I-Scores, in both the 
105
th
 and 106
th
 Senate the Republicans were in the Majority but were still more independent/moderate 
in their voting than the Democratic Minority. Whilst holding Majority status the Democratic average 
I-Score was 9.689, which is just fractionally lower than the Republican equivalent score (9.689 to 
9.782 respectively). As the Minority Party the Democrats voted against their party in 11.185% of 
votes; 4.545% less than the Republican figure of 15.730%. Given this, is there just something innate 
to the GOP which makes them less loyal to central party leadership, and more fractious, given the 
heterogeneity of their scores? 
 
Party Variety in the GOP, or Minority/Majority Status? 
To answer the question posed above I consider the range (i.e. the difference between the 
highest and lowest score) of I-Scores of each party, in both the House and the Senate, across the entire 
period. Figure 3.17 was derived from finding the highest and lowest I-Score of each party per 
Congress in both the House and Senate, and then finding the average of the two numbers. For instance 
in the 102
nd
 Congress the highest Republican I-Score in the House was 43%, the lowest was 3% 
giving a difference of 40. Whilst in the 102
nd
 Senate the difference between the highest and lowest 
Republican I-Score was 31. The average of 31 and 40 is 35.5, which is plotted below in that manner 
for both parties across the entire period. Further research could conduct a large-scale I-Score analysis 
along these lines. Clearly, the Republican Party exhibits a much wider range of I-Scores than the 
Democratic Party does. 
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Even in the 104
th
 House, when the Democrats were far more independent than the 
Republicans were, (an I-Score of 17.258 compared to a GOP score of 9.890), and where 94 of the top 
100 most conformist congressmen were Republicans
367
 the GOP still had a higher range of I-Scores 
than the Democrats did. So even whilst the Republican Conference was more united, it still had a very 
wide range of scores. The Democrats on the other hand, are growing more conformist (see above) and 
exhibit a much smaller range of I-Scores across the period. There is some considerable volatility in 
the figures, particularly in the first half of the period considered, and I attribute this to those 
ideological outliers who (at that time) were yet to be “sorted” into the “correct” part (as Fiorina et al. 
describe it, simply at the elite rather than mass level). There is only limited space here and this is not a 
predominantly qualitative study, but this evidence does point to some innate quality of the modern 
Republican Party which is more factional than the modern Democratic Party is. There is an extremely 
voluminous literature on the makeup of both members and supporters of each party but our focus is on 
the elite level. Are Republicans more ideologically varied than the modern Democrats? I will consider 
party variety through the prism of one key issue in the next chapter, namely the national security state 
and civil liberties.  
 
Conclusion. 
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Given the state of the two increasingly distant, polarized parties, academics have derived a 
variety of methodologies to explain why American politics has become so partisan. DW-NOMINATE 
is perhaps the most important of these, whilst a variety of party unity scores exist to measure party 
cohesion and homogeneity. In this chapter the I-Score approaches the polarization puzzle from the 
perspective of intra-party splits. Which groups and regions are contributing most to I-Scores, and how 
have they declined? We know that as polarization increases, party unity goes up and I-Scores fall,
368
 
so it is vital to study which groups, caucuses, states and regions provide the most in the way of 
moderating the party cohesion tendencies of the modern American parties in Congress. As well as 
internal groups like the Tea Party or Blue Dog caucus, the power of a given party (whether it is in the 
Majority or Minority) also plays a large role in a party’s average I-Score for that Congress. These 
internal splits (one of which, on national security, I shall dissect in Chapter Four) are not necessarily 
“fractures” or “rows” in a negative sense, but a vital part of representative Democracy. Short of some 
drastic reformation, internal party democracy and vibrant internal party debates are among the most 
potent tools against a model of American politics where two homogenous (and extreme) parties vie 
for votes from a disenchanted centre, whilst any hope of a third party challenge is suppressed by the 
intricate web of state and national law which privileges the established duopoly on electoral power.  
Despite the broad academic consensus on elite polarization, as late as the 110
th
, 111
th
 and 
112
th
 Senates, the GOP were still voting (on average) 15, 14.7 and 15.8 percent of the time against 
their party leadership. The Democrats have become more conformist, and as my analysis shows the 
extinction of their Southern wing and the decline of the Blue Dog Caucus is largely to blame for this.  
If there is hope for undoing the damage of polarization, these groups must be part of the answer, and 
are therefore worthy of study, even if they are numerically weaker than they were a generation ago. If 
anything, that makes academic attention even more pressing. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: I-Scores in Practice; Three Issue Case Studies. 
 
Chapter Abstract 
I will now consider polarization through the prism of three legislative case studies, to 
demonstrate what I-Scores can tell us about party heterogeneity and variety in the 
modern Congress. I review two domestic issues from the early days of President 
Obama’s first term, which produced unanimous (or near-unanimous) party-line voting; 
these are healthcare reform in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the $1 
trillion stimulus in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. I will then consider a 
third issue, national security, which has broken the familiar frame of polarized parties. I 
also offer some suggestions for refining and developing the I-Score methodology because 
of this unusual, non-partisan polarization. 
 
Introduction. 
Many votes in Congress today are near-perfect expressions of party unity.
369
 Whilst most 
debates fall on left or right divisions,
370
 the exposure of the NSA’s mass surveillance programme has 
developed new, elite-level cleavages in Congress which do not fall on party lines.
371
 Analysis of 
polarization on an issue-by-issue basis demonstrates what I-Scores reveal about party unity- and fault-
lines where the left/right divide plotted by DW-NOMINATE is no longer sufficient on its own. 
Congressional Quarterly’s breakdown of ‘party unity’ votes reveals that by 2013 ‘House Republicans 
voted unanimously [in] 25 percent of party unity votes…[and] House Democrats voted unanimously 
[in] 22% of the party unity votes’372 which was an all-time high. Over in the Senate, Democrats voted 
‘unanimously on 52 percent of the party unity votes in 2013- an all-time high for either party in either 
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  As early as 2000, Snyder and Groseclose found ‘strong evidence of party influence’ on ‘key procedural 
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Congressional Roll-Call Voting’ in The American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2, (April, 2000).  
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 As argued by Poole and Rosenthal, ‘Voting in Congress is now almost purely one-dimensional’ in ‘The 
Polarization of the Congressional Parties’, (19th January, 2014) taken from 
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp accessed on 4th June 2014. 
371
 Such as the very public split between John McCain and Rand Paul (among many other examples).  
372
 ‘CQ Roll Call’s Vote Studies – 2013 In Review’, 3rd February 2014, taken from 
http://media.cq.com/votestudies/ accessed on 6
th
 June 2014. 
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chamber’ whilst for Republicans this figure (in the Senate) was 31%.373 The I-Scores develop this 
analysis and explores how the decline of specific groups, regions and factions within the two parties 
have actually led to this phenomenon of low independent-voting and the incredible levels of party 
cohesion that exist today (see Chapter Three above). By now exploring polarization through the prism 
of three specific issues we can see how Congress actually functions (or fails to function) in this 
environment. I have picked these three issues to illustrate two cases of “typical” polarization in action, 
and one to demonstrate where I-Scores may succeed in offering some fresh insight not provided by 
other more established methodologies. I also offer some suggestions refining I-Scores and developing 
them for further study. 
Clearly it is somewhat artificial to consider a political issue in detachment from others. For 
instance, Alter notes that the Obama administration began its healthcare messaging by ‘framing 
[healthcare] as a cost issue’374 and Admiral Mike Mullen said that the federal deficit was the greatest 
threat to American national security in the world.
375
 Mullen’s exact remarks, made to a meeting of 
Business Executives for National Security, were that, ‘I’ve said many times that I believe the single, 
biggest threat to our national security is our debt, so I also believe we have every responsibility to 
help eliminate that threat.’ This view was shared by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as well as 
the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haas, who said ‘we've reached a point now 
where there's an intimate link between our solvency and our national security. What's so discouraging 
is that our domestic politics don't seem to be up to the challenge. And the whole world is watching.’376 
Healthcare was a titanic cost issues, and that cost was driving up America’s national debt which in 
turn affected the national security of the United States. Nonetheless, to break-down how polarization 
affects the policy-making process we must reduce it to manageable, meaningful blocks of policy. My 
method in this chapter is to look at some of the key votes within the three issues identified, and then 
single-out noteworthy, individual legislators as case studies to show how the standard polarization 
model works; and how it breaks down on modern national security matters. This will tie in the themes 
and groups I have discussed throughout my research with practical examples of how low I-Scores 
have contributed to the high levels of polarization in recent years; and equally, how those remaining 
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374
 Jonathan Alter, The Promise: President Obama, Year One, (London, 2010), p.33.  
375
 Remarks by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen, Department of Defense Press Release ‘Debt 
is Biggest Threat to National Security, Chairman Says’ (22nd September, 2011) taken from 
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77% 
23% 
Democrats
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Figure 4.1- % Breakdown of House ‘Yes’ votes 
on Social Security Amendment Act of 1965. 
100% 
0% 
Democrats
Republicans
Figure 4.2- % Breakdown of House ‘Yes’ 
votes on Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, 2010. 
legislators with high I-Scores offer the most hope for bipartisan negotiation on the sizeable issues 
facing the American government at present. 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010. 
 Given that American healthcare policy is an extraordinarily convoluted subject-area I do not 
attempt to engage in the details of the actual policy itself; this study’s focus is on how the Affordable 
Care Act was passed and what the Act’s passage can tell us about polarization. I will discuss this 
through the prism of I-Scores, which offer a handy breakdown of the votes needed to secure passage. 
To show how bipartisan law-making efforts have declined over time I will begin by comparing the 
Affordable Care Act with another (similar) piece of liberal legislation, the Social Security 
Amendment Act of 1965 which created Medicare and Medicaid. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 compare the final 
House votes on passage of these two bills, two of the most significant health reforms in American 
history. The 1965 bill came out of a long tradition of Democratic Party reform (from Roosevelt’s 
‘New Deal’ to Johnson’s ‘Great Society’, but even so 23% of its supporters in the House were 
Republicans. Many of these supporters were Northern Republicans, whose high I-Scores historically 
exerted a great influence on the aggregate Republican I-Score (as shown in Chapter Three). This 
significant GOP force leant some significant Republican support for the passage of several moderate 
(or even liberal-left) pieces of legislation, and even voted against their own party to stop cuts aimed at 
liberal programs.
377
 But, by 2010, we can see the practical impact of this I-Score-moderating, 
Northern cluster being lost (or significantly degraded). Not a single House Republican voted for the 
Affordable Care Act which they and their base derided as ‘Obamacare’. The Act was ultimately 
passed in both chambers on almost pure party lines. In the House the vote came down to a slim 219- 
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212 vote in favour. Every ‘yes’ vote was from a Democrat, 178 of the ‘No’ votes were Republican 
and they were joined in their opposition by 34 Democrats. In the Senate, after a tumultuous congress 
in which the Democrats struggled to maintain their control over the 60
th
 vote following the death of 
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), the vote was entirely on party lines with no defections. It is ironic that 
the Senate, designed to be the more deliberative and bipartisan body,
378
 voted on party lines whilst the 
House did not entirely do so. Clearly the ‘electoral costs’379 of support for many of the remaining 
Southern and/or conservative Democrats were such that their support for the Affordable Care Act was 
impossible to give. Such is the polarization of modern Congress that since passage of the Affordable 
Care Act the House Republicans have voted 54 times to repeal (as of 21
st
 March 2014).
380
 The 
Affordable Care Act (and the struggle to pass it) is indicative of the wider political climate of high 
party unity that prevails. Given that the 111
th
 House had an overall I-Score of just 5.867% and that the 
two party’s leaderships were completely at-odds on this bill, it is not surprising that they had their 
way and steered both of their caucus to near-homogenous votes. In parliamentary-style, the two 
parties voted in an extremely conformist way as is increasingly common. Figure 4.3
381
 shows the 
number of votes ‘on which a majority of voting Democrats opposed a majority of voting Republicans’ 
as a score of how many ‘party unity’ votes took place in each Congress.382 As the graph shows there 
has been a steady increase since the 1950s with significant spikes in the past ten years. The 
Affordable Care Act is a good practical example of how declining I-Scores lead to polarization, but as 
I will show, it also reveals the influence still wielded by moderates on both sides of the aisles. To 
demonstrate this I will now consider the Senate passage of the Affordable Care Act and several high 
I-Scoring senators.  
The Democratic-controlled Senate saw extraordinary procedural manoeuvres used to secure 
reconciliation between the House and Senate bills- a particularly extreme example of the procedural 
polarization that Theriault identifies.
383
 To ensure a filibuster-proof Super-Majority of 60 the 
Democrats needed the support of both moderate Democrats like Ben Nelson (D-NE) and perhaps even 
the support of moderate Republicans. Both sides (in the Senate) made ultimately failed attempts at 
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Figure 4.3- Number of Party Unity Votes, House and Senate. 
House 
Senate 
courting moderate votes. In the end this process led to a pure party line vote on final passage (if we 
class Lieberman (I-CT) and Sanders (I-VT) as Democrats, given that they caucused with them during 
the 111
th
 Congress and exclude Olympia Snowe’s (R-ME) vote to release the bill from committee). 
The final vote was won for the White House by Senator Reid and the Democratic leadership 
successfully courting moderate Democratic votes like Ben Nelson (D-NE) after the failure of the 
Democrats’ negotiations with (relatively) centrist Republicans. Who were the moderate votes on both 
sides that both Republican and Democratic leadership sought? I identify four potential moderate 
votes, all of whom have high the I-Scores we would expect of moderate centrists. These four are Joe 
Lieberman (I-CT), Arlen Specter (R then D-PA), the aforementioned Olympia Snowe of Maine (R-
ME) and Ben Nelson (D-NE), the conservative Democrat from Nebraska. I will consider these crucial 
senators now. To put these essential moderates in perspective I have ranked all Senators in the 111
th
 
congress by I-Score and Party. Figure 4.4 plots all I-Scores in the 111
th
 Senate by party, with higher I-
Scores towards the middle. Republicans are more independent in their voting throughout the 111
th
 
Senate and from this the White House had a reasonable chance of peeling away some moderate 
Republican votes. However, for every moderate Republican vote secured liberal votes on the left were 
jeopardised. This meant that the Democratic Party, with an average I-Score of just 6.231% in the 111
th
 
Senate, was put in the position of splitting the party by reaching out across the aisle, or relying on 
securing a 60
th
 vote (and/or procedural tactics) to pass a more liberal bill than any hypothetical health 
reform which could carry 
Republican support as 
well. The initial strategy 
was to reach out to 
moderate Democrats and 
Republicans.  
The first of the 
moderate voters I consider 
here is Arlen Specter (R-
NE), who  held a 
remarkable I-Score of 
68% as a Republican 
(signalling his inevitable defection to the Democratic Party), and an I-Score of 29% as a Democrat 
once he had finally defected. Senator Specter is a good example of elite level sorting as he had clearly 
become distant from the average Republican ideological point, and his I-Score reflects this. The only 
other Republican, and indeed the only Republican prospect after Nelson swapped his party allegiance, 
was Senator Snowe (R-ME). Olympia Snowe voted against the party leadership in 31 percent of votes  
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Figure 4.4- 111
th
 Senate, All I-Scores. 
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in the 111
th
 Senate as she came towards the end of a long career as a moderate centrist (see Chapter 
Two for a case study in her I-Score profile). Snowe was considered as a potential ‘yes’ vote for longer 
than any other Republican, as she had voted to release the Affordable Care Act from the Finance 
Committee, though as she noted at the time this did not mean she would vote for the final bill. Snowe 
was the third most moderate Republican of the 111
th
 Senate, after Specter and fellow Maine Senator 
Susan Collins R-ME).
384
 
On the Democratic side Ben Nelson (D-NE), who voted against his party leadership 31% of 
the time, nearly ‘doomed’385 the healthcare bill before announcing his retirement and ‘speaking out 
more favourably.’386 In this case, once the ‘electoral costs’ were removed Nelson clearly felt more 
able to cast a more ideologically liberal vote than he would otherwise of done had he to confront 
Nebraska voters with his decision. Nelson secured concessions on abortion
387
 and negotiated the 
infamous ‘Cornhusker Kickback’ in pork-barrel Medicaid funding for Nebraska. Lieberman was also 
considered crucial to the Democratic effort after early signs of dissent, but as Figure 4.4 shows he was 
well within the Democratic fold in terms of party unity, and despite his Independent status he is only 
the 9
th
 most independent minded senator in the Democratic Caucus.
388
 Lieberman had initially 
declared his opposition to a ‘government-created insurance company’389 and put the coveted 60th 
Democratic vote at risk by announcing that he would support the Republican filibuster.
390
 
Nonetheless, he eventually reversed course and voted in favour, reporting in 2013 that he ‘stands by’ 
his vote for Obamacare.
391
 The fact that these four Senators were the crucial votes validates the I-
Score methodology, these four senators account for four of the five highest I-Scores in the 111
th
 
Senate. To develop this methodology in future studies and to add a predictive capacity to the scoring 
system, legislators could be scored on party disunity along issue-based lines. So, every legislator 
would be given an I-Score derived from their votes on key issues. For example, there could be an 
‘economic I-Score’, a ‘national security I-Score’ a ‘gay rights/social issues I-Score’. Whilst this paper 
seeks to advance understanding of polarization through the study of party disunity and independent-
voting, this could be expanded by designing thematic scores of party unity in future research. Then 
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factions within the two parties could be better identified. As I argue, ideological variety and high I-
Scores are crucial to un-doing polarization in a two-party system and the refinement of the 
methodology in this way would be the logical next step in the study of I-Scores, party variety and 
polarization. In this case we could, for instance, score Susan Collins on how often she votes against 
her party in general (her standard I-Score) before then tallying up in what percentage of the time she 
votes with her party on matters of healthcare. We might find that on healthcare votes Senator Collins 
is actually quite conformist to the Republican Party line whilst on other issues she is not. This would 
add another dimension to the analysis set out here. Whilst I-Scores are clearly very good predictors 
(four out of five senators in this vote) scoring on ideological themes/issues would be a sound next 
step.  
Returning to the Affordable Care Act, this cluster of four moderate votes was urgently sought 
by both sides, but in an eventual capitulation to powerful party leadership they all voted on party 
lines. Whilst they had large potential power, in the final vote their “modifier” on the vote was nil. 
Another expansion of the analysis, prevented by the limited space available here, would be to consider 
the “modifier” effect of the groups reviewed in Chapter Two (for instance the Blue Dog Caucus, the 
Tea Party, Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats) on specific issues and votes. This would 
allow a cross-comparison of where each group, faction or caucus has the most impact. Perhaps whilst 
the Tea Party, for instance, has a large economic modifier on net Republican party unity (on matters 
like tax and deficit reduction) it has little or no impact on other issues. This could explain its low total 
modifier, as it has large impact on some issues which is negated by its limited impact on others. In the 
case of the Affordable Care Act, why did the four moderates all side with their party in the final vote? 
A number of factors can be identified beyond the general climate of declining I-Scores and tighter 
party unity I explore throughout this paper. Two distinct incentives are identified in the literature as 
exerting pull on party unity behaviour. Firstly, we must recognise a legislator’s reliance on incentives 
from leadership to fund their campaigns.
392
 Where leadership incentives (such as pork-barrel 
spending) exceed electoral costs, legislators will support party leadership and thus decrease net I-
Scores. Additional fundraising incentives exist for legislators of the Majority party, thus vesting the 
legislator with another financial incentive for party cohesion and “cartel” behaviour.393 The more 
united the party, the more likely it is to succeed in its agenda and retain majority control; thus netting 
these additional campaign funds. Theoretically phrased, leadership, cartel and campaign finance 
incentives all exceeded potential electoral costs for these four senators. Other factors also exist of 
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course; Gerber, Huber, Doherty and Dowling raise ‘differences in policy confidence’ as one 
explanation for a legislator’s willingness to ‘adopt incongruent policy positions’.394 Unfortunately for 
Senator Specter he had miscalculated, and lost his seat, whilst the other three (Snowe, Lieberman and 
Nelson) all retired; thus negating electoral costs as a downside for their support. Without these costs 
Snowe and Nelson, who both represented states that typically vote for their opposition party in 
presidential elections, had no prospect of electoral reprisal from their constituents and were thus free 
to vote along the party line that would otherwise have jeopardised their prospects for re-election. 
Despite some prospects for high profile defections on this vote, there were none (save Specter’s 
switch in party allegiance- hardly surprising given his rather extreme disunity from the rest of the 
Republicans in the Senate). Figure 33 shows the I-Scores of the four most independent Senators in the 
111
th
 Senate (with Specter as a Democrat)
395
 plus Lieberman who was the other swing-vote and slight 
outlier, given his relative conformity, and compares these five scores to the averages of the two 
parties. Collins, despite having the highest (and therefore most promising I-Score) was only seen as 
potential vote if the White House and Democratic Leadership could secure Olympia Snowe. In 
conversation with then Congressman Weiner (D-NY), President Obama argued that securing Snowe’s 
vote ‘gets me [both] Snowe and Collins’. Jonathan Alter claims that ‘the president thought the 
moderate Republicans would also give him cover to nail down moderate Democrats like Ben Nelson, 
Mary Landrieu, and Blanche Lincoln’396 (all of whom did ultimately vote for passage, despite no 
moderate Republicans doing so). Nelson, Landrieu and Lincoln had I-Scores of 31, 7 and 16 percent 
respectively. It may well be the case that they were all likely to vote for the bill from the outset, but 
could use their status as crucial swing-votes to secure important concessions. Collins was ultimately 
not a key factor in the ACA vote negotiations after Snowe withheld her support, the two Senators are 
known to vote together very frequently.
397
 As posited above I would suggest a further development of 
this methodology breaking down I-Scores into thematic scores, so that legislators can be scored on 
their party unity along key votes. This could answer the question over whether the moderate 
Democrats were all secure votes or not (pending concessions) by comparing their economic/deficit 
hawk I-Scores with their healthcare I-Scores.  
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Given the large gulf between the averages of the Democratic swing votes (principally Nelson 
and Lieberman), and the average I-Score of the entire Democratic Senate Caucus, we can see just how 
hard it was for the Democratic Leadership to corral enough moderates to vote for passage without 
losing their left flank. In the end, as is the trend over the past decade, party unity won out after the 
moderates extracted concessions to limit the electoral costs of their support. Despite high levels of 
Republican disunity
398
 the Republican leadership prevented any Republican support for Obamacare in 
the Senate, despite the two blips of Arlen Specter’s defection (thus making his vote on Democratic 
lines a Democratic party unity vote rather than a vote against Republican party leadership) and 
Olympia Snowe’s support for the bill in committee (though not, ultimately, for passage).  
Republican anger at Obamacare helped fuel the Tea Party,
399
 despite similar legislation being 
enacted by Republican Governor Mitt Romney, and Republicans like Richard Nixon and Nelson 
Rockefeller proposing similar (or even more liberal programmes)
400
 in the past. Though we know that 
the Tea Party had a limited (even negligible) modifier effect on the Republican Party I-Score from 
comparison of the 111
th
 to 112
th
 congresses, my dataset ends before we can consider their longer term 
impact. An issue-by-issue I-Score would be the next step in identifying which areas they had the most 
impact, we may find interesting results were we to consider a ‘Tea Party healthcare I-Score’ derived 
from all Tea Party Caucus votes on healthcare. Would they move the whole GOP right and increase 
party unity in frequent repeal votes, before eventually exhibiting higher I-Scores in this behaviour as 
more mainstream Republicans moved away from efforts to repeal ‘Obamacare’? Would the 
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correlation between high party unity and ideological polarization still hold under these conditions? 
Further use and refinement of the I-Score would be an excellent way of testing this. DW-NOMINATE 
is an excellent measure of polarization, but in this instance I-Scores sorted by theme or issue could 
offer a supplementary analysis of how and where the Tea Party influence party disunity. Presently, the 
I-Score methodology I use here demonstrates how, despite the swing-votes holding relatively 
moderate DW-NOMINATE scores, party unity (through incentives from party leadership to reduce 
electoral costs) trumped independent voting- even among this group of moderates. This fits the pattern 
of polarization described in the literature, and the I-Score decline found in this paper. In the 
Affordable Care Act vote we see the real-world effect of this; not a single Senator felt able to defy 
their party whip. Despite relatively high I-Scores, every swing-vote returned to the party fold. 
Nonetheless, I-Score to identify potential votes; this may be another example of their forecasting 
potential. 
Whilst DW-NOMINATE is peerless when considering polarization through the prism of 
ideological distance between parties, I-Scores contribute to the debate by showing how the collapse of 
specific moderate groups and the rise of party unity drive polarization. By concentrating on 
ideological distance alone this might be overlooked; I-Scores also points to areas where polarization 
might be broken down (by a resurgence of Blue Dog Democrats, for instance). A caucus and/or 
thematic I-Score would allow much deeper analysis than the overview and demonstration permitted 
by the length of this paper. 
 
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, 2009.  
The atmosphere in Washington in the weeks prior to Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009 
was dominated by the uncertainty of the on-going financial crisis. The Obama administration’s early 
focus was on passing a massive stimulus bill ‘in the range of $800 billion to $1.2 trillion’401 in order 
to kick-start the economy. It is this stimulus package that I consider here, which ultimately became 
known as the ‘American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (of 2009)’. I will look at both House and 
Senate passage of this bill. Some early motions were made towards the idea of bipartisan cooperation, 
but as the febrile post-election environment settled into more familiar Washington routines the two 
parties fell into an aggressively partisan tug-of-war over the bill with the predictable low I-Score 
features. As with Obamacare this was a ‘normal’ vote by modern standards; that is to say it fell on 
almost perfect party lines in both chambers. What can I-Scores reveal about this vote? I will use I-
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Score analysis of dissenting votes (legislators who voted against their party line either for or against) 
to show how the groups identified in the preceding chapter attempt to exert influence over their 
otherwise conformist parties. I begin with the House of Representatives, where the stimulus package 
was known as HR 1.  
The final vote tally in the House was 244 ‘yes’ (all Democrats) and 188 ‘no’ (11 Democrats 
and 177 Republicans). The only defections in this vote were the 11 Democratic ‘no’ votes, which are 
my focus here. All but one of the defectors was a member of the Blue Dog Coalition, the outlier being 
Paul Kanjorski (D-PA). Kanjorski is a strange case in this vote; over the 111
th
 congress his I-Score 
was only 3%, and he was not a Blue Dog. His defection on this issue is something of an anomaly. The 
other member of note is Parker Griffith (D-AL) who later defected to the Republicans shortly after the 
ARRA passed, due in part to his opposition to the later Affordable Care Act. Griffith’s I-Score of 
26%, the third-highest in this group, is a good indicator of poor party sorting on his part (and of some 
relatively rare Democratic Party ideological variety, at least before his defection). The score shows 
that Griffith was increasingly at-odds with the majority of the Democratic Party. Whilst DW-
NOMINATE would show his ideological differences with the party, by scoring his independence 
from the leadership we can see how that centrist (or even conservative) voting record actually 
manifests itself in percentage of roll call votes against his party. His transfer to the more ideologically 
appropriate Republican Party is an example of elite-level sorting, as ideologically misfit holdovers 
from the more heterogeneous parties of the past move to the more philosophically ‘correct’402 party.  
Of course there are many such moderates who are not poorly sorted but simply don’t fit into either 
party, given their ideological extremity. The two legislators in this group who were more independent 
than Griffith are southerners Bobby Bright (D-AL) and Walt Minnick (D-ID), both of whom remained 
with the Democratic Party in spite of their incongruent voting record. For the ARRA vote however, 
Griffith too was still a Democrat.  
Not every Blue Dog voted against the ARRA but a significant portion of their (dwindling) 
caucus did. Though they didn’t affect the final passage of the bill it is, for our purposes, a good 
example of a moderate group caught in the middle between the two parties without a well matched 
ideological home. As is consistently the case with other such groups (like liberal Republicans) the 
Blue Dogs do not have the “gravitational pull” (what I call a ‘modifier’) to actually do very much in 
moderating their party caucus/conference. As was the case in this vote, the Blue Dogs did not alter the 
outcome. Without the numbers to move the bill to the centre the Blue Dogs move to outright 
opposition. From the perspective of the party leadership, given a significant enough majority (like that 
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in the 111
th
 House) it makes far more sense to rely on secure, numerous ideological votes on the left, 
rather than making large sacrifices to win a smattering of votes in the centre. This is why 
understanding party disunity through the I-Score method is important to understanding polarization as 
a whole. I-Score analysis shows how the collapse of specific factions has intensified party unity, 
leading to the highly polarized DW-NOMINATE party mean scores recorded over recent years. Of 
course these factions are identified in the literature, but this methodology emphasises them in a way 
that party unity scores don’t.403 In the Democratic Party there were 185 congressmen with an I-Score 
of 3% of less. This extraordinary figure demonstrates how the very low numbers of fiscal 
conservatives in the small Blue Dog Caucus can exert any influence at all. Of course a parallel 
argument could be made for the GOP as well. The fact that only eleven Democratic votes (and zero 
Republican votes) could be prized away from their leadership is another indictment of high party 
unity, and the failure of the Blue Dogs to sink or modify the bill is another demonstration of 
moderates losing influence. The eleven Democratic dissenters represent just 2.5% of the total votes on 
this bill. As gerrymandering crafts liberal and conservative-only districts, moderates will continue to 
dwindle as redistricting erodes their support and opens them up to the threat of primary challenges.
404
 
 
Figure 4.6 plots all Democratic ‘no’ votes, along with the average Democratic (House) scores 
for the 111
th
 congress, the average Southern Democrat score and an average of all Democratic ‘no’ 
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votes. The only real anomaly is the aforementioned Kanjorski, who is less independent than the 
average Democrat, less independent than the average southern Democrat and far less independent that 
the average of ‘no’ votes on this bill. Allen Boyd, the next lowest I-Score for any no-vote is slightly 
more independent than the average Democrat, but only barely. Figure 4.6 shows the large gulf 
between the Blue Dog ‘no’ votes and the average of the Democratic Party.  
 In the Senate we have an inverse of what happened in the House. The final vote was 61 ‘yes’ 
and ‘37’ no. Every ‘no’ vote was Republican, whilst the yes vote was comprised of 56 Democrats, 
three Republicans and two independents. The two independents were Joe Lieberman (I-CT) and 
Bernard Sanders (I-VT). The three Republican defectors were Susan Collins (R-ME), Olympia Snowe 
(R-ME) and Arlen Specter (R-PA). All three names are familiar by this point. It is surprising, 
however, that unlike in the House not a single Democrat voted ‘no’. I would anticipate the Senate 
being less partisan than the Senate
405
 and the I-Scores show that the Senate generally exhibits higher 
I-Scores than the House, however on this vote that was not the case. It is also surprising that 
Democrats from the South, with relatively high I-Scores, also stayed the course along the party line. 
For instance, both Mary Landrieu (D-LA) and Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), with I-Scores of 7% and 16% 
respectively, both higher than the Southern Democratic House average of 6%, both voted along party 
lines. Other evidence exists to suggest that House polarization is filtering into the Senate
406
 (for 
instance through ex-House members winning Senate seats),
407
 and my I-Score analysis also suggests 
this given steadily falling I-Scores in both chambers.  
One of the most important political effects of the stimulus was the rise of the Tea Party.
408
 
The size of the stimulus package fed the discontent which culminated in the Tea Party protest 
movement, who saw the unprecedented $1.2 trillion act as the most egregious example of 
Congressional pork-barrel spending in history.
409
 Phillip Dennis, founder of the Dallas Tea Party and 
adviser to the National Tea Party Coalition wrote for CNN that ‘Tea Party groups viewed the stimulus 
bill as the crowning moment of decades of irresponsible government fiscal behaviour. The federal 
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government is addicted to spending, and the consequences are now staring us in the face.’410 As with 
the Affordable Care Act, an I-Score breakdown by issue would show us where Tea Party Republicans 
in successive congresses (after the end of my dataset) influenced policy most. Did they raise I-Scores 
by increasing ideology (rather than the conventional pattern seen since 1991 here, where high I-Scores 
indicate moderation) or did they increase DW-NOMINATE scores and lower I-Scores, by moving the 
centre of mass in the Republican Conference to their agenda? This is another example of what is 
being missed about the process of polarization by simply concentrating on aggregate party ideology 
scores. Party disunity is a crucial measure of polarization but it also shows the most and least 
conformist blocks, indicating exactly which sections of a party are driving polarization. This has 
produced surprising results. A thematic I-Score would allow an even more precise identification of 
where this is taking place.  
As for some context to the passage of the ARRA, let us consider briefly the role of the White 
House. During the preliminary conversations between the then-President-elect and Congressional 
leadership, the incoming President made a number of rhetorical overtures to the Republican 
leadership. Two-weeks before his inauguration during a meeting with the President-elect, Vice 
President-elect Biden and senior Democratic and Republican congressional leadership figures, Obama 
made his opening moves to elicit the support of Republicans for his economic recovery agenda. 
Speaking of the need to ‘’build in medium and long term fiscal discipline’’ to tame the growing 
federal deficit’411 the President-elect asked for ‘everyone’s ideas’, going on to state that ‘if it works, 
we don’t care whose idea it is.’412 These are clear appeals to Republican priorities like fiscal restraint, 
which shortly went on to become a key Tea Party mantra. Whilst paying lip-service to bipartisanism, 
Obama’s brief Senate record speaks for itself. In the 109th Senate he had an I-Score of 5%; in the 110th 
he had an I-Score of 4%. This was six points below the average (11.174%) Democratic I-Score in the 
109
th
 Senate, and three points below the significantly reduced Democratic Senate I-Score of 7.059% 
in the 110
th
 Senate. This makes Obama the third least independent Senator of the 109
th
 Senate, and the 
ninth least independent Senator of the 110
th
 Senate. As he served for such a brief time in the Senate a 
pattern is hard to discern, but from the two Senates he did serve in, Senator Obama was amongst the 
most ideological Democratic Senators. As for the Vice President, Joe Biden had an extensive Senate 
career, but by the 110
th
 Senate (directly before assuming office as Vice President) he had an I-Score 
of just 3% (ranking him third worst in terms of high party unity). Whilst DW-NOMINATE plots 
legislator ideology, a distinct measure of how often congressmen and senators vote against their party 
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line offers unique insights into how bipartisan they are actually likely to be. The I-Score, being firmly 
grounded in (and derived from) real-world roll call voting data contributes to the field here by 
measuring past behaviour and a legislator’s propensity to break ranks with their party, as we have 
seen throughout, this has been a reliable indicator of future behaviour. At the party-level, rather than 
just measuring polarization with average DW-NOMINATE scores of each party on one dimension, I-
Scores blend elements of party unity scores with measures of ideology, to score legislators on what 
essentially amounts to how likely they are to be bipartisan.  
Obama’s own position on deficit reduction and the economy generally was initially quite 
mixed. Viewed with hindsight, from an I-Score perspective and given that the deficit and the national 
debt both surged under the Obama administration (as they had under Bush), Obama’s private claim in 
the negotiations about ‘fiscal discipline’ was ultimately rather reminiscent of Pelosi’s similar promise 
in 2007 of ‘no new deficit spending;’413 under her tenure and the least years of the Bush presidency, 
the US national debt increased by almost $5 trillion.
414
 The major priorities of the early Obama 
Administration from 2009 onwards (namely the ARRA stimulus and the Affordable Care Act), show 
that the Democratic leadership (in the White House and Congress) clearly put economic growth 
through stimulus above deficit reduction, and subscribed to the view that a large stimulus package 
would “kick-start” the economy (as President Bush also argued).415 Indeed in 2013 President Obama 
remarked in an interview with ABC News that the country did not have a ‘debt’416 problem. As for 
Obama’s personal ideology, he described himself as a ‘Blue Dog’ Democrat in private417  (despite 
never caucusing with them) but this seems completely at odds with his Administration’s economic 
policy. One of the first major economic decisions of Obama’s presidency was a $1.2 trillion stimulus; 
hardly the actions of a fiscally conservative Democrat. Obama’s I-Scores over the two-senate period 
he served point to a consistently low record of independent-voting, and given the correlation between 
high party unity and high ideology found by Clinton et al
418
 and cited at the start of this paper, 
Obama’s efforts to reach out to Republicans before taking office (whether genuine or not) were never 
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likely to involve serious compromise on the contents of the bill by the Democrats; as evidenced by the 
opposition of key Blue Dog Democrats and the overwhelming support of liberal, mainstream 
Democrats. Unfortunately the ARRA is evidence of further decline of the Blue Dog Caucus, and a 
reaffirmation of the fact that there are no ‘liberal’ Republicans left in Congress. Some centrists 
remain, but both parties are increasingly well sorted leaving little place for these un-adjusted 
moderates. On the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, high party unity ensured a near-total 
grip by party leadership over intra-party splits.  
 
National Security. 
In the two preceding sections I have presented two fairly straightforward examples of party 
unity votes. Now I turn to an area of debate where traditional party labels are increasingly unhelpful. 
In recent years, national security and the powers of the government to tap without warrant and detain 
American citizens (or even to target them for death abroad), have divided opinion. Crucially however, 
they have divided them across party lines. Strange coalitions, not unlike the bipartisan moments of the 
1950s or 60s, have formed to advance or repel government power in the realm of national security. 
These divisions have split the Republican Party along a libertarian-authoritarian axis, with Tea Party 
favourites like Rand Paul (R-KY) and Justin Amash (R-MI) leading the charge against neo-
conservative hawks like John McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC). On the Democratic side 
of the aisle leadership and inside figures like Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) now 
support policies not unlike those which led to Democratic calls for impeachment when they were 
advocated by President Bush.
419
 On the far left, Democratic-caucusing Independent Bernie Sanders (I-
VT) contests the national security agenda of his caucus leadership along with fellow Democrats like 
John Conyers (D-MI). This raises an interesting anomaly and is completely at odds with the picture of 
polarization found in the academic literature. There is still huge ideological polarization, but it is not 
partisan or party-based. Intra-party splits now come to the fore, validating I-Scores and an emphasis 
on party disunity and ideological heterogeneity.   
Although beyond the dataset of this study, the Amash-Conyers amendment of the 113
th
 
Congress is a peerless example of this anomaly. I consider this amendment principally because it is 
such a good example of intra-party ideological variety, and I use it to demonstrate the merit and 
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advantages of the I-Score methodology, and to put forward a potential advancement of the I-Score 
methodology. Rather than breaking down I-Scores and analysing them as I have in the previous two 
case studies, I instead use the amendment vote to show how I-Scores inform our understanding of 
polarization, and to offer a refinement of the measure for future study (the aforementioned issue-by-
issue I-Score, which is not possible in a thesis of this length which also covers such a large period of 
time). The amendment, aimed at blocking warrantless NSA surveillance, was heavily attacked by the 
White House who argued that, ‘the blunt approach [of the Amendment] is not the product of an 
informed or deliberative process’ and stating that ‘[the White House] oppose[s] the current effort in 
the House to hastily dismantle one of our Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism tools.’420 The 
White House urged the House to reject the Amendment. What followed was a baffling display of 
bipartisanism, and a complete breakdown of the party unity model we have come to expect.  
Whereas Wildavsky found that ‘presidents have had much greater success in controlling the 
nation’s defense and foreign policies than in dominating its domestic policies,’421 Fleisher and Bond 
argued in 1988 that presidential ascendancy in foreign and defense policy existed ‘only for 
Republicans’.422 Shortly before the War on Terror, Fleisher, Bond, Krutz and Hanna concluded that 
‘foreign policy voting has become considerably more partisan’.423 Whilst 9/11 saw dramatic displays 
of presidential power
424
 over congress along the lines of the ‘two presidencies’ thesis, this subsided in 
the near decade and a half since, and what we find now is not just a partisan divide over foreign policy 
and national security, but very entrenched intra-party divides. This has made the foreign and defense 
policy arena in Congress a far more convoluted space than that described half a century ago by 
Wildavsky; this is epitomised in the Amash-Conyers amendment vote. This is where I-Scores can be 
of immense use in tracing these fractures; I also suggest enhancements on my current methodology 
which would make I-Scores an even more useful tool for political scientists, in addition to established 
methodologies.  
When the House finally voted on the Amash-Conyers Amendment (HR 2397) it saw Michelle 
Bachmann (R-MN), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Paul Ryan (R-WI), Debbie Wasserman-Schultz (D-FL), 
John Boehner (R-OH) and Steny Hoyer (D-MA) all vote together on the same side, to continue the 
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NSA surveillance program. This was an extraordinary display of bipartisanism and was attacked 
vociferously by those campaigning against warrantless surveillance. As Glenn Greenwald, who first 
reported the Snowden leaks, argues, ‘when it comes to foreign policy, war, assassinations, drones, 
surveillance, secrecy, and civil liberties, President Obama’s most stalwart, enthusiastic defenders are 
often found among the most radical precinct of the Republican Party’.425 This is not an accurate 
rendering of how Obama’s foreign policy is received by Republicans as the ‘two presidencies’ theory 
of Wildavksy breaks down under polarization,
426
 but on the issue of civil liberties Greenwald does 
have something of a point, as the roll call vote shows. On the final HR 2397 vote, the 205 ‘yes’ votes 
consisted of 111 Democrats and 94 Republicans; whilst the 217 ‘no’ votes contained 83 Democrats 
and 134 Republicans.
427
 The number of Democratic ‘yes’ votes represent an extraordinary display of 
independent voting; more Democrats defied their party leadership than voted for it. 57% of Democrats 
votes against their party; and so in the parlance of I-Scores we would say the Democratic Caucus as a 
whole had an I-Score of 57% on this issue, for this vote. Considering that the actual Democratic I-
Score average across all votes in the immediately preceding 112
th
 Congress was only 9.84%, this 
figure of 57% is astounding. As for the ‘no’ votes, more Republicans voted to support President 
Obama’s position than voted against. The Republicans had an I-Score, on this vote, of 41%; again an 
extraordinary figure. This was a remarkable vote in which a liberal Democratic President relied 
completely on right-wing Republican votes to defeat his own party on a crucial national security vote. 
In the unlikely event that this was repeated on other issues, it would ameliorate the concern spelled 
out by Parker and Dull that ‘divided government generates more and more-intensive congressional 
investigations’ but that this oversight is ‘contingent on partisan... factors’. 428  In other words, 
polarization would make legislative oversight of the executive explicitly partisan in nature. The vote 
on the Amash-Conyers Amendment, despite the Amendment’s defeat, is a reassuring example of 
bipartisan willingness to hold the executive branch to account. Though, as I state in the beginning of 
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this section, in the present climate this vote was exceptional. There are few other signs that the 
legislature’s oversight role is being conducted in a bipartisan way.429  
This vote marks a milestone for the issue of privacy in American political debate. 
Hetherington points to ‘salience’430 of an issue to question whether the American public can really be 
divided over something that they don’t particularly care about.431 Others have also made this point.432 
Surveillance was typically far less salient than national security. However a Pew Polling Report in 
2013, released two days after the Amash-Conyer vote, found that for the first time in ‘Pew Research 
polling… more [respondents] have expressed concern over civil liberties than protection from 
terrorism since the question was first asked in 2004’.433 This meant that for many legislators the issue 
was (if not already) important for them too and not what Chris Christie called, an ‘esoteric, 
intellectual debate’.434 The increasing salience of civil liberties and the public split over security on 
the one hand and civil liberties on the other may have interesting consequences for polarization. The 
bipartisan nature of the ideological divide over warrantless surveillance is such that two coalitions 
have formed; one broadly authoritarian on surveillance, and one broadly libertarian on surveillance. 
Indeed this topic has received attention in the literature already, ‘Hetherington and Weiler suggest that 
the parties are also sorting on another… dimension, namely authoritarianism’.435 Given the increasing 
salience of these issues and the (currently informal) formation of two rival blocs on this debate, votes 
like the Amash-Conyers amendment roll call will likely become increasingly common as the two 
coalitions grapple for control over policy. The experience of bipartisan cooperation may bleed across 
into other themes and issue clusters, and as legislators gain their first experience of cooperating with 
the other party the practices of a functioning, bipartisan congress may once again become normalised. 
There is no way to be sure, however and only time will tell. Another structural shift has muddied the 
waters somewhat, further clouding the otherwise clear-cut picture of elite-level polarization found by 
this thesis, and throughout the literature. The loss of Republican ‘ownership’ of national security is 
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also at play. Identified by Goble and Holm
436
 in the mid-2000s, a new Democratic Party ascendancy 
on national security issues is something the party leadership are clearly keen to cultivate and retain 
where possible; the distribution of votes on the Amash-Conyers roll call is telling, the size of the 
Republican defection points to the emergence of civil liberties as an equally (or even more) salient 
issue in their conference than national security is. This may further endanger the “traditional” 
Republican lead on matters of national security. As shown, both parties harbour deep divisions over 
this. The national security v. civil liberties debate is a rare example of very poor party sorting
437
 in the 
modern era. 
What can I-Scores tell us about this non-partisan, but deeply ideological schism? At the 
moment we know that party leadership on both sides is currently defending the established practices 
of the National Security Agency to conduct “bulk” spying. Significant blocks of Democratic and 
Republican votes are defying their leadership on these issues. This may encourage further defections 
on other issues as legislators become used to breaking with the party line (establishing new norms, or 
returning to old ones); I-Scores will be effective at measuring these defections when they occur, and a 
larger, subsequent study can break-down the analysis thematically to see where and why defections 
are occurring and on what issues. This will begin to establish whether revolts on civil liberties are 
bleeding across into related areas like the limits of presidential power, broader American foreign 
policy and interrelated Fourth Amendment debates. This is not standard polarization because the gulf 
is philosophical, not partisan. This limits the applicability of DW-NOMINATE series single-
dimension party mean points because measures of aggregate ideological distance between members or 
parties will not tell us where defections are likely to occur.
438
 As we have seen, very liberal Democrats 
are allying with very libertarian (and conservative) Republicans. As civil liberties become more 
salient to voters and thus to legislators, the I-Score will be crucial in picking out clusters, caucuses, 
groups, regions and states where civil liberty defectors can out-vote national security conformists. A 
low national security I-Score will be a better indicator of voting behaviour on issues of civil liberties 
than a legislator’s position in a DW-NOMINATE series left-right distribution because the I-Score is 
derived from past propensity to rebel, and is thus a reliable indicator of future roll call choices. The 
two methodologies complement each-other of course, but in this situation a thematic I-Score will be 
of more use than establishing how liberal or conservative a legislator is; which is often the sole scale 
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used to assess the aggregate difference between the two parties. Equally, traditional party unity scores 
will be of limited use here because, for instance, a hypothetical liberal Democrat who votes with his 
party in 98% of votes may regularly defect on matters of privacy and civil liberties. An aggregate-
legislator-party unity score would not show this, where a thematic I-Score breakdown of a legislators 
voting history would. We miss a part of the polarization puzzle by concentrating on average 
ideological scores (be they of legislators or whole parties). 
Another unique feature of this issue theme is that debate is taking place among those with 
high I-Scores. High I-Scoring Republicans like Rand Paul (R-TX) are on the other side of the debate 
from other high I-Scoring Republicans like John McCain (R-AZ). This is because the debate takes 
place away from the traditional left-right scale. As I-Scores effectively measure legislator distance 
from two poles (the left wing Democratic Party Unity average and the right wing Republican Party 
average), they can perhaps predict engagement in the debate, but not which side a legislator will come 
down on. This is where we have to use qualitative data (as set out in Chapter Two) to place legislators 
in the correct context. It is also an argument for refining the I-Score methodology into a series of 
issue-by-issue scores in subsequent research. 
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Conclusion. 
 
 At the beginning of this paper I note the emphasis on mean party ideology scores 
within the literature. I also note that party unity is considered a precondition of polarization; unless 
parties are homogenous, they cannot be said to be polarized. DW-NOMINATE is peerless for 
establishing these relative party positions and shows convincingly that in broad terms the parties are 
polarized, if only at the elite level (whilst mass polarization is currently disputed by academics). 
Whilst I do not dispute the validity of an approach focusing on mean party scores (and indeed 
partially use mean scores of my own design here), this approach alone does have the unintended effect 
of crowding out the remaining moderates, absorbed as they are by the ideological mass of their party’s 
mean score. This means that a significant piece of the polarization “puzzle” is being neglected by 
focus on majority behaviour. Instead, my focus has been on the few remaining clusters of legislators 
who are not well sorted, and who remain ideologically incongruent with their party. In Chapter Two, 
with reference to the literature and to Poole and Rosenthal’s data, I show that a high I-Score will 
almost always indicate a moderate/centrists voting record and demonstrate (with mean I-Score points) 
that ideological variety still exists, albeit in relatively small pockets. 
The collapse of conservative, southern Democrats and liberal, northern Republicans (for 
example) is a heavily researched area; but less attention is paid in the literature to their current state, 
save to say that they are “extinct” or otherwise negligible. I have devoted significant research (and 
developed a new methodology) to situate these remaining moderates against their party averages and 
provide a detailed analysis of how they vote, and what impact they have on their two parties today. 
Using the I-Score I have quantified their impact on mean party unity, and place it into a historical 
context. I have developed weighted ‘modifiers’ for several significant groups of moderates, and 
suggest areas where future I-Score analysis could be conducted.  
My reasoning for focusing on these outliers is three-fold. Firstly, these groups were once 
historically significant and are now significantly depleted. This makes study of their decline and 
current state not merely interesting but urgent, before expectations of total party unity by party 
leadership and ideological activists make ideological moderation impossible in the two-party system 
and the remaining moderates leave office. The second main reason for focusing on this minority is 
because the pattern of their numerical decline (through comparison of different I-Scores) can tell us a 
lot about how polarization (in the form of high party unity) has come about. In which states, regions 
and caucuses has moderate decline fed ideological extremism most? This brings us onto the third 
justification for a focus on the heterogeneous minority; if I-Scores can identify where moderates once 
existed and where some still remain, might it also point to where they may one day make a resurgence? 
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In Chapter Four I address this point with study of unusual bipartisan-voting on national security and 
civil liberties, which can be visualised with DW-NOMINATE scores but which is well understood in 
terms of actual voting disloyalty to party leadership, which the I-Score is derived from.  
Much of the literature uses only one axis (liberal-conservative) of DW-NOMINATE to show 
that congress is polarized, but several debates now fall down on lines which are not left or right. 
Whilst DW-NOMINATE can demonstrate this on the basis of individual votes to show which 
legislators voted together, it may mean that visualizing polarization with only one dimension and 
party mean points becomes less useful in the future. Polarization is great on civil liberties, but it is not 
partisan between Democrats and Republicans, it cuts across party lines. The I-Score is well suited to 
identifying and analysing independent-minded legislators who defy their respective leadership on 
these issues, but a thematic or issue-by-issue I-Score for each legislator would greatly increase the 
methodologies utility, in concert with DW-NOMINATE.  This refinement of the I-Score methodology 
could advance their use now that this paper has introduced the system and provided a broad overview 
of I-Score behaviour in the last twenty years. Future studies could make use of two-dimensional DW-
NOMINATE vote analysis along with thematic/issue-cluster I-Scores. 
This paper aims to complement DW-NOMINATE and party unity scores, but cautions against 
using DW-NOMINATE in one dimension with party mean scores as a definitive proof that 
polarization exists and is getting worse. This is true on the whole, but I-Scores show that the picture is 
more complex than that and the methodology demonstrates that party variety and ideological 
heterogeneity still exist; a feature of American politics which is not well developed in the literature 
given the understandable focus on the conformist majority. There is a danger of over-emphasis on 
party unity, where in fact party disunity (I-Scores) can tell us a great deal about sorting, realignment 
and where elite-level polarization has come from. As I write above, I-Scores may also offer some 
forecasting potential for showing where moderate legislators may yet be elected in the future if 
current trends are ever to be reversed. 
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